VISIT…

Deleuzian Encounters

Studies in Contemporary Social Issues

Edited by
Anna Hickey-Moody
and Peta Malins

Deleuzian Encounters

Also by Anna Hickey-Moody

MASCULINITY BEYOND THE METROPOLIS (*with Jane Kenway and Anna Kraack*)

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Anna and Peta would like to dedicate this collection to '"the people to come"... mass-people, world-people, brain-people, chaos-people'

Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy, *1994, p. 218*

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Preface

Deleuze always denied that his work amounted to a systematic philosophy. He rather thought of it as a series of encounters, increasingly with the work of novelists, artists, playwrights and filmmakers but also, especially in his early work, with extremely systematic thinkers such as Kant and Spinoza. His sketchy delineation of 'Transcendental Empiricism' in *Difference and Repetition* was perhaps the closest he came to outlining a systematic philosophy. Rather than proceeding to fill in the details of this new approach to metaphysics, however, his subsequent work took a very different turn. His work with Guattari represented an encounter with the theories of Freud and Marx but also with the revolutionary spirit and desire for change that was expressed in the diverse social movements that emerged in France towards the end of the 1960s. He became a passionate participant in a number of these movements, including the 'Prison Information Group' (GIP) started by Foucault, the beginnings of French Gay Liberation, activities in support of migrant workers, the Palestinian Liberation Organization and a variety of individuals pursued by the authorities for assisting such movements.

This commitment to social and political activism does not distinguish Deleuze from many other philosophers with a social conscience, some of whom held quite different conceptions of philosophy. What does distinguish him is the manner in which he took this revolutionary spirit and desire for change to heart in his practice of philosophy. *A Thousand Plateaus* was written with the explicit aim of developing a practice of philosophy that could function creatively in relation to non-academic, practical political, aesthetic and other activities. The goal was to create philosophical concepts that could be of use to non-philosophical ways of thinking and to write in a way that calls for connection with forces outside the text. In their last book, *What is Philosophy?*, Deleuze and Guattari formalized this political conception of philosophy as the invention of concepts that called for new kinds of society and new people. This extraordinary philosophical experiment was not without risks, the same as those assumed by Nietzsche a century before when he employed a variety of non-systematic and literary styles to express his own untimely thoughts. Apart from the risk of not being understood and finding no end-users for the concepts developed, the greatest danger is that the

meaning of what is written will be determined by forces that were not anticipated or that the authors would have preferred to avoid. Far from finding no end-users, the concepts might be put to work in ways that run counter to the spirit in which they were written. There are no guarantees that the concept of smooth space will not be absorbed by the Israeli war machine as well as the Palestinian Intifada.

Deleuze's texts are not immune from the different forces in play in the academic publishing machine. They are often the target of reactive desires to provide the definitive label for 'Deleuze's philosophy': this is above all a philosophy of creation, of the unworldly, of immanence, of desire and so on. It is ironic that someone who devoted so much effort to escaping from the confines of the history of philosophy should have become the subject of so many efforts to tie his own thought to one or other figure from the history of philosophy: Deleuze is post-Kantian, Bergsonian, Nietzschean, he is closer to Hegel, to Heidegger, or to Eriugena than we suspected. At the same time, it is entirely to be expected that Deleuze's work should have become the site of so many conflicting interpretations and approaches. In this context, *Deleuzian Encounters: Studies in Contemporary Social Issues* is a welcome reminder of the pragmatic orientation and political ambitions of his experimental philosophy written in collaboration with Guattari. The chapters in this book take Deleuze's philosophy outside the charmed circle of academic interpretations and scholarly publications. In some cases they take Deleuzian concepts quite literally back to the streets, in others into the courtroom, the classroom or detention centers for refugees. Some chapters seek to confront Deleuzian concepts with social phenomena never considered by Deleuze and Guattari, other chapters deal with social movements that have emerged only since the publication of their major works. Together, all of the chapters in this book bear witness to what Deleuze described as the guerilla campaign against ourselves and our established ways of thinking that is an inevitable consequence of the desire to think and act differently. They amount to a renewed attempt to bring Deleuze's philosophy into contact with the outside, which is the only way to keep it alive.

Paul Patton, 2007

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Introduction: Gilles Deleuze and Four Movements in Social Thought

Anna Hickey-Moody and Peta Malins

This anthology is driven by a desire to affirm the capacity of individuals to effect change in the social issues with which they are concerned. It is inspired by our belief that such change can be affirmed not only through corporeal forms of action (such as street protest, campaigning and policy writing) but also through *rethinking* the social issues one is hoping to change. It is also inspired by our belief that the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze offers a particularly useful, yet largely under-utilized resource for rethinking social issues and transforming the world around us.

Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) is one of the most significant French philosophers of the twentieth century. His work has had a dramatic impact on scholarship worldwide, influencing fields as diverse as mathematics, architecture, law, science, economics and the arts.[1] It has also been taken up within the humanities and social sciences, inspiring innovative work in disciplines such as politics, cultural studies, gender studies, education and criminology.[2] Yet Deleuze's philosophy is not always well received in these domains. Many social researchers find his texts difficult because of the unusual terms and concepts they introduce; concepts which are not easily mapped over existing knowledges.[3] Many also find his work unsettling because of its capacity to disrupt the structures of thought which form the basis of the word as they know it. And many others remain wary of what they perceive in his work to be a celebration of anarchy and chaos at the expense of the real struggles going on for people every day.[4] Such misgivings have impeded, and continue to hinder, productive encounters between Deleuze's work and contemporary social issues.

This anthology opens up a space for these encounters to take place. It does so by offering an accessible collection of studies that bring Deleuze's thought to bear on a range of contemporary social issues.

The essays in this collection demonstrate that, despite its idiosyncratic nature, Deleuze's work can be accessible and that its dismantling of foundational structures can be life affirming. More than anything, these essays show that Deleuze's thought is eminently social and political, and that his concepts can – and do – have important practical implications.

Deleuze's philosophy and social ethics

Deleuze's commitment to social politics and ethics, although evidenced throughout his career, came to the fore in the last 25 years of his life. The mass student and worker protests which took place in Paris in May of 1968 had a great impact on Deleuze's philosophy, as did his friendships with Michel Foucault and Félix Guattari, both of whom were involved in a range of social justice and activist movements. These influences gave Deleuze's philosophy an increasingly socio-political edge, exemplified in his first two collaborative texts with Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*[5] and *A Thousand Plateaus*.[6] Moving beyond philosophical critique to the creation and affirmation of new forms of thought and life, these texts constitute a form of conceptual social activism. Populated with hybrid ideas from fields as diverse as mathematics, music, art, history, physics, zoology, biology, literature and geography, they provide a rich source of concepts for re-thinking the social world.

In their last collaborative work, *What is Philosophy?*,[7] Deleuze and Guattari shift their focus back to philosophy and its role in effecting revolutionary social change. For Deleuze and Guattari, the aim of philosophy is the creation of concepts which enable something new to be thought or felt. Such concepts have the power, when inserted into concrete fields or assemblages, to produce a change in that field; a change which may in turn lead to other, potentially revolutionary changes. Philosophical theory, in this sense, is not something with which to understand the social, nor is it something which is to be proven true or false. The question is not whether a particular concept is 'true', but whether it works, and whether it opens up the range of possibilities in a given situation.

Deleuze's philosophy can therefore be approached as an open system, rather than a totalizing structure which must be taken as a unified system of belief.[8] It is for this reason that Deleuze conceives of each concept as a 'tool box';[9] as a collection of potentialities, the value of which is affirmed in their use. For Deleuze all philosophy has a symbiotic relationship with social empiricism: it depends upon ongoing connections with social fields to keep it alive, just as those social fields need

philosophy to open them up and keep them moving.[10] The events of 11 September 2001 in New York, for example, changed the ways in which contemporary philosophy and theory has evolved. The sound-images that accompanied media reporting of the event prompted people to re-think and re-conceptualize the relationships between sound, vision and knowledge. Plans to memorialize the towers through spatial design not only drew on existing theories of space and memory, but also instigated a major re-thinking of these concepts. The ways in which we imagine the world, and other bodies around us, impacts upon what is possible; imagining others is a way of impacting upon them. For Deleuze, these interconnected realms of theory and practice are both locations of applied (practical) action. There is no 'theory and practice' divide in Deleuze's ontology because for Deleuze, theory *is* a practice.[11]

This approach to philosophy, which Deleuze refers to as a 'transcendental empiricism',[12] is intimately connected to his understanding of ethics. For Deleuze, ethics is very different from a 'morality', which operates as an overarching or transcendent system of prior rules and judgements.[13] Such judgements work to close off and limit the potentiality of a situation, foreclosing its future.[14] Deleuze draws on the work of Spinoza[15] and Nietzsche[16] to call for an immanent form of ethics: one which resides within (rather than above or outside) matter and practice, and which seeks to evaluate relations as they emerge, rather than judge them a-priori.[17] For Deleuze we are not the 'origin' or agent of our thoughts and actions, but the affects produced by our thoughts and actions; in other words we are the affects of our 'ways of existing', or what Deleuze (following Nietzsche and Foucault) also calls 'styles of life'.[18] Styles of life and modes of evaluation that are shaped by resentment, judgement and negation tend to reduce and close off bodily possibilities and potentials for change. By contrast, those which affirm life and its positive capacity for difference, enhance our range of powers and potentials. Deleuze's approach to ethics is thus concerned with evaluating 'what we do, [and] what we say, in relation to the ways of existing involved',[19] and in relation to the kinds of potentials and capacities that those ways of existing affirm. Within such an evaluation, it is not what a body 'is' that matters, but what it is capable of, and in what ways its relations with other bodies diminish or enhance those capacities.

Deleuze's ethics is also informed by the concept of univocity:[20] the idea that all matter (human, non-human) consists of the same substance and exists – despite individual differenciation – at the same level or

plane of consistency.[21] For Deleuze, there are no pre-existing hierarchies between bodies, nor between species or life-forms. The human body is not placed above other bodies (as transcendent), nor is it separate (unified, autonomous) from them. There are no 'sovereign' individuals who act upon the world; there are only bodies that are produced through their contexts and connections with the world. Ethics must, therefore, go beyond the human to incorporate relations between humans and other, non-human, bodies such as animals, trees, rivers, micro-organisms and built environments. By giving the name ethology (the study of animal relations) to this practice of ethics, Deleuze draws attention to the importance of evaluating relations between all bodies. Ethics, for Deleuze, is about maximizing the capacities of all bodies to affect and to be affected. It is also about affirming difference and the production of the new. Rather than limiting the future to what has already been or to what is already known, ethics involves opening up the potential for the unknown.

It is in this spirit that we offer this anthology. Each of the chapters in this collection can be understood as an encounter between Deleuze's work and a particular social issue. Each is intended to open up new possibilities for thinking and engaging with social concerns. From each, something new may emerge: a new style of life, a new concept, a new possibility for thought or practice. We hope that this collection will inspire you to experiment with Deleuzian concepts in other fields, and to find ways to rethink these fields beyond Deleuze.

The chapters in this anthology are arranged according to four contemporary movements in socio-political thought that have, with the help of Deleuze, gathered momentum in recent years. We have named these movements: *Politics Beyond Identity*; *Ethico-Aesthetics*; *Socio-Spatiality*; and *Global Schizophrenia*. By grouping the essays within these scholarly trajectories, we hope to draw attention to the broader implications of Deleuze's work and to the ways in which each encounter is always connected to a wide range of socio-political movements.

Politics beyond identity

During the 1960s and 70s, a range of minoritarian[22] groups – including women, African-Americans, gays and lesbians, and Indigenous peoples – took to the streets to protest against their oppression and to demand equal social, legal and political rights. The importance of these revolutionary identity-based movements lies not only in the changes they brought about, but also in their success at raising awareness of the

very personal nature of the political. Political theory has since been compelled to consider the myriad ways in which diverse personal and group perspectives on the world matter politically, thereby shifting the ways in which social politics are thought, spoken about and practiced.

Identity politics – the mobilization of group identity for political purposes (as when a feminist speaks 'as a woman', or when an individual speaks as a 'gay', a 'black' or a 'Jew') – has enabled, and continues to enable, important changes in the socio-political realm. Many contemporary theorists have, however, begun to draw attention to the limitations of a politics based on identity, and the extent to which identity categories might conceal as much as they express. Individuals, for example, cannot but exceed the identity categories which seek to contain them: most traverse multiple identities at once, and many find that no group represents their individual circumstances and interests. As such, the work of Deleuze and Guattari is increasingly being used to critique, and strategically move beyond, a politics of identity.[23]

For Deleuze and Guattari, identity can be understood as one of the many ways in which society organizes, and tries to make sense of, the chaos and flux of the world. Bodies are not static entities but exist in a state of continuous change. In order to make sense of this, bodies become stratified;[24] arranged within grid-like categories such as sex, gender, colour, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, age and ability. Such categories can be extremely useful, for they create a stable sense of 'self' and enable the production of the thinking, speaking, political subject. Yet they are also limiting, for they reduce the body to particular modes of being and interacting; affecting not only how the body is understood, but its potentiality; its future capacity to affect and be affected.

Categories of identity can also reduce the capacity for relations between bodies because they rely on, and reproduce, an external, negative notion of difference; a difference which consists in its differing *from*, or *in relation to*, an 'other'. For Deleuze, difference is, first and foremost, an internal – rather than relational or external – process.[25] A body is produced through an internal differenciation (as when cells differentiate) and, over time, continually differs from itself. This view presents difference as positive and productive, rather than negative and subtractive; difference is that which produces life itself, and enables the production of the new. This concept of difference disrupts the idea – popular in contemporary socio-political thought – of a self which is constituted through its difference to an 'other', and allows us to think

relationships between bodies as productive of (rather than reliant upon) difference.

In order to move beyond a politics founded on identity, Deleuze and Guattari call for a politics of becoming; one which seeks to dismantle social stratifications and open onto an unknown field of differentiation.[26] Becomings take place when a body connects to another body and in doing so, begins to perceive, move, think and feel in new ways. Deleuze and Guattari propose a series of political becomings which include: becoming-woman[27] (to disrupt the dominant male form of subjectivity), becoming-animal (to disrupt humanism), becoming-molecular (to disrupt the organization of the body), and becoming-imperceptible (to dismantle the idea of the self). These becomings do not involve an imitation, nor do they involve a transformation from one thing to another (e.g., person to horse), but rather constitute a zone of transformation within which bodily capacities – and modes of perception – are combined (producing, for example, a 'horson' or person^{horse}). A becoming-horse, would involve beginning to perceive the world – and to have the same limitations and powers of acting in the world – as a horse.[28] Becomings are always at least double; they have the potential not only to affirm one's own capacity for change, but also to engender further becomings elsewhere.[29] The outcome of a becoming can never be determined in advance. It is therefore a delicate process: becomings that take place too fast or too carelessly can be dangerous; destroying all frames of reference can be fatal. But the outcome of becoming can also be liberating and even the smallest becoming can be revolutionary.

It is with this theme of **Politics Beyond Identity**, that the anthology begins. In the opening chapter, ***The Politics of Non-Being***, Gregory Flaxman explores Deleuze's concept of 'non-being', arguing that it might assist with the problem of defining what it means to *be*, and more specifically, to *be political*, in an age in which politics and philosophy are increasingly subsumed by imperatives of capitalism and marketing. Flaxman traces the concept of non-being through its emergence in ancient Greek philosophy, its re-articulation by Deleuze, its relationship to the concept of utopia, and its significance in the contemporary world. He suggests that non-being is a concept which cannot be reduced to the negative, nor can it be reduced to a dialectical opposition, but rather affirms a place – or more specifically, a utopian *non-place* – from which philosophy is able to bring forth the new, the unknown and the unpredictable. In doing so, Flaxman reminds us of the importance of

philosophical thought – in and of itself – for revitalizing hope in the contemporary world.

In ***The Revolutionary Dividual***, Jonathon Roffe also takes up the concept of utopia, this time to explore the relationship between political subjectivity and possibilities for bringing about new ways of living, thinking and feeling. In the contemporary capitalist world, subjects are increasingly 'individualized' – bound to particular conceptions of identity, self and agency. The first step toward becoming revolutionary, Roffe suggests, is to access our 'dividuality'. This step is in many ways a destructive one: it must first involve disrupting the discourses and practices of identity which sustain 'individualization'. Yet such destratification will not suffice on its own, and must be coupled with an affirmative, constructive act: the creation of new forms of life. Thus, Roffe suggests that destratification must go hand in hand with creativity if we are to bring about new ways of living.

Edward Mussawir's ***Intersex: Between Law and Nature***, shifts focus to explore the limits of socio-legal productions of gender. To do so, Mussawir draws on the example of a court case in which a child with the body and social status of a girl is fighting for permission to have gender-reassignment hormone therapy. Through a Deleuzian reading of the concept of Intersex, which does not refer to a mixture of two sexes in one individual, but rather to a state of becoming; an affirmation of the multiple sexes that pass through and between people, Mussawir argues for a non-binary understanding of sex. Gender therefore becomes an expression of a lived, transforming body which articulates itself within worldly assemblages that themselves are gendered. The law, which can only interpret gender in terms of binary relations (male/female/male trapped in female body/lesbian/bisexual, and so on), is inadequately equipped to conceptualize gender as flux, and as such is unable to respond adequately to the child's request.

In ***Deleuze and Suicide***, Ashley Woodward explores the ways in which Deleuze's approach to his own life and death might enable more useful understandings of suicide and our responses to it. He notes that popular conceptualizations of suicide, which have been shaped by the work of Durkheim and Camus, are limited in their ability to explain, and to help us deal with, voluntary death. By understanding life itself in terms of becomings and lines of flight – lines which carry with them both the potential for new life and the potential for madness and death – it might be possible to better understand and respond to suicide. By appreciating the ways in which forms of institutionalization and stratification can carry risks – through stifling and blocking desire – it might also be

possible to ensure that our attempts to prevent death do not bring it about through other means.

Each of the chapters in this section point to limitations in contemporary popular and institutional understandings of subjectivity and identity. They suggest that by re-thinking the individual and their relation to the world we can begin to respond more adequately to the complexities of social relations. Any movement beyond a politics of identity will, as Roffe suggests, not only require a process of deterritorialization but also one of creativity. The following section looks more closely at the nature of creativity and the importance of the relationship between aesthetics and ethics.

Ethico-aesthetics

For some social theorists, aesthetics – an interest in art, beauty, pleasure and taste – is anathema to social ethics.[30] Yet for Deleuze, who we are and what we are capable of is directly related to embodied sensation. How things look, feel, taste and smell – how things *affect* us sensually – has important socio-ethical implications. For Deleuze, aesthetics and ethics are intrinsically linked.

An important part of Deleuze's ethico-aesthetics is the concept of *affect*.[31] Affect is that which is felt before it is thought; it has a visceral impact on the body before it is given subjective or emotive meaning. Thinking through affect brings the sensory capacity of the body to the fore. When we encounter an image of a bomb victim, smell milk that has soured, or hear music that is out of key, our bodies tense before we can verbally articulate an aversion. When moving amongst thousands of anti-war protesters, standing before a painting by Klee, or dancing to a feverish melody, the body responds with something powerful before we can articulate awe or a renewed faith in the social. Affect is, therefore, very different from emotion: it is an *a*-subjective bodily response to an encounter. Emotion comes later, as a classifying or *stratifying* of affect.

The production of affect has both ethical and political implications because affect determines the way in which a subject is approached. It provides, for example, the unconscious set of assumptions that motivate an embodied response to a woman in a hijab, or a person with a disability. As a concept, 'affect' enables us to think about how certain assemblages, languages or social institutions impact on bodies in ways that are not conscious. Affects have the capacity to disrupt habitual and entrenched ways of thinking. They have the capacity to make us move

our bodies in new ways, to force us to relate to, and think about, the world differently.

Art provides one of the most important sites for the production of revolutionary affect.[32] The study of art (painting, music, drama, dance, cinema, photography, installation, and so on) is therefore not incidental to the study of social ethics, but crucial to it.[33] The power of art lies in its capacity to produce 'blocs of sensation' that operate differently to the organized world of political opinion, identity and reason. Art creates new milieus of sense and collections of impersonal associations. Its affects are not produced in relation to a pre-existing 'human' or 'individual' but rather take place at the level of the body that is not yet defined as human.[34] Art creates new, unimagined sensory landscapes for an audience that does not yet exist, because the viewing body – their capacities for affecting and being affected – is itself produced in relation to each artwork or performance.[35]

It is for this reason that Deleuze and Guattari speak of an audience that is 'yet to come'.[36] Art produces its audience because it has the capacity to re-work a body's limits: it can re-adjust what a person is or is not able to understand, produce or connect to. A work of art develops a miniature universe that can perform a pedagogic function through crafting and presenting previously non-existent elements of difference, which in turn produce the viewing body. This is not to say that a work of art will change its viewers in prescribed ways, rather, that it can create new associations; new organized patterns of affect. Art engenders, then, both a corporeal reconfiguration and an emergent cultural geography of human affectivity.[37]

The four chapters in this second section, **Ethico-Aesthetics**, offer creative and practical examples of how Deleuzian concepts of art, affect, sensation and aesthetics can be employed to reconfigure socio-political imaginings. The section begins with Anna Hickey-Moody's ***Intellectual Disability: Sensation and Thinking Through Affect***, which explores the ways in which performances that feature dancers with intellectual disability can generate an understanding of the body that acknowledges and affirms the productive, creative capabilities of those who are medically categorized as 'intellectually disabled'. This re-conceptualization of bodies with intellectual disabilities through performance art offers a means to give positive forms in thought to the forces such bodies produce.

In Chapter 6, ***Towards a Pedagogy of Affect***, Jennifer Daryl Slack and Christa Albrecht-Crane devise a conceptual framework for thinking pedagogy through affective knowledge exchange. They argue that the

classroom is a space animated not only by orderly lines of curriculum and learning, but also by the chaotic movement and production of affect. Affect disrupts and mutates the processes of learning; deterritorializing the classroom and giving it an intensive relation to the outside. Thinking the classroom through affect draws attention to the politics of learning; an often-imperceptible politics which slips between and beneath what is said and what is 'known'. Affect opens up the possibility for the production of new forms of teaching; new kinds of pedagogy which affirm the experimental lines that traverse the classroom.

Erin Manning's ***Sensing Beyond Security*** turns to the question of what it means to feel safe and to be secure in the contemporary world. Drawing attention to the ways in which ideas of 'security' necessarily reduce the capacities of bodies to affect and to be affected, Manning proposes an alternative, embodied politics of 'sense' that positions bodies in new relationships to one another and to notions of security. She calls for a politics that reaffirms the value of bodily sensation and touch, and the value of openness to new encounters.

In this section's concluding chapter, ***Affective Terrorism***, Felicity Colman extends the scholarly thematic of security to consider the affective logic of terrorism, as discernable through the images communicated by Western screen media. Such images, Colman argues, work to both 'entertain and consume us';[38] they increase media ratings and capitalist consumption at the same time as they diminish social compassion and intellectual and cultural development. This 'affective terrorism' encourages a style of life governed by fear, hatred and individualized paranoia, and has the capacity to limit the ways in which we can imagine and respond to social events.

Each of these four chapters highlight the importance of style, aesthetics, affect and sensation in an ethics of social relations. In the following section the focus shifts to explore the ways in which an ethico-aesthetics also matters spatially,[39] and does not simply take place *in* space, but rather is produced *with* space; as an interactive, connected field.

Socio-spatiality

Space is generally understood as inert: as a neutral container within which social action takes place. This assumption has long been given credence in Western philosophy and science, and can be linked back to the work of Descartes and Euclid, who evaluated space according to its geometric dimensions. Such readings, as many theorists (particularly

within geography and feminism) have noted,[40] ignore the aesthetic, social and political aspects of space and the material affects that different spaces have on bodies.

Deleuze's work offers useful concepts for moving beyond static conceptions of space. The most widely utilized of these is his distinction, developed with Guattari, between *smooth space* and *striated space*.[41] Striated spaces are those which are rigidly structured and organized, and which produce particular, limited movements and relations between bodies. Think of the ways in which supermarkets are delineated by aisles, school classrooms by rows of tables and traffic intersections by traffic lights and left and right lanes. Smooth spaces, by contrast, are those in which movement is less regulated or controlled, and where bodies can interact – and transform themselves – in endlessly different ways. Think of an empty hall; a grassy expanse of parkland or the ocean. Each leaves the body far more open to new movements, performances and connections (dancing across the hall, cartwheels on the grass, encountering a fish while diving under the waves). It is important to note, however, that smooth spaces are not necessarily better than those that are striated; indeed some spatial striations are very useful (for getting shopping done quickly, for teaching a group of students, for driving safely). However, to the extent that a space is striated, it can also be understood to be limiting: reducing bodily and socio-political potentials for change.

The striation of spaces is also linked to what Deleuze and Guattari call the *territorialization* of space. Bodies tend to create particular habitual relations with the spaces they encounter; creating, for example, a space that is 'home'. This process is more aesthetic than structural: colors, textures, motifs and tunes, for example, all create a territory.[42] Territories create a safe or familiar space, within which bodies can gain the necessary strength or resolve to head out into the world. Territories are not, in other words, themselves productive of becomings, but provide bodies with a stable base from which to launch becomings. Like stratifications and striations, territories can therefore be understood as both useful and limiting.

While Deleuze and Guattari's concepts of territorialization and smooth and striated space, each enable the socio-political implications of space and spatial production to be evaluated, they do not provide an intimate understanding of how spaces actually produce affects within the body. It is here that Deleuze's concept of the *fold* becomes useful. Drawing on two very different philosophers, Leibniz[43] and Foucault,[44] Deleuze conceptualizes the relationship between bodies and space to be one of

folding. He writes: 'The outside is not a fixed limit but a moving matter animated by peristaltic movements, folds and foldings that together make up an inside: they are not something other than the outside, but precisely the inside *of* the outside'.[45] Bodies enfold that which surrounds them and, at the same time, they fold out into the world to shape the spaces they encounter. A body can be understood to have many folds, and to be folded in many different ways. Bodies can develop rigid folds, which stratify them in a particular way, reducing their potential for change. They can also unfold their relations with the world; unfurling the categories of identity and habit that make them what they are.

Drawn together with the concepts of smooth and striated space, the notion of the fold enables an ethical evaluation of space according to the kinds of bodies and social relations it makes possible.[46] Connected to Deleuze's concept of affect, it becomes possible to articulate the ways in which even a small alteration to a socio-spatial assemblage can affect ethico-political changes. The third section of this anthology addresses this theme of **Socio-Spatiality**, bringing into focus the specific spatialities of the social, and exploring the impacts of these spatial organizations on social relations.

The section begins with a study of the specific socio-spatial assemblage of a marine park in South Australia. Mark Halsey's ***Molar Ecology: What Can the (Full) Body of a Marine Park Do?*** brings to light the various structures that, over a given period, transform a mainly unscripted or 'smooth' space into one occupied by objects, rules, regulations and set trajectories. Comparing the kinds of movements, sensations and whale-interactions previously enabled along the open coastline, to the formulaic trajectories enacted within the current marine tourist park, Halsey highlights the potentials which are inevitably lost when lands become territorialized. Although such spatial regulations perform important conservation functions, they also work to disrupt and limit interactions with the natural world. As such, they have implications not only for the ways in which people envision or interact with 'nature' from *within* such places, but also how they interact with the environment in their everyday life.

In the following chapter, ***City Folds: Injecting Drug Use and Urban Space***, Peta Malins argues that to develop productive responses to injecting drug use in urban space, the drug using body – and its relationship to space and to other bodies – needs to be rethought. Drawing on interviews with ten women who inject drugs in inner Melbourne, Malins suggests that this relationship can be understood as one of folding: city

spaces enfold bodies and, at the same time, those spaces fold into bodies. Injecting sites which have, for example, become 'dirty', 'diseased' or 'junkie' spaces (through their syringe litter, garbage, darkness, secludedness or smell), fold into bodies, producing women who think of themselves, and interact with the world, *as* 'junkies'. These city folds have implications for the success of harm minimization initiatives in city space and for the ways in which we might imagine and construct an ethico-aesthetics of urban space more broadly.

In Chapter 11, ***Holey Space and the Smooth and Striated Body of the Refugee***, Hélène Frichot explores the spaces occupied and traversed by the body of the refugee, with particular reference to the refugee detention and processing centers which have been established in Australia. Going beyond Deleuze and Guattari's concepts of smooth and striated space to explore their under-theorized concept of 'holey space', Frichot argues that modes of spatial organization currently being employed in Australian detention centres reduce the potential of the refugee body to experience what Deleuze would call 'a life'. She suggests that the concept of holey space might offer a way of welcoming, rather than policing, the figure of the refugee.

The final chapter in this section, Kenneth Dean and Thomas Lamarre's ***Microsociality and the Ritual Event***, takes up notions of spatiality and temporality to explore the political significances of ritual practices in Southeast China. The authors argue that such rituals establish a unique, located economy of production and consumption, which differs from – but does not oppose – capitalism. The ritual event incorporates elements of capitalism yet evades it at the same time, challenging its pervasiveness. A study of ritual can enable us to think differently about capital and its movements, and to develop spatialized forms of resistance that support non-capitalist economies of exchange.

Each of these chapters articulates a spatiality which is inherently socio-political, and which exceeds its local context. In the final section of this collection, we broaden this spatial lens to look at the globalizing aspects of contemporary sociality. In doing so, we return to the themes of subjectivity and identity with which the collection began. For contemporary global movements – movements of capital, of migration, war or activism – cannot be separated from the constitution of bodies themselves; from the very possibilities of their becoming. In section four, **Global Schizophrenia**, the anthology explores the relationship between contemporary global movements and the bodies that make up, and are affected by, global flows.

Global schizophrenia

In the contemporary world, the experience of schizophrenia can be understood as both the 'limit' and the 'logic' of global capitalism.[47] Capitalism, the history of which is closely tied to colonization, relies on the construction of specific ways of mapping space, time and sensory experiences.[48] The schizophrenic – who experiences the world according to an anti-logic of multiplicities, haecceities[49] and chaotic flows – haunts and threatens the West, serving as a reminder that non-capitalist experiences of spatiality, corporeality and modes of consumption exist.[50] At the same time, these very flows, haecceities and chaotic multiplicities have come to define the operation of global capitalism – such that, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest: 'the capitalist machine does not run the risk of becoming mad, it *is* mad from one end to the other... and this is the source of its rationality'.[51]

The relationship between capitalism and schizophrenia is first explored by Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus* and continued in their follow-up text, *A Thousand Plateaus*. In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari critique psychoanalysis, criticizing the way it isolates the study of desire from broader socio-political concerns. They also critique the model of desire relied upon by psychoanalysis, one which understands desire as located in the subject and tied to lack (e.g., 'I desire that which I lack'). For Deleuze and Guattari, desire is not something that can be owned by a subject, nor is it negatively tied to lack. Rather, desire is an impersonal 'life-force' or flow. Positive and productive, desire is that which generates life; enabling bodily connections and social relations. Although Freud was one of the first theorists to identify the dynamic and chaotic nature of desire, he nonetheless continued to find ways to overcode and restrain desire. His tendency, for example, to read flows of desire as a sign or symptom of a particular problem, repression or fantasy, along with his tendency to bind desire to hetero-normative family relations worked to recode desire; turning it inwards and detaching it from its socio-economic and political implications.

Instead of psychoanalysis, Deleuze and Guattari propose a practice called schizoanalysis. Despite its name, schizoanalysis does not involve analysis or interpretation, but involves the production, release and affirmation of flows of desire. This can take place at the level of the individual body, or it can take place in relation to large social assemblages and machines. For schizoanalysis, it is not what desire means or signifies that is of interest, but the ways in which flows of desire are organized (and organize themselves) within the socius. The question, in other

words, is not 'What does this desire represent?' but 'What does this assemblage of desire enable a body or society to do?'

Flows of desire move through the body and the socius in at least two different directions. Deleuze and Guattari call these two tendencies paranoia and schizophrenia. While paranoiac desires are those which produce social structures, hierarchies and repressions, schizo-desires are those which go against the strata, forming revolutionary micro-flows and lines of escape. Each society can be understood to have its own way of arranging flows of desire. Unlike non-capitalist social formations, which tend to operate in a paranoiac manner – stratifying desire according to rigid social categories such as those of race, religion, gender, sexuality, age – capitalism tends toward the schizophrenic pole: it relies on the multiplication of desire-flows in order to function. Its primary movement is one of destratification and deterritorialization: freeing desire from the social and religious codes which have been placed on it, and liberating it from the territorial and national boundaries which have enclosed it. Capitalism thus operates as a form of decoding that surpasses any other.[52]

Yet capitalism is also, as Deleuze and Guattari acknowledge, 'defined by a cruelty having no parallel in the primitive system of cruelty, and by a terror having no parallel in the despotic regime of terror'.[53] This is because what capitalism deterritorializes on the one hand, it reterritorializes on the other; connecting schizophrenic flows of desire directly to flows of money and profit.[54] Instead of stratifying and coding desire-flows, capitalism *axiomatizes*[55] them, or gives them monetary value: making them directly necessary to the functioning of the economy.[56] In order to perform this economic axiomatization of desire, capitalism relies on and reproduces the connection between desire and lack, and it does so by 'deliberately organizing wants and needs amid an abundance of production; [and] making desire teeter and fall victim to the great fear of not having one's needs satisfied'.[57] While this link between desire and lack is retained, capitalism is able to harness the energy generated by deterritorialized and decoded flows of desire, turning it into flows of money and goods, flows of profit. It is in this sense that capitalism succeeds in performing a new level of social oppression and repression.[58] Capitalism does not prevent the desire-flows of bodies, but instead seeks to ensure that those flows are always already functioning for capitalism.

Capitalism, however, does not always succeed in axiomatizing desire. In the process of multiplying flows of decoded desire, it cannot help but also produce flows of desire that escape; flows which, instead of moving in line with capitalism, go against it, or run off in other directions.

'The deepest law of capitalism', write Deleuze and Guattari, is that 'it continually sets and then repels its own limits, but in so doing gives rise to numerous flows in all directions that escape its axiomatic'.[59] Revolutionary movements, terrorism, illicit drug use and madness, for example, are formed with escaping desires; and each can constitute a challenge to capitalism.[60] In many respects, capitalism would prefer to do without the State and its stratifying institutions, which interfere with the free-flow of desire. Yet it relies on the state apparatus and its machines of coding (medicine, the law, the prisons, the media, the bureaucracy) to capture and defuse escaping desire flows: turning revolutionaries into the criminal, the disorderly, the social outcast, the insane.

Deleuze and Guattari call for an understanding of fugitive desire-flows (lines of escape and resistance) which acknowledges their important revolutionary potential. In order to effect revolutionary change, activist movements need to move beyond the stratified politics of identity, representation, language and place, and enter into lines of flight which not only dissolve strata but which also threaten capitalism. Schizoanalysis thus seeks to affirm – rather than pathologize or criminalize – these perverse lines of escaping desire; lines such as those found in fringe art, or in 'carnival' and 'prankster' forms of activism, which each carry their own potential, however small, for unravelling dominant modes of existence. Yet schizoanalysis does not assume that all lines of escape are revolutionary: many head towards disaster; towards illness, madness and death. We therefore need to devise ways to encourage and support chaotic desire-flows, the lines which escape and which flee, while at the same time preventing them from turning into lines of madness and death.

The final section of this anthology, **Global Schizophrenia**, explores these flows of revolutionary desire and the various ways in which they make their escape. It begins with Simone Bignall's ***Indigenous Peoples and a Deleuzian Theory of Practice***; a study of some of the ways in which contemporary narratives and practices of Reconciliation impact on relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous bodies. Examining the formal processes of Reconciliation being developed between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians, Bignall notes that these processes are limited by their conceptions of progress and difference in which progress is thought to produce a 'unity' which will eventually overcome – and thus solve the 'problem' of – difference. Bignall proposes an alternative approach to Reconciliation based on Deleuze's conceptualisation of difference as differen*t*iation/differen*c*iation – a difference composed, that is, of both

processes of productive differenciation (as in the differenciation of cells in the production of a body) and positive differentiation (the process through which bodies continually transform themselves). This idea of difference disrupts the idea of Reconciliation as a bringing together of two 'different' groups, and instead enables a conception of the kinds of intensive social and perceptual transformations that are necessary if we are to actualize a post-colonial social in Australia and elsewhere.

In Chapter 14, ***Deleuze and the Tale of Two Intifadas***, the focus shifts to explore the strategies and ethics of revolutionary uprisings. Examining two different Palestinian uprisings – or Intifadas – Todd May contrasts an unpredictable, rhizomatic, destratified mode of resistance to one which is organized, hierarchicized and directed toward a recognizable end. Where the former opens up the possibility of creative, revolutionary change, the latter is more likely to provoke violence and create rigid, oppositional blockages that prevent change and diminish life. May's chapter offers important lessons for contemporary activism and for the development of more creative, life-affirming forms of resistance.

The following chapter, Dimitris Papadopoulos and Vassilis Tsianos' ***The Autonomy of Migration: The Animals of Undocumented Mobility***, explores the creative ways in which migrants and refugees change their identities in order to sustain paths of material and subjective mobility. Focusing on the specific transnational border space of the Aegean line, which is traversed by a regular flow of migrants from Ghana, Gambia, Egypt, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and China, the authors document some of the ways in which migrants strategically transform themselves – such as through the use of animal names in border crossings – and constantly adapt their practices and alliances. Rather than calling for a system of rights – a humanist system based on identity, visibility and national sovereignty – Papadopoulos and Tsianos show how the creative, intensive and extensive movements of migrants call forth deterritorializations and becomings. These becomings are movements capable of challenging the very systems of national sovereignty, identity and representation within which a framework of rights becomes necessary.

In the final chapter of this anthology, ***Complex and Minor: Deleuze and the Alterglobalization Movement(s)***, Graeme Chesters returns to the theme of the opening chapter and to the possibilities for change which are opened up within contemporary capitalism. The schizophrenic movements of contemporary global capitalism create, as Chesters notes, particular difficulties – as well as particular opportunities – for activist movements. Examining present and future

activist collectives, Chesters suggests that 'alter-globalization' movements generate new types of global flows. These flows work to transform and dissolve, rather than directly 'oppose' globalized capitalism. To be successful, alter-globalization movements have to be constructed locally, must be experimental and creative, and should allow lines of flight (escaping desire) to be multiplied globally. Most importantly, however, they ought to affirm – as Chesters does – the idea that 'the project of political life... [should] be immanent to the style in which one lives'.[61] Only then, will other worlds be truly possible.

Conclusion: New machinations

> It breathes... it eats. It shits and fucks. What a mistake to have ever said *the* id. Everywhere *it* is machines – real ones, not figurative ones: machines driving other machines, machines being driven by other machines, with all the necessary couplings and connections... we are all handymen: each with his little machines.
>
> Deleuze and Guattari[62]

Like the desiring machines Deleuze and Guattari characterize in such visceral terms, this anthology is a little machine. It is designed to function in practical, material ways; to produce socio-political movements and affects; transmit flows and intensities; and generate changes. Its field of operation is the social.

Deleuze's philosophy makes socio-political empiricism an imperative, because the assemblages that social researchers and practitioners form with the world necessarily have implications for bodies and their capacities. As social beings we are always already collective; what we do, and do not do, affects socio-political realities. This means that we cannot afford to sit back and wait for change: we need to effect it through the everyday style in which we live. As Deleuze and Parnet suggest:

> [T]he question of the future of *the* revolution is a bad question because, in so far as it is asked, there are so many people who do not *become* revolutionaries, and this is exactly why it is done, to impede the question of the revolutionary becoming of people, at every level, in every place.[63]

A reactionary approach to social issues would see socio-political concern develop into a nihilism composed of resentment, blame, aggression, fear and withdrawal. As an alternative to such a reactionary

approach, Deleuze advocates a mode of engagement that is affirmative and creative. Such an ethics opens up creative possibilities for social becomings. Direct dialectical opposition – a negative positioning of the enemy as 'other' and a use of what Deleuze, following Nietzsche, refers to as 'reactive' forces – brings nihilism and weakness. A way out of this dialectic is to change approach: to adopt a strategy of using active forces; affirming one's own life and the potential for everyday revolutionary change.

With this anthology, we hope to open up such a space of thought and action; to encourage readers to think about – and act on – particular social issues in new ways. We also hope to set in motion further connections between Deleuze and social issues; hybrid, unexpected connections. Above all, we want to inspire a general openness to encounters that shift the ground from under us and disrupt established ways of being: encounters that call forth a social yet to come.

Notes

1. For an example of Deleuze's impact on mathematics see Duffy, S. (Ed.) *Virtual Mathematics: The Logic of Difference* (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2006). Examples of Deleuze's thought being applied to architecture include: Grosz, E. *Architecture from the Outside: Essays on Virtual and Real Space* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001); Rajchman, J. *The Deleuze Connections* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2000); Williams, J. 'Deleuze's Ontology and Creativity: Becoming in Architecture', *Pli*, 9(2000) pp. 200–219; and a special issue of *Architectural Design*, entitled 'Folding in Architecture', 102(1993). Examples from legal studies in which Deleuze's work is being taken up include: Lefebvre, A. 'A New Image of Law: Deleuze and Jurisprudence', *Telos*, 130(2005) pp. 152–175; Mussawir, E. 'The Trial: Elements of a Legal Assemblage of Desire', *Studies in Law, Politics, and Society*, 34(2004) pp. 111–131; and a special 'Deleuze and the Semiotics of Law' edition of *the International Journal for the Semiotics of Law*, 20(1)(2007). Examples of where Deleuze's thought is being taken up in relation to science include: DeLanda, M. *A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History* (New York: Zone Books, 1997); and Grosz, E. *The Nick of Time: Politics, Evolution, and the Untimely* (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2004). An example of Deleuze's work being brought to bear on economic theory is: Kaye-Blake, W. 'Economics is Structured Like a Language', *Post-Autistic Economics Review*, 36(2006) pp. 24–33. Examples of Deleuze's impact on the creative arts include: Bogue, R. *Deleuze on Music, Painting, and the Arts* (London: Routledge, 2003); O'Sullivan, S. *Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari: Thought beyond Representation* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); and Zepke, S. *Art as Abstract Machine: Ontology and Aesthetics in Deleuze and Guattari* (New York: Routledge, 2005).

2. For examples of Deleuze's work being taken up in relation to politics, see Patton, P. *Deleuze and the Political* (London: Routledge, 2000); and Thoburn, N. *Deleuze, Marx and Politics* (London: Routledge, 2003). Cultural studies examples include: Buchanan, I. 'Deleuze and Cultural Studies', *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 96(3)(1997), pp. 483–497; Massumi, B. (Ed.) *A Shock to Thought: Expression after Deleuze and Guattari* (London: Routledge, 2002); Probyn, E. *Carnal Appetites: Food, Sex, Identities* (London: Routledge, 2000); and a special issue of *Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities*, entitled: 'Creative Philosophy: Theory & Praxis', 11(1)(2006). Gender studies examples include: Braidotti, R. *Patterns of Dissonance* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996); Buchanan, I. & Colebrook, C. (Eds) *Deleuze and Feminist Theory* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000); Gatens, M. 'Feminism as "Password": Re-thinking the "Possible" with Spinoza and Deleuze', *Hypatia*, 15(2)(2000), pp. 59–75; Grosz, E. *Time Travels: Feminism, Nature, Power* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); Lorraine, T. *Irigaray & Deleuze: Experiments in Visceral Philosophy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); Olkowski, D. *Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); and Probyn, E. *Outside Belongings* (New York: Routledge, 1996). Education examples include: Lambert, G. *Report to the Academy: Re- the New Conflict of Faculties* (Aurora: The Davies Group Publishers, 2003); Morss, J. 'Gilles Deleuze and the Space of Education', *Philosophy and Education*, 12(2004), pp. 85–97; and St. Pierre, E. & Pillow, W. (Eds) *Working the Ruins: Feminist Poststructural Theory and Methods in Education* (New York: Routledge, 2000). Criminology examples include: Halsey, M. *Deleuze and Environmental Damage: Violence of the Text* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishers, 2006); Hier, S. 'Risky Spaces and Dangerous Faces: Urban Surveillance, Social Disorder and CCTV', *Social Legal Studies*, 13(4)(2004), pp. 541–554; Milovanovic, D. 'Ethics of Edgework: Spinoza, Nietzsche, and Deleuze', in Arrigo, B. & Williams, C. (Eds) *Philosophy, Crime, and Criminology* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006), pp. 197–218; Parr, A. 'The Deterritorializing Language of Child Detainees: Self Harm or Embodied Graffiti?', *Childhood*, 12(3)(2005), pp. 281–299; and Reynolds, B. *Becoming Criminal: Transversal Performance and Cultural Dissidence in Early Modern England* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2002).
3. As noted by: Grosz, E. *Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 161.
4. Morris, M. 'Crazy Talk is Not Enough', *Environment & Planning D: Society & Space*, 14(1996), pp. 384–394.
5. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (French: 1972) Trans. R. Hurley, M. Seem and H.R. Lane (London: Athlone, 1983).
6. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (French: 1980) Trans. B. Massumi (London: Athlone, 1987).
7. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?* (French: 1991) Trans. G. Burchell and H. Tomlinson (London: Verso, 1994).
8. Massumi, B. 'Translator's Foreword: Pleasures of Philosophy', in Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., pp. ix–xv.
9. Deleuze, in an interview with Foucault titled 'Intellectuals and Power', in Deleuze, G. *Desert Islands and Other Texts* (French: 1953–1974) Trans. M. Taormina (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004), p. 208.

10. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 16.
11. See Deleuze in 'Intellectuals and Power', op. cit., p. 207; also cited in Massumi, B. 'Translator's Foreword: Pleasures of Philosophy', op. cit., p. xv.
12. Transcendental empiricism is a philosophy based on developing knowledge through experience and in Deleuze and Guattari's writing it refers to their re-working of the Kantian rejection of Hume's empiricism. See Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., pp. 35–60.
13. See, for example, Deleuze, G. 'On the Difference Between the *Ethics* and a Morality', in Deleuze, G. *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* (French: 1970) Trans. R. Hurley (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1988), pp. 17–43.
14. Deleuze, G. *Negotiations* (French: 1990) Trans. M. Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 100.
15. See Deleuze, G. *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* (French: 1968) Trans. M. Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1990); Deleuze, G. *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, op. cit.; and Spinoza, B. *Ethics* (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth, 2001).
16. See Deleuze, G. *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (French: 1962) Trans. H. Tomlinson (London: Athlone, 1983); Nietzsche, F. *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future* (London: Penguin Classics, 1973) (Reprinted 1990); and Nietzsche, F. *Ecce Homo: How one Becomes What One Is* (London: Penguin Classics, 1979).
17. See, for example, Smith, D. 'Deleuze and the Question of Desire: Toward an Immanent Theory of Ethics', *Parrhesia*, 2(2007), pp. 66–78.
18. Deleuze, G. *Negotiations*, op. cit., pp. 91 and 100.
19. Ibid., p. 100.
20. Univocity is the idea that all things that exist are different expressions of the same substance.
21. A plane of consistency is the material level at which life unfolds. Deleuze uses various ideas of 'planes' in ways that change across his career. For our purposes, we employ 'plane of consistency' as an articulation of the material world, and 'plane of immanence' as an expression of Deleuze's model of thought as the practice of transcendental empiricism.
22. The term 'minoritarian' is qualitative rather than quantitative, it refers to a mode of being which is minority in nature (hence women, although they may number more than men, can be minoritarian). It can be contrasted to 'Majoritarian' which refers to those bodies which are qualitatively dominant (white, male, heterosexual, and so on).
23. See, for example, Conley, V. 'Becoming-Woman Now: Deleuze & Feminist Theory' and Flieger, J. 'Becoming-Woman: Deleuze, Schreber, and Molecular Identification' both in Buchanan, I. & Colebrook, C. (Eds) *Deleuze and Feminist Theory*, op. cit., pp. 18–63 and 38–63; Goulimari, P. 'A Minoritarian Feminism? Things to Do with Deleuze and Guattari', *Hypatia*, 14(2)(1999), pp. 97–120; and O'Rourke, M. (Ed.) 'The Becoming-Deleuzoguattarian of Queer Studies', *Rhizomes*, 11/12(2005/2006), accessed 12 February 2007 from: http://www.rhizomes.net/issue11/index.html.
24. See Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., pp. 40–74, 134 and 159.
25. Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition* (French: 1968) Trans. P. Patton (London: Athlone, 1994), pp. 20–27.
26. Ibid., pp. 232–309.

27. Many feminist theorists have been wary of Deleuze and Guattari's concept of becoming, particularly their use of the term *becoming-woman*, due to a perception that it is a concept that can only be thought from a male perspective. Others have expressed concern that the idea of becoming might suggest a kind of limitless agency; the ability for anyone to become anything, wherever and whenever. Many have been cautious of letting go of a politics based on identity, especially when so many important social battles remain to be fought. For a critique of these concerns see, for example, Ahmed, S. 'Phantasies of Becoming (the other)', *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, 2(1)(1999), pp. 47–63; Bryden, M. 'Stroboscopic Vision: Deleuze and Cixous', *Women: A Cultural Review*, 15(3)(2004), pp. 320–329; Drexler, J. 'Carnival: The Novel, Wor(l)ds, and Practicing Resistance', in Olkowski, D. *Resistance, Flight Creation: Feminist Enactments of French Philosophy* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 217–234; and Driscoll, C. 'The Little Girl', *Antithesis*, 8(2)(1997), pp. 79–98.
28. There is an autistic woman in the US named Temple Grandin who is famous for her ability to think – and perceive the world – in ways more aligned to animals than humans. Her skill has transformed the cattle industry (helping to discover ways to keep cattle calm before slaughter) and has brought her world fame. See http://www.templegrandin.com and http://www.grandin.com.
29. Deleuze and Guattari write: 'Becoming is always double, and it is this double becoming that constitutes the people to come and the new earth', Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 109.
30. Kant, in 'Analytic of the Beautiful', offers an example of the argument that aesthetic values are divorced from social ethics and politics. Kant does so by laying down impartial rules via which one may deem an object to be beautiful. For introductory discussions of Kant's 'Analytic of the Beautiful' and scholarship on aesthetics, see Gaut, B. & McIver L. (Eds) *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics* (Oxon: Routledge, 2002), pp. 55–70.
31. For an introduction to the Deleuzian concept of affect see Colman, F. 'Affect', in Parr, A. (Ed.) *The Deleuze Dictionary* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), pp. 11–13.
32. See Massumi, B. (Ed.) *A Shock to Thought: Expression after Deleuze and Guattari* (London: Routledge, 2002); and O'Sullivan, S. *Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari: Thought Beyond Representation* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
33. Stephen Zepke lays a framework for taking up Deleuze and Guattari's aesthetics as an ontology in Zepke, S. *Art as Abstract Machine: Ontology and Aesthetics in Deleuze and Guattari* (New York: Routledge, 2005).
34. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 169.
35. See Parr, A. 'Becoming and Performance Art', in Parr, A. (Ed.) *The Deleuze Dictionary*, op. cit., pp. 24–26. Further discussion of Deleuze's writings on performing arts can be found in Bogue, R. *Deleuze on Music, Painting, and the Arts*, op. cit.; and Bogue, R. 'Gilles Deleuze: The Aesthetics of Force', in Patton, P. (Ed.) *Deleuze: A Critical Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 257–269.
36. Deleuze and Guattari write: 'Artist are presenters of affects... they not only create them in their work, they give them to us and make us become with

them... art is the language of sensations... that summons forth a people to come', Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?*, pp. 175–176.

37. For discussions of corporeal reconfiguration through affect see Stivale, C. 'On *heccéités* & *ritournelles*: Movement & Affect in the Cajun Dance Arena', in Genosko, G. (Ed.) *Deleuze & Guattari: Critical Assessments* (London: Routledge: 2001), pp. 281–301; and Manning, E. 'Negotiating Influence: Argentine Tango & a Politics of Touch', *Borderlands*, 2(1)(2003), accessed 21 August 2004 from: http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol2no1_2003. For discussions of the relationship between art and cultural geographies of human affectivity see Colman, F. & Stivale, C. (Eds) 'Creative Philosophy: Theory & Praxis', Special edition of *Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities*, 11(1)(2006).
38. Colman, F., this volume.
39. For further discussion of a spatial ethico-aesthetics see Williams, J. 'Deleuze's Ontology and Creativity', op. cit., pp. 200–219.
40. See, for example, Lefebvre, H. *Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday Life* (London: Continuum, 2004); and Rose, G. *Feminism and Geography: The Limits of Geographical Knowledge* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993).
41. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., pp. 474–500.
42. Ibid., p. 315.
43. Deleuze, G. *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (French: 1988) Trans. T. Conley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).
44. Deleuze, G. *Foucault* (French: 1986) Trans. S. Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988).
45. Ibid., pp. 96–97.
46. Some theorists working with the concept of the fold (particularly within architecture, where it has been most popular) have taken it to suggest a need for constructing literal folds in form, and have thus worked to incorporate structural pleats or folds into buildings. Others have mistakenly taken the fold to be a sign of 'good'ness: as though a space that is 'folded' is better than one that is not. Yet all spaces produce folds and are folded. The question is not: *Is it folded?* but: *What sort of folds does it enable?*
47. For further discussions of contemporary capitalism and resistance in relation to Deleuze's thought see Bennett, J. *The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Hardt, M. & Negri, A. *Empire* (London: Harvard University Press, 2000); and Hardt, M. & Negri, A. *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* (New York: Penguin, 2004).
48. Indeed, the history of capitalism in relation to colonization extends beyond the construction of specific ways of mapping space, time and sensory experiences to include the construction of political and gendered subjectivity. See McClintock, A. *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest* (New York: Routledge, 1995).
49. An haecceity is an entity defined by its particularity or uniqueness – its 'this'ness. To see the world in terms of haecceities is to see multiple entities or intensities rather than synthesised wholes or unities. A tree for example, would not be seen as a 'tree', but as a collection of green and brown and light and shade.

50. See, for example, Brown, P. *Literature Review of Major Trends in the History of Schizophrenia in the Past 400 Years, and the Development of Dance Movement Therapy: An Assessment of Theory and Practice* (Philadelphia: Hahnemann University, 1991).
51. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *Anti-Oedipus*, op. cit., p. 373.
52. Deleuze and Guattari write: 'capitalism forms with *a general axiomatic of decoded flows*... *A new threshold of deterritorialisation*... capitalism has from the beginning mobilised a force of deterritorialisation infinitely surpassing the deterritorialisation proper to the State', Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 453.
53. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *Anti-Oedipus*, op. cit., p. 373.
54. Ibid., p. 303.
55. For a further explanation of Deleuze's concept of capitalist axiomatization, see Toscano, A. 'Axiomatic', in Parr, A. (Ed.) *The Deleuze Dictionary*, op. cit., pp. 17–18.
56. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 453.
57. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *Anti-Oedipus*, op. cit., p. 28.
58. Deleuze and Guattari note: 'the great social axiomatic has replaced the territorial codes and the despotic overcodings that characterized the preceding formations; and a molar, gregarious aggregate has formed, whose mode of subjugation *has no equal*... social inscription and repression no longer even need to bear directly upon bodies and persons, but on the contrary precede them', Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 372, emphasis added.
59. Ibid., pp. 472–473.
60. Deleuze and Guattari write: 'capitalism... continually draws near to its limit, which is a genuinely schizophrenic limit... it is not a question of a way of life, but a process of production... capitalism, through its process of production, produces an awesome schizophrenic accumulation of energy, against which it brings all its vast powers of repression to bear, but which nonetheless continues to act as capitalism's limit'. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *Anti-Oedipus*, op. cit., p. 34.
61. Chesters, G., this volume.
62. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., pp. 1–2.
63. Ibid., p. 147.

Part I
Politics Beyond Identity

1
The Politics of Non-Being

Gregory Flaxman

The non-being of philosophy

In the opening pages of *What is Philosophy?*, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari admit that their book, the last they would write together, is inspired by old age, when sobriety has settled into the spirit and a kind of 'sovereign freedom' has taken hold – not only the freedom to ask what philosophy is but, also, the freedom to consider the dilemmas of philosophy today.[1] Thus, when the authors define philosophy as 'the construction of concepts', they immediately turn to the conditions that beleaguer this constructivism. They note with particular concern that ours is a world in which '[t]he simulacrum, the simulation of a packet of noodles, has become the true concept, and the one who packages the product, commodity, or work of art has become the philosopher, conceptual personae, or artist'.[2] Although the cumulative powers that the authors evoke in this regard, from computer science and marketing to design and advertising, are only the most recent challengers to philosophy, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that they represent the 'most shameful' of challengers. Unlike other contenders, the disciplines of communication have 'seized hold of the word *concept* itself', thereby asserting: 'This is our concern, we are the creative ones, we are the *ideas men*! We are the friends of the concept, we put it in our computers'.[3] Today, the 'ideas man' (or woman) is everywhere, and is everywhere celebrated, for this ambitious executive – this young *apprentice* – transforms the concept into a form of immediate promotion and self-promotion.

By the same token, though, philosophy itself has increasingly gravitated toward the procedures of communications. In a notorious interview concerning the 'New Philosophers', for instance, Deleuze lambastes this

younger generation of thinkers who have forsaken the 'fine articulations' of philosophy for the spectacle of the event and the creation of celebrity.[4] On the one hand, as he notes, these philosophers work exclusively with 'big concepts, all puffed up like an abscess: THE Law, Power, Master, THE World, THE Revolution, Faith, etc.' But on the other hand, he adds, it is precisely because these bloated concepts are ultimately empty that they serve as an exhibition or advertisement for the philosopher-author (the adjective 'new' in New Philosophers should thus be understood in the context of communications, where it forms an assemblage with the forces of marketing and capital: 'new and improved!') Inasmuch as the New Philosophers 'have introduced France to literary and philosophical marketing', however, they make philosophy into an enterprise that – under the pretense of big, bright concepts – actually works against the invention of *new* concepts.[5] Indeed, the irony of the New Philosophers is that they find in communications the means of representing universals, super-sized concepts which threaten to destroy the market for clever and careful innovations. No doubt it is in this light that Deleuze and Guattari wonder: 'How could philosophy, an old person, compete against young executives in a race for the universals of communication for determining the marketable form of the concept...?'[6]

Deleuze often defines the initial task of philosophy – and I would add, of politics – according to the art of forming problems, as opposed to the duty of producing of solutions, since the latter effectively conditions the kind of answers we produce, no less the kind of thinking we 'deserve'. A problem is neither that which demands recognition, nor that which calls for a response, since in each of these cases the problem is defined according to presuppositions, already given coordinates and universal conditions. Classical philosophy often begins by articulating what we know or how we might know, but the production of problems consists first and foremost in the creation of that which resists knowing. To the question that Deleuze and Guattari pose – the question as to how philosophy can compete with the universals of communication – this chapter will attempt to indicate the basis for affirming 'philosophy, an old person' by tracing the problem – the concept of the problem, the problem of creating concepts – back to one of its most 'antiquated' avatars, namely: 'non-being'. While this concept seems, at first glance, to confirm the nihilism into which philosophy (at least, as I have described it here) has been plunged, the discussion to follow revolves around the fundamental contention that non-being forms the beginning of a new politics. Indeed, non-being constitutes one of Deleuze's most remarkable

and least acknowledged contributions to political philosophy: non-being as the problem of the political or, in the context of Ancient Greek philosophy, non-being as the problem of the *Polis*.

The beginnings of non-being

This return to Greek philosophy will likely strike some as strange, even perverse, implying as it does that we should derive our political philosophy from antiquity, if not from an antiquated concept. Why should the 'all too postmodern' lament with which the chapter began induce a return to the ostensible origins of philosophy? Why should a sojourn to the Greek world be necessary in order to formulate a critical philosophy suited to contemporary politics? Why should philosophy, in other words, be an 'old man'? These questions actually augur the particular path that this chapter will trace in the discussion to follow, for they indicate the 'untimely' manner of our approach. Traditional history would likely proceed on the basis of an unbroken continuity from the Greeks to our own world, such that non-being would be a matter of retracing a kind of logical causality. Deleuze's treatment of antiquity, however, works to detach the Greeks from such an historical inevitability. Hence, in *What is Philosophy?* he and Guattari ask 'Why philosophy in Greece at that moment?', only in order to provide an answer that irreparably tears the event of Greek philosophy from any sense of necessity and dwells instead on the various elements, encounters, and connections that 'could have been different'.[7] The resulting history they call 'geophilosophy': the geographical and ultimately spatial consideration of philosophy whereby one seeks to map the contingent conditions from which the Greek world emerged. 'Geography is not confined to providing historical form with a substance and variable places', they write, '[i]t wrests it from the cult of origins in order to affirm the power of a "milieu" '.[8]

What are the geophilosophical conditions, the milieus, from which Greek philosophy emerges and how can we understand the concept of non-being as its untimely legacy and perhaps even the source of a new critical hopefulness? In establishing the lineaments of geophilosophy, Deleuze and Guattari outline three intimately related conditions which form the serial characteristics of Greek philosophy and the constituents of a theory of non-being: (1) 'a pure sociability as milieu of immanence'; (2) 'a certain pleasure in forming associations, which constitutes friendship'; and (3) 'a taste for the exchange of view, for conversation'.[9] For the sake of brevity, these conditions can be recapitulated according to the

terms that, in his own writings, Deleuze introduces as the basis for both philosophy and Athenian democracy, namely: *autochthonie*, *philia*, and *doxa*.[10] Insofar as geophilosophy consists in the analysis of the philosophical landscape, or what Deleuze will ultimately call 'the Earth' (*la Terre*), the numberless Greek myths of *authochthonie* serve as the inevitable or 'founding' point of departure. But, as Deleuze and Guattari contend, the geographical situation of the Greeks – a series of islands which have literally sprung from the earth, and a profound 'maritime component that goes under the sea to reestablish the territory'[11] – predisposed them to *authochthonie*. By no means designating a sedentary or stratified existence, *authochthonie* ought to be understood as the expression of a remarkable deterritorializing principle with which the Greeks made the Mediterranean a 'bath of immanence'.[12] Because they 'are the first to be at once near enough to and far enough away from the archaic Eastern empires to be able to benefit from them without following their model', the Greek citizens (*polei*) free themselves from the constraints of transcendent imperialism and instead enter into feverish competitions for markets, for colonies, and for prestige.[13]

It is in this respect that the second condition of geophilosophy (*philia*) can be grasped, for the network of Greek cities prepared the way for new kinds of relationship among people. The 'international marketplace' into which the Greeks entered makes possible 'a pure sociability as milieu of immanence, the "intrinsic nature of association", which is opposed to imperial sovereignty and implies no prior interest because, on the contrary, competing interests presuppose it'.[14] The very transformation of the *polei* in general, and of Athens in particular, bears witness to this new sense of sociability: where once the city had been hierarchically ruled by noble families (*genes*), the spirit of competition that sustained these filial relations gradually passed into new means of distributing power among citizens. 'Those who made up the city, however different in origin, rank, and function, appeared somehow to be "like" one another', Jean-Pierre Vernant writes of Greek democracy. 'This likeness laid the foundation for the unity of the *polis*, since for the Greeks only those who were alike could be mutually united by *philia*, joined in the same community'.[15] Surely the most profound sign of its 'health' (and the sign with which we pass to the final condition of geophilosophy: *doxa*) is that *philia* brought about a spirit of contestation. Only when a relationship of equality among equals (*isoi*) has been established does a genuine rivalry among differing opinions emerge.

Deleuze's taste for the Greek world[16] can be attributed in no small measure to the way in which its philosophy celebrates this 'strife for opposites' – a strife that is conjured by Heraclitus, rekindled by Hesiod, and strangely consummated by Plato. Ultimately, the historical contingency of Greek philosophy lies in the encounter made possible by a milieu whereby immanence, equality, and agonism ramify each other, the result of which is a vast theater of argument in which 'opinion... assumes a decisive importance'.[17] Is this not the very condition which Platonism, for better or worse, rises to confront – the 'democratic' condition which makes possible the articulation of philosophical discourse but which also threatens the privilege of philosophy as such? As Deleuze often points out, what troubles Plato is the fact that 'in Athenian democracy anyone can lay claim to anything', that the taste for opinion and conversation, even philosophical conversation, carries on without criteria for assessing the claimants and deciding among rivals.[18] Hence, especially in the later dialogues when Socrates' presence (and method) gives way to a dramatization of competing viewpoints, Platonism places the philosopher in the position of the jurist who must decide among claims and between opinions. 'The Platonic dialectic is neither a dialectic of contradiction nor of contrariety', Deleuze writes, 'but a dialectic of rivalry (*amphisbetesis*), a dialectic of rivals and suitors'.[19] In the *Statesman*, the philosopher's task is to determine the genuine shepherd of men; in the *Phaedrus*, the philosopher's task is to determine the genuine lover; in the *Sophist*, the philosopher's task is to determine the real sophist. And yet, as this last task suggests, the Platonic operation of selection and privilege discovers in the figure of the sophist the beginning of a labyrinth from which it cannot, with any degree of certainty, escape. For if the sophist can be identified with the creation of false images, or simulacra, the being of those images will have already been tacitly granted, since '[t]he audacity of the statement lies in its implication that "what is not" has being, for in no other way could a falsehood come to have being'.[20]

In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze acknowledges that among the Greeks who formulated the concept, 'non-being' (*mēg on*) tended to lead to two alternatives: 'either there is no non-being, and negation is illusory and ungrounded, or there is non-being, which puts the negative in being and grounds the negation'.[21] The first position belongs, above all, to Parmenides, who denies the existence of non-being altogether; the second belongs, in various forms, to the sophists, who launched their assault on Parmenides by reducing potentially everything to non-being.

But in the context of the *Sophist*, where the battle between these foes is literally renewed, another sense of non-being emerges in which the concept is tacitly affirmed without lapsing into negation.[22] The aim of preserving the philosopher's position over and against the sophist leads Platonism to confront non-being as the problem of being itself: that point at which its 'common sense' fails but which, for all that, cannot be reduced to the negative, the non-existent.[23] Indeed, 'it is precisely not the negative which plays this role' of non-being, Deleuze argues, adding that insofar as this is the case, 'we must consider whether or not the celebrated thesis of the sophist, despite certain ambiguities, should be understood as follows: "non" in the expression "non-being" expresses *something other than the negative*'.[24]

Rather, non-being can be understood to correspond to something like a gap or fissure in the tissue of the world. Far from consisting in the negation of being, non-being is that which, by all accounts, should *not be* but nevertheless *is*. While Deleuze offhandedly suggests that, in this light, we might convey the enigma of non-being as '(non)-being' or even '?-being', it might be more useful to follow his own advice to forego typographical cleverness and turn instead to the more enduring sense with which he stamps non-being, namely, the 'being of the problematic'.[25] Consider once more the alternatives into which non-being is typically drawn: 'either there is no non-being, and negation is illusory and ungrounded, or there is non-being, which puts the negative in being and grounds the negation'. Deleuze's alternative, which is in fact the alternative to alternatives, introduces an entirely new and uncanny possibility, for as we have seen there might be 'reasons to say *both* that there is non-being *and* that the negative is illusory'. Indeed, the very structure of this definition provides the basis for a critical intervention that releases us from the logic of exclusion ('either ... or'), which is itself structured by negativity, in order to affirm the logic of a problem which opens a disjunction ('both ... and') in being. In other words, non-being corresponds to the point where or when the present differs from itself and affirms that which is otherwise in the here and now. But how can non-being, or the being of the problem, be evoked today – and what would that mean for the prospect of a new politics?

The non-being of capitalism

It is worth noting that, in the wake of these early references, Deleuze never really returns to the concept of non-being; and yet his geophilosophy of modernity maintains a fidelity to the forces of non-being with

which we might begin to reckon in the sphere of politics today.[26] Not incidentally, the repetition of non-being effectively commences with a doubling of the question with which the chapter began. 'Why philosophy in Greece at that moment? It is the same question for capitalism', Deleuze and Guattari explain: 'why capitalism at these places and at these moments?'[27] In the case of both ancient philosophy and modern capitalism, the temptation to imagine a necessary or even an inevitable logic lurking behind the event must be resisted so that the peculiar points of bifurcation – the moments of when things might well have been otherwise – might be glimpsed. In both cases, Deleuze and Guattari have posed the same question: Why not in China? Why not locate the emergence of capitalism in China, or somewhere beyond the pale of the West, when the constituents of capitalism already seem to be in place there?[28] And in both cases, the answer lies in the imposition of a kind of imperial transcendence from which Greek philosophy and Western capitalism are, relatively speaking, free. In the absence of external limits and absolute rule which would centralize power on the imperial state, '*the West extends and propagates its centers of immanence*'.[29]

Indeed, the very combination which Deleuze and Guattari discover in the Greek context – *autochthony, philia, doxa* – is renovated and redistributed under capitalism, 'even if they have taken on a new meaning, which explains the permanence of philosophy in the economy of our democratic world'.[30] In the first place, the immanence which *autochthonie* evoked in Greece is resumed in the 'field of immanence of capital', where the 'maritime component' linking markets is effectively transformed by the variable flows, or tributaries, which link modern markets. In the second place, the sociability or *philia* which the Greeks enjoyed is resumed in the guise of 'the society of brothers or comrades', which constitute both the vast collective of workers as well as the potential force of revolution (the people). And in the third place, the democratic taste for *doxa* is resumed in a new 'reign of opinion', which determines the shape of democratic institutions and the larger 'public sphere' where society debates and negotiates its problems.[31] In capitalism, as Deleuze and Guattari write, we find 'a resumption, in another form and with other means, on a scale hitherto unknown, which nonetheless relaunches the combination for which the Greeks took the initiative'.[32]

And yet, insofar as a relationship has been forged between ancient philosophy and modern capitalism, the contingency of these correspondences must be addressed. In the case of each of these three conditions, the initial possibilities and the fantastic deterritorializations that

they promise have also led to bitter disappointments. In the first place, the milieu or plane of immanence to which capital gives rise only continues to sustain itself by imposing relative, axiomatic limits (reterritorializations) which result in the development of democratic nation states whose actual investment almost always concerns markets more than actual democracy. In the second place, the society of 'brothers and friends', which made possible agonism and rivalry in the Greek world, now devolves into brute competitions of an uncivil society, a war of all against all (*bellum omnium contra omnes*) that threatens to turn even the philosopher into a salesperson seeking to pawn his or her wares. In the third place (and this is what is of most concern here), the efflorescence of opinion and conversation, which challenged and even nurtured the development of philosophy, lapses into a communications society where marketing supplants philosophy and advertising slogans stand in for concepts: 'Free markets make free peoples'; 'the time of the welfare state is over'; 'God bless America' – 'for everything else, there's Mastercard'...

Whence the irony with which we pass from the Greek world to modern capitalism – and, as Deleuze and Guattari say, the history of capitalism is invariably 'ironic' – for while rivalry constitutes an integral and even genetic element of philosophy, we now confront a rival in the form of communications that lays claim to the title and role of philosophy itself.[33] It is no doubt true that communications and marketing demonstrate a sympathy for the creation of concepts, but it is also important to be aware of how much the concept 'has become the set of product displays (historical, scientific, artistic, sexual, pragmatic), and the event has become the exhibition that sets up various displays and the "exchange of ideas" it is supposed to promote'.[34] However sensational the fabrications of our 'ideas men' may be (and perhaps precisely because they are sensational), they can only appeal to the logic of the *present*: 'buy a new car now', 'refinance immediately', 'go to Spain today'. Yes, capitalism provides a plane of immanence on which remarkable concepts have been invented, but as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, under capitalism their production is often botched, creating all manner of pale and vacuous concepts that hardly deserve the name except insofar as they lay claim to it. Or, more precisely, by laying claim to the concept, the ideas-man ('les conceptuer') effectively kills the concept ('tuer le concept'). Thus, the process of marketing and communication ought to be understood in the double sense of an execution insofar as it carries out a kind of production at the expense of thinking.

The non-being of utopia

Perhaps, in the wake of this discussion, the dilemma of critical and political philosophy today can be posed anew, for our contemporary communication society propagates a concept – or, better yet, a concept of the concept – which by its nature cannot escape its present, its *Zeitgeist*. The timeliness of the concept, its sad and deflated currency, increasingly forecloses belief that an 'other' society, an 'other' politics, an 'other' history might be possible. Ironically, the postmodern anticipation that master narratives were nearing extinction has gradually given way to a recognition that we might be stuck with 'this' sad society, 'this' dismal politics, 'this' irremediable history. In this context we might well ask, whether to ourselves or aloud: 'what is to be done?' The history of this old 'Russian' question – beginning with Chernyshevsky's social vision, then Tolstoy's moral one, and finally Lenin's revolutionary one – always consists in its conversion into a program concerning what *should* be done. But in our present context the question seems to have re-acquired the quality of a genuine, and perhaps genuinely unanswerable, appeal. What is to be done today, when the prospect of revolutionary politics seems impossibly antiquated and even the pragmatism of mainstream liberal politics appears to have been squelched?

In this regard, the importance of the geophilosophical series that has been traced from *autochthonie* to *philia* to *doxa* should not be underestimated, for it leads not only to an understanding of the Polis as the first space of philosophy, but also to an understanding that philosophy itself, however much it may 'criticize, surpass and correct' these contingent conditions, 'nonetheless remains indexed by them'.[35] Indeed, only by following this old geophilosophical series can we begin to affirm philosophy today in the face of our communications society. Whereas the latter exists in a perpetual present, the present in which concepts themselves are consumable, philosophy must find ways to intervene in the present without, for all that, being 'of' the present. The mission of philosophy, Deleuze and Guattari intimate, is to resonate with 'its own epoch' without simply replying to the dominant determinations of that epoch, since such replies and reactions condemn philosophy to sociology, to journalism, or to current affairs.[36] It is in this sense that Deleuze and Guattari propose a revitalization of utopianism, for utopia is precisely the critical and conceptual operation which links the 'now and here' to the 'nowhere'. In order to understand this operation it may be helpful to undertake a brief etymological detour. Utopia is comprised of the Greek prefix 'u' ('*óv*'), which means 'not', and a modification

of the Greek '*topos*' ('τόπο') which means 'place'. But soon after philosopher Sir Thomas More coined the term 'utopia', his contemporaries began to suggest that the concept was better conveyed by the spelling 'eutopia'.[37] The addition of '*eu*' ('εύ') is typically used to make what follows it the subject of goodness – making eutopia refer to a 'good place'.

In this light, and by way of conclusion, a distinction between the two senses of utopia can be established on the basis of their respective movements of deterritorialization. Where *eutopia* displaces the real world onto another, better, world, such that the initial deterritorialization gives way to the actualization of a new transcendence, *utopia* intervenes in the actual world by means of another reality, a 'virtual' reality, which opens up a disjunction in the space-time of the present. 'Actually, utopia is what links philosophy with its own epoch, with European capitalism, but also with the Greek city', Deleuze and Guattari write:

> In each case it is with utopia that philosophy becomes political and takes the criticism of its own time to the highest point. Utopia does not split off from infinite movement: etymologically it stands for absolute deterritorialization but always at the critical point at which it is connected with the present relative milieu, and especially with the forces that stifle that milieu.[38]

This may well explain why Deleuze and Guattari go so far as to suggest that the concept which ought to be conveyed by the word 'utopia' requires something like the invention of another word, since the literal sense of utopia has been laden with connotations that have taken us too far afield from its potential power to open, within the present, a problem that is not of 'this' world.[39] One should already detect in the concept of utopia the unmistakable echo of non-being, for in both cases the pretense of a kind of quasi-negation only serves to underscore the absence of an 'actual' plane of things in favor of that which is elsewhere. Indeed, just as non-being emerges within the Greek geophilosophical series – as both its consummation and its refutation – the same can be said of utopia in the geophilosophical series of capitalism. Utopia revokes the simple offering of locality, actuality, or presence in order to affirm the link between our time and that which is untimely. Utopia intervenes in our space-time but always intervenes from elsewhere, and in this respect utopia can be affirmed in the same way that non-being can: there is both reason to say that utopia exists and to say that the negative is illusory. Whereas the conceptualization of utopia

as 'eutopia' effectively displaces us into a better future, utopia as 'non-being', emerges strangely, unpredictably, and uncannily as a problem within the present. Confronted with a contemporary sense of nihilism, we can do no better than to call on a utopian politics of non-being 'to work against the time and thereby have an effect on it, hopefully for the benefit of a future time'.[40]

Notes

1. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?* (French: 1991) Trans. G. Burchell and H. Tomlinson (London: Verso, 1994), p. 10.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Deleuze, G. *Two Regimes of Madness* (French: 1975–1995) Trans. A. Hodges and M. Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2006), p. 141.
5. As Deleuze explains, this kind of philosopher most closely approximates the politician, 'who is above all concerned to deny that which "differs", so as to conserve or prolong an established historical order, or to establish a historical order which already calls forth in the world the forms of its representation' in Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition* (French: 1968) Trans. P. Patton (London: Athlone, 1994), p. 53.
6. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., pp. 10–11.
7. Ibid., p. 93.
8. Ibid., p. 96.
9. Ibid., pp. 87–88.
10. See 'Plato and the Greeks', in Deleuze, G. *Essays Critical and Clinical* (French: 1993) Trans. D. Smith and M. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 136–137. In this short piece, Deleuze forecasts many of the concerns that he and Guattari will broach in their writing on geophilosophy.
11. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 86.
12. Ibid., p. 88.
13. Ibid., p. 87. Also see Braudel, F. *The Mediterranean in the Ancient World*, Trans: S. Reynolds (London: Penguin, 2002). The innovation of the Greek world, which Braudel compares to that of the great Italian market cities of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, unleashed a sphere of 'commerce' that encompassed not only goods but, also, ideas. Fernand Braudel once observed, 'It was then that the network of Greek cities, both ancient and modern, really "went live" ', p. 216.
14. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 87.
15. Vernant, J. *The Origins of Greek Thought* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 60–61.
16. Deleuze's taste for the Greek world, as I have called it, is of course inspired by Nietzsche's own profound love of the Greeks. Indeed, the phrase 'strife for opposites' is borrowed from: Nietzsche, F. *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, Trans. M. Cowan (Washington: Regney Publishing, 1998), p. 55.
17. Deleuze, G. *Essays Critical and Clinical*, op. cit., p. 136. This phrase, and especially the adjective 'decisive', ought to be carefully considered. What is

'decisive' is precisely the way that the space of the city potentially opens an arena of opinion without providing a means of external or transcendent control.

18. Ibid., p. 137.
19. Deleuze, G. *The Logic of Sense* (French: 1969) Trans. M. Lester and C. Stivale (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 254.
20. Plato, *The Collected Dialogues of Plato* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 979.
21. Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., p. 63.
22. In the *Sophist*, the dialogue begins when a stranger – one of Parmenides students – is pressed by Socrates to distinguish between a philosopher and a sophist. Hence, the dialogue resumes the very problem with which Parmenides (and his student, Xeno) confronted.
23. Deleuze, G. *The Logic of Sense*, p. 256. In Deleuze's words, 'as a consequence of searching in the direction of the simulacrum and of leaning over its abyss, Plato discovers, in the flash of an instant, that the simulacrum is not simply a false copy, but that it places in question the very notations of copy and model'.
24. Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., p. 63.
25. Ibid. Deleuze's warning against 'typographical cleverness' can be found, most notably, in the opening pages of Deleuze, G. *A Thousand Plateaus* (French: 1980) Trans. B. Massumi (London: Athlone, 1987), p. 6, where he and Guattari invoke the problem of writing outside the logic of 'the book'.
26. The exception here is to be found in a short and peculiar essay, 'An Unrecognized Precursor to Heidegger: Alfred Jarry', which appears in Deleuze, G. *Essays Critical and Clinical*, op. cit., pp. 91–98.
27. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 95.
28. The question of capitalism in China, which leads to the more general questions of 'Asiatic production' or 'uneven development', is first broached by Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus*. Both there and then in *What is Philosophy?*, they tend to follow Fernand Braudel in suggesting that while the history of capitalism begins earlier than is typically dated by Marx's mature writings (Braudel effectively locates its initial organization in the great Italian market-cities of the fourteenth century, thereby following the writings of the younger Marx), this shift only serves to clarify the conditions (i.e., absence of transcendence) that permits the great syntheses of wealth and labor that characterize capitalism as such. See the section on 'Savages, Barbarians and Civilized Men', in Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (French: 1972) Trans. R. Hurley, M. Seem and H.R. Lane (London: Athlone, 1983). Also see the section on 'Towns and Cities', in Braudel, F. *The Structures of Everyday Life*, Trans. S. Reynolds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
29. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 97.
30. Deleuze, G. *Essays Critical and Clinical*, op. cit., p. 137.
31. Ibid.
32. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 97.
33. As Deleuze and Guattari write in the introduction to *What Is Philosophy?*, our situation today recalls the 'whole Platonic theater that produces a prolif-

eration of conceptual persona by endowing them with the powers of the comic and the tragic' (p. 10).

34. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 10.
35. Deleuze, G. *Essays Critical and Clinical*, op. cit., pp. 136–137.
36. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 99. No doubt the sense of an 'epoch' on which Deleuze and Guattari draw (i.e., a point of chronology) is inflected by the related sense of 'epoché' on which Husserl insists (i.e., a suspension or stoppage of historical judgement).
37. See, for instance, Philip Sidney's *Defence of Poesy*, where he refers to 'Sir Thomas Moore's Eutopia' in line 442. Notably, many editions of Sidney's work have transposed eutopia to utopia, as if the latter were simply the more common spelling and not, as I am indicating, a different concept. See Duncan-Jones, Katherine (Ed.) *Sir Philip Sidney: The Major Works* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 222.
38. Ibid., pp. 99–100.
39. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 110. As Deleuze and Guattari say, 'Utopia is not a good concept because even when opposed to History it is still subject to it and lodged within it as an ideal motivation'.
40. See Friedrich Nietzsche's chapter 'On the Utility and Liability of History for Life' (p. 87), in Nietzsche, F. *Unfashionable Observations*, Trans. R. Gray (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).

2
The Revolutionary Dividual

Jonathan Roffe

Introduction

It is a difficult time to believe in the concept of utopia. Whether we take a conservative political bent, which promotes the instrument of violence as a tool of freedom, or a liberal view, which insists on the power of grass-roots intervention and the necessity of beginning with what one has and making the best of it, it is difficult to be an unbridled optimist. It is hard, in short, to hope for the genesis of a better world given the current state of contemporary life.

The society proposed in Thomas More's famous *Utopia* of 1516 – in which the reader is led to think of a beatific state of affairs in which the rule of law is humane, the institution of property is abolished in favour of a common wealth and, as a result social inequality is done away with – takes on the sheen of a fairy tale when confronted with the contemporary world in which, as Walter Benjamin says, a '"state of emergency"... is not the exception but the rule'.[1] Why is it then, in the face of all of this, that Gilles Deleuze proposes in his final book that philosophy, science and art – that creative thought – has a utopian orientation?

For Deleuze, utopia is a matter not of hope nor of an ideal society, but of who we are, and what we are capable of, *here and now*. The goal of this chapter is to outline why, despite the state of emergency that is normality, utopia is still a word and a concept that has the critical force of freedom.

What follows will elaborate this position by answering three interconnected questions, which lead towards a reason why hope may be maintained in contemporary times. The first question: Who acts, and who is the subject of political action? This question leads us to a theme

that emerges in Deleuze's later work, that of the *people to come*.[2] The second question: How do new ways of going ahead, new ways of living, feeling and thinking – in other words, revolutionary alternatives – come about? And the third question: Why is the word *utopian* a good choice to describe this political perspective?[3]

Who acts? Deleuze's account of a dividual subjectivity

This first question – who acts? – seems to begin a long way from the concept of utopia, for it relates to how we imagine ourselves, rather than the world around us. However, if we want to consider society and its future, we must also think through what it means to be a self, a subject.

In contrast to viewing society and its political life in terms of the ways in which it is organized by the people (the people choose democracy, monarchy, and so on), Deleuze focuses on the ways in which different social formations produce different kinds of subjects. Deleuze's political philosophy is therefore concerned with the *constitution* of the subject in place of the traditional focus on individuals in society. While many perspectives on social life presuppose that individuals are already formed, and that they have a fixed 'nature', Deleuze rejects the idea that human beings are pre-established, autonomous individuals. In fact, he goes much further than this, and argues that a philosophy which begins from a belief in an autonomous, founding subject, undermines its capacity to grasp the real structure of social life, thought and subjectivity itself.

In *Anti-Oedipus*,[4] Deleuze and Guattari describe not just three social formations (pre-State, State and capitalist society), but also the definitive traits that characterize subjectivity – what it means to be a self, and how people experience themselves – in these formations. For Deleuze, the constitution of subjectivity takes a very particular form. The subject is constituted from an accumulation of initially passive pre-individual elements that later, in response to both encounters with the world and social structures, develop centralized reflection and active capacities. In his studies of Hume[5] and Bergson,[6] Deleuze will show that before the advent of subjectivity proper, there are always passive collections of habits, echoes of the world, or ensembles of images, none of which are initially able to organize themselves as they are not yet 'human nature' (Hume) or a 'centre of action' (Bergson). I propose, in light of these remarks, that Deleuze's basic picture of subjectivity is centred on what can be called the *dividual*: divided rather than fundamentally unified,

constituted instead of presupposed, initially passive rather than *a priori* active.[7]

The dividual nature of subjectivity manifests itself for Deleuze on two levels: the intra-subjective and the collective or inter-subjective. I have already discussed the first point: the belief that the subject is constituted from pre-subjective elements in the context of particular social structures. As an illustration of this idea, it is helpful to recall the famous opening page of *A Thousand Plateaus*, where Deleuze and Guattari declare of themselves that 'each of us was already several, there was already quite a crowd'.[8] In relation to the second point, there is, for Deleuze, an equally important sense in which discrete individuals (human subjects) are a part of larger subjects. In *Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature*,[9] this belief is what leads Deleuze and Guattari to insist that, rather than seeing a writer as an individual genius, we must see them as a part of a 'collective assemblage of enunciation': one part, that is, of a greater 'subject' producing the literary text. It is rare to have the kinds of experiences which reveal what Deleuze is discussing here, experiences of being made up of many parts, or of being immediately a part of dividual subjects bigger than ourselves. Deleuze's explanation for this is that experiences which interrupt an autonomous experience of the self are restricted in advance by the kind of subjectivity that are favored by particular social formations. In other words, our ways of thinking about ourselves, our ways of feeling experiences, are part of how we are constituted in a particular social context. This analysis of subjectivity leads us to an important political question: If we, as subjects, are constituted by the society of which we are a part, how can we intervene, resist or challenge the structures of these societies if we want to change what we are?

Responding to this concern, the first thing to note is that, for Deleuze, the formation of subjectivity is never final (a *fait accompli*). Subjectivity is continually made and remade. Borrowing from the philosopher Gilbert Simondon, and also Benedictus Spinoza, Deleuze argues that individuals are not 'guaranteed' in their individuality. The individual is not a stable unity. Rather, it is *metastable*; that is, always in a complex relation with pre-individual elements from the milieu in which the individual emerged in the first place. A milieu which, in the terms we are using here, is society itself. The self is thus in precarious relations of composition and decomposition with the society by which it is produced. We meet with people, eat, change our minds. We are moved by books and by cars. We encounter the world innumerable times in our everyday lives. And, in these encounters, our stability as 'selves' is perpetually in

the presence of elements that constitute the pre-individual milieu from which we are formed. This continual inter-relation of self and society demonstrates, in terms of Deleuze's position, that there is always room for the current state of a subject to be changed.

It would be excessively optimistic, however, to think that many of these everyday encounters have the power to alter anything profound in terms of what it means to be a self in a particular context. A substantial effort needs to be made, therefore, in order to enable changes in the ways in which we are composed as subjects in specific social contexts. For Deleuze, this takes place in two steps, or moments, which may or may not be distinct in particular cases. First of all, there must be a moment of de-individualization, an escape to some degree from the limits of the individual. Secondly, there must be the constitution of new ways of being in the world, new ways of thinking and feeling, new ways of being a subject. In fact, both movements are given by Deleuze and Guattari a single name: *becoming*. On the one hand, becoming is a movement on the pre-individual level, the level of what constitutes us: all the movements, connections, pieces of our world that are patched together to form a subject. These becomings ultimately concern new ways of being in the world. On the other hand, becoming is the name for every kind of relationship or connection which is not governed by the dominant codes which organize life. The discussion of becoming-woman undertaken in *A Thousand Plateaus*[10] describes both an attempt to flee the gravity of 'the average adult-white-heterosexual-European-male-speaking a standard language',[11] but also the means by which relationships can be entered into that evade this standardizing grid. Hence, becoming is the name for the constitution of new collective subjectivities.

Yet the question remains: how can substantial change be *effected*? If the constitution of forms of subjectivity is at the heart of all social formations, what kinds of political challenge can individual subjects make? How can the double movement of de-individualization and the creation of new ways of living be performed? For Deleuze, it is a matter of creating new forms of subjectivity that will also be new ways of thinking and feeling. It is to philosophy, art and science that Deleuze and Guattari assign the task of such a creation.

How is revolution possible? Creativity and politics

Deleuze and Guattari assign specific products to philosophy, science and art: philosophy creates concepts; science creates functives; and art,

affects and percepts. However, what all three practices of thought have in common is precisely that they are *creative*. Being creative produces new ways of thinking. Taken in a broad sense to include experience in general (ways of feeling, ways of seeing, ways of knowing, ways of being affected, and so on), this conception immediately breaks with what is certainly the dominant way of understanding the practices of philosophy, science and art. For Deleuze and Guattari, there is no sense in which these practices *represent the world as it is*. Rather, the concepts created through the practice of philosophy literally create new ways of thinking. In turn, art doesn't *describe*, represent or narrate the world, but literally *creates* new ways of experiencing the world; ways of feeling (affects) and perceiving (percepts).

In addition to this rejection of representation, the products of creative thought are not immediately attributable to subjects: philosophical concepts are not the thoughts of a particular person, artistic affects and percepts are not the perceptions *of* anyone, or the affections that anyone feels. Deleuze and Guattari argue that concepts, functives, percepts and affects are real beings that exist irrespective of the point of view adopted towards them by particular people. It is at this point that Deleuze and Guattari introduce a particular scholarly theme. If the percepts embodied in a painting (not a picture of an ocean, but a view *from* the ocean, a way of seeing-as-ocean...), or in a concept of society, are not the perceptions or concepts *of* anything or anyone, then what is their relation to subjectivity? Here Deleuze frequently takes up a thesis based on the work of the artist Paul Klée, namely the belief that the audience for art is lacking. The work of art does not represent (or distort) the familiar world for the benefit of a pre-existing audience. Instead, in creating new ways of experiencing and living, artwork necessitates a new people, an audience that does not yet exist.

Deleuze and Guattari take on this theme and expand it. Given that all creative thought presents us with ways of thinking and feeling that do not belong to a particular person's point of view, it is the case that each concept, each percept, affect or functive all call for a new subject who can think, feel or know from the point of view of these creations. In general, creative thought calls for new forms of subjectivity to take it up, to express or embody it in the world. Deleuze and Guattari's evocations of 'a new people and a new earth',[12] in *What is Philosophy?*, concern precisely this point. Philosophy, science and art continually call for new forms of subjectivity: people who take up creations in and of the world, and perform new ways of living that correspond to it.

A note of caution is needed at this point. In the words of Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus*: 'we hold in the first place that art and science have a revolutionary potential, and nothing more'.[13] It would be a mistake to think that all attempts at artworks (or philosophy or science) succeed in creating new ways of thinking and experiencing. Attempts at creative thought face many threats, relative to the milieus in which these respective creations take place. A philosophy may not succeed in creating any new concepts, and art might fail in provoking new ways of feeling or seeing. However, insofar as these practices attempt to rupture aspects of contemporary ways of living, and the forms of subjectivity that go along with it, they do have revolutionary potential. The following passage from *What is Philosophy?* offers a summary of this:

> We do not lack communication. On the contrary, we have too much of it. We lack creation. We lack resistance to the present. The creation of concepts in itself calls for a future form, for a new earth and people that do not yet exist... Art and philosophy converge at this point: the constitution of an earth and a people that are lacking as the correlate of creation.[14]

Philosophy and art, as creative practices, work to *resist the present.* It is this argument which leads us to consider the use of the term *utopia* by Deleuze and Guattari.

In what sense is Deleuze's political thought utopian?

Deleuze and Guattari's main discussion of the theme of utopia occurs in the fourth chapter of *What is Philosophy?*, entitled 'Geophilosophy'.[15] In this chapter, Deleuze and Guattari elucidate the relationship between the social context in which philosophy is practised, and the practice of philosophy itself (although we can also add science and art to this account by considering the rest of the book). In particular, Deleuze and Guattari explain the role of philosophy in the context of capitalism, and argue that it has a *political* role. For Deleuze and Guattari, contemporary capitalist society is characterized by a relative degree of what they term *deterritorialization.* Certain elements of society, particular ways of acting and thinking, states of affairs, are more or less freed from the grid of social codes that governed their role, in order to be circulated as saleable commodities. For example, land – which was once the very ground of human existence – has been deterritorialized, and is now a commodity

that can be bought and sold. Likewise, Deleuze and Guattari argue that there has been a shameful deterritorialization of conceptual creation, whereby advertizing and marketing have taken the concept from its previous place in philosophical discourse, allowing pseudo-concepts to be sold as new ways of living and thinking, ways which do not offer the rupturing power of the properly philosophical concept.

To this relative degree of conceptual deterritorialization, which occurs via the 'lifestylization' of culture, Deleuze and Guattari oppose the *absolute* deterritorialization of the concept. They consider this to be the 'proper' deterritorialization of the concept. Philosophy, science and art facilitate creation outside of social structures, and exceed the capacity of capitalism to evade these structures. Taking painting as an example (as Deleuze does with particular reference to Francis Bacon[16]), there is always a battle waged by the painter on the canvas *itself* – which forms a point of contact for the world of cliché, of social structures and norms, and of the relative deterritorializing forces of capitalism. What emerges from the canvas, if the artist is successful in breaking with these clichés, are affects and percepts that completely exceed the social codes that were present on the canvas to begin with. The world of clichés is deterritorialized in an absolute sense through the creation of the artwork.

With this in mind, I turn to the central passage of *What is Philosophy?* on utopia, where Deleuze and Guattari write:

> Philosophy takes the relative deterritorialization of capital to the absolute... turns it back against itself so as to summon forth a new earth and a new people... Actually, utopia is what links philosophy with its own epoch, with European capitalism, but also already with the Greek city. In each case it is with utopia that philosophy becomes political and takes the criticism of its own time to its highest point. Utopia does not split off from infinite movement: etymologically it stands for absolute deterritorialisation but always at the critical point at which it is connected with the present relative milieu. Erewhon, the world used by Samuel Butler, refers not only to no-where but also to now-here... The word utopia therefore designates that conjunction of philosophy, or of the concept, with the present milieu – political philosophy.[17]

As the creation of new ways of thinking, philosophy (alongside science and art) exceeds the deterritorialization proper to capitalism, which is targeted toward the creation of commodities. When capitalism achieves this goal, it only adds a further pleat or fold to the structure of society

itself; it does not create a new social formation. Creative thought has, as its goal, the complete cracking of the structure of society in order to let in fresh air, or create space for real novelty. In doing so, it must be designated as *utopian*, since it calls for a new earth (a new relationship with a social milieu, a new territory) and a new people (new forms of subjectivity). In Deleuze and Guattari's account, 'utopian' is in fact a title for practical and concrete political struggle. This is why Deleuze so often comes back to Butler's word *Erewhon*, which combines both the importance of absolute deterritorialisation (the 'infinite movement' mentioned above), and that of the here and now, the 'present milieu', in the political engagement with our times.

In addition to these points, we must add that there is, for Deleuze and Guattari, a link between the concept of utopia and the future. The concept of the future in question, however, is not the future as a calculable outcome of contemporary historical processes. Art and philosophy must *resist* the present in favor of the future, but not in the hope of the advent of a particular state of affairs.

What is at play here is a striking conception of the future. An essential component of this concept is the following: both the present and the past, as temporal modes, are based in the stability and centrality of the subject (the constituted individual-dividual). The future, understood on the basis of this, is merely what can be expected, that which remains in harmony with our social selves (as we remember them) and provides continuity. More broadly, the future is what can be extrapolated from the present state of affairs, in the sense of being a consequence of the present; that which is likely to happen. In contrast to this, Deleuze considers the future in another sense, one that breaks open the monad of the subject, and subjects the expected future to the potential for alternatives. This is the idea of an essentially *open* future, an openness that constitutes the ground for change and all difference. On the one hand, there is the 'historical future', the predictable or possible states of affairs that may follow from the current situation. On the other, there is the future as the openness of any state of affairs; as the condition for things being other than what they are; the condition for a rupture within the present. Deleuze and Guattari give the name non-historical *becoming* to this other account of the future, and link it to Nietzsche's *untimely*, Foucault's *actual*, and Kant's idea of revolutionary *enthusiasm*. This is precisely why, in *Anti-Oedipus*, readers are told that there cannot be any revolutionary political program offered in advance[18] – there cannot be any definitive answer to the question 'what should be done?' – since what is to be done must be determined on a case-by-case basis.

In *A Thousand Plateaus*, a similar reminder is given: 'Politics is by no means an apodictic science. It proceeds by experimentation, groping in the dark, injection, withdrawal, advances, retreats. The factors of decision and prediction are limited'.[19]

Conclusion

I conclude with the statement, perhaps most famously propounded by Leon Trotsky, that revolutionary politics needs to be *permanent*.[20] Permanent revolution is not concerned with change in the internal organization of a social structure – comparative wealth-levels, the relative global position of nations, and so on – but rather with changing the world as it is and as it is experienced. For Deleuze and Guattari, such a politics involves art, science and philosophy – not as secondary elements, but rather central activities. To do philosophy, to create artworks, these activities can be *literally* revolutionary.

Why is revolutionary politics always permanent for Deleuze and Guattari? I have argued that the utopian character of revolutionary politics does not suppose, or impose, any particular state of affairs as its goal. In turn, the future can never be reduced to the set of consequences to be drawn from the present. More concretely, no matter what new ways of living have been or are created, there is no guarantee that these will continue to be of any use. New situations will emerge, and previous ways of living and thinking are no longer of help. For example, our contemporary capitalist society adjusts to changes, and works to refold rogue elements of the socius back into the ceaseless play of the commodity. An active political life, with the goal of bringing about new ways to be a subject, must put into play all the resources available in the contemporary context. However, this can only be done in the name of the future as the virtual ground of all change – which is to say, in the name of utopia. The concept of utopia remains central to a politically engaged way of thinking our societies and ourselves. We need to consider that it is in the name of the future that we try and create new ways of living. And it is in the name of the future that we begin to think again. Such is the utopian project.

Notes

1. Benjamin, W. *Illuminations*, Trans. H. Zohn (London: Fontana, 1977), p. 259.
2. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?* (French: 1991) Trans. G. Burchell and H. Tomlinson (London: Verso, 1994).

3. My preferred recent treatment of the concept of utopia in Deleuze's philosophy is Paul Patton's in Patton, P. *Deleuze and the Political* (London: Routledge, 2000).
4. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (French: 1972) Trans. R. Hurley, M. Seem and H.R. Lane (London: Athlone, 1983).
5. Deleuze, G. *Empiricism and Subjectivity* (French: 1953) Trans. C. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).
6. Deleuze, G. *Bergsonism* (French: 1966) Trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam (New York: Zone, 1991).
7. This divided subject is very different from the Lacanian 'split self'. As Slavoj Zizek characterizes it: 'In the Lacanian theory, the subject is precisely not "in-dividual," an indivisible One, but a constitutively divided, split Subject'. See Zizek, S. *Tarrying with the Negative* (New England: Durham University Press, 1995), p. 30. For Deleuze, the dividuality of the subject is neither constitutive nor is the 'split' due to the conflict between our nature and our socio-centric existence. The social subject is a constituted unity rather than a result of a constitutive split. Deleuze's own occasional uses of the word 'dividual' (e.g., in the Cinema books) speak to a slightly different point. See Deleuze, G. *Cinema 1: The Movement Image* (French: 1983) Trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989); and Deleuze, G. *Cinema 2: The Time Image* (French: 1985) Trans. H. Tomlinson and R. Galeta (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989).
8. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (French: 1980) Trans. B. Massumi (London: Athlone, 1987), p. 3.
9. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature* (French: 1975) Trans. D. Polan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).
10. See Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., pp. 275–279 and 287–294.
11. Ibid., p. 105.
12. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit.
13. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *Anti-Oedipus,* op. cit., p. 379.
14. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 108.
15. Ibid.
16. Deleuze, G. *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation* (French: 1981) Trans. D. Smith (London: Continuum, 2004).
17. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., pp. 99–100.
18. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *Anti-Oedipus,* op. cit., p. 380.
19. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 461.
20. A key text in this regard is his 1929 book, Trotsky, L. *The Permanent Revolution* (New York: Merit, 1969).

3

Intersex: Between the Law and Nature

Edward Mussawir

Introduction: Encounter

Writing about a social issue through Gilles Deleuze is problematic at the same time as it is productive. It is problematic, because one risks applying pre-given concepts to a particular segment of reality; thereby limiting the ways in which the 'issue' can be understood. On the other hand, it is productive, because irrespective of the judgments we bring to any concrete topic, the thought of a philosopher can only be encountered through something that is lived and experienced. As Deleuze himself suggests: '[s]omething in the world forces us to think. This something is an object, not of recognition, but of a fundamental *encounter*.'[1]

The aim and movement of this chapter is two-fold. It is to explore the relationship between law and sexual difference which Deleuze develops in his work entitled *Proust and Signs*,[2] and it is to facilitate an encounter with this element in his philosophy through a particular legal case concerning transsexuality. The case in question was heard in the Family Court of Australia in 2004 and is entitled *Re Alex: Hormonal Treatment for Gender Identity Dysphoria*.[3] It concerns the sex and sexuality of a young person before the law. 'Alex', then 13 years old, sought legal approval for a course of hormonal treatment that constituted the initial stages of a 'sex-change'. Alex believes that he is a boy,[4] although 'anatomically and in the eyes of the law'[5] he was recognized as being a girl. Confronted with a situation in which neither Alex, nor his guardian, were legally able to consent to the procedure, the court was called upon to decide whether immediate hormonal treatment would be in Alex's best interests.

My engagement with the case of *Re Alex* is in part to explore what it means to reduce gender – and the difference between genders – to a

form of socio-legal representation such as *judgment*. It is also to explore in what ways, for example, this form of representation might limit our understandings of sexual politics and the practices of sexuality. Are there ways in which the law and sexuality can be configured other than through judgment?

Conceptualizing desire and subjectivity

Before this problem is explored, it is useful to give some background to Deleuze's conceptualization of desire and sexuality. One of the more common ways in which Deleuze's work has been approached is through his critique of psychoanalysis and the 'Oedipus complex'.[6] Popular psychoanalytic understandings of subjectivity tend to associate sexual subjectivity with 'lack'.[7] In the case of heterosexual desire, this 'lack' is the women's lack of a phallus and consequent desire for the penis, and the man's lack of sexual attention from his mother and consequent desire for women. Deleuze offers a productive way to think through social issues related to sexuality and gender by moving beyond this structural psychoanalytic link between lack, gender and sexual desire.

For Deleuze in particular, the theorization of sexuality demands positive understandings of both desire and difference as political concepts. Against the negatively defined concept of sexual subjectivity, Deleuze articulates a fundamental positivity in his philosophy of desire and difference. One of the ways he does so is through a concept of absolute immanence.

Deleuze uses the term absolute immanence to refer to the radical interiority of a conceptual space. This is not as abstract as it may sound. In fact, it is uniquely practical. What are abstract for Deleuze are only those forms that we intuitively place *outside of* immanence; for example, a self, 'I', a subject and an object, mummy and daddy. It is to these transcendent terms or co-ordinates that psychoanalysis tends to make all expressions of sexuality refer. Expressions can be understood within psychoanalysis only by attributing them to a subject or to the form of a self separated from an object that it lacks. This is useful only up to a certain point, for while it may adequately explain all relationships of desire within terms that are immediately familiar, it does not explain the relationship of these terms themselves to an underlying concept of desire. What, for instance, does desire need and want from the form of an 'I' or a 'self'?

Deleuze's concept of immanence responds to this kind of question by devolving all unifying, abstract and transcendent terms upon a single

'plane'. It thus provides the means of going beyond the conceptual 'lack' in psychoanalytic representations of sexuality by implicating a space of collective and productive modes of expression and experimentation that do not depend upon any particular form of identity. Everything practical and experimental in terms of sexual desire implicates this plane of immanence. This does not just mean that it would be up to 'me' to experiment in order to desire, but the experimentation that I necessarily become in immanence is constitutive of a productive movement of desire.

Re Alex: The body and the law

The case of *Re Alex* has received widespread attention in Australia, from the media and from legal scholars.[8] In doctrinal terms, it is considered important as part of a series of cases involving the power or jurisdiction of a court to approve or refuse special medical procedures for minors who are unable to legally consent to such procedures in their own right. But the case is also significant because it marks an encounter, in very practical and corporeal terms, between the legal institution and the problem of sexual difference. It is a case which explores the legal imagination of gendered identities and the relation of identity to biological and discursive techniques of manipulation and transformation.

During the case, Alex's sexed body becomes both the *subject* of a legal proceeding and the *object* of a transformation. This anomalous scenario invites a problematization of law's relation to sexual identity and also a questioning of the being of sex or sexuality beyond the deployment of these identities.

We do not know exactly who Alex is or what he is capable of. Throughout the case, he is described almost exclusively in terms of certain gendered characteristics. What is made known, first, is that he has the body of a 13-year-old girl. What emerges, secondly, is that this body places Alex in a socially marginal position, for through this body – as his primary point of contact with the social world – his experiences of being male are socially disavowed. It is reported, for example, that Alex 'feels angry and cheated that [his] body is female' and especially feels this way 'when it is reinforced to [him] that [he] is a girl'.[9] In 2001, when Alex asked to see a doctor to confirm that he was male, he was required to reformulate the problem in different terms: that he 'knows that [he] is a girl but would like to be a boy'.[10]

Like the doctor, the court also required that Alex and his lawyers reframe his 'problem' so that it could be understood in the form of a legal

desire (the desire to have the hormonal treatment approved). However, in order to rule upon this question, the court needed to enquire into the nature of Alex's sexual identity. The reason for this inquisition was doctrinal: the court could only authorize the treatment transforming Alex from female to male if it was deemed to be in Alex's 'best interests' to have his gender re-assigned. Yet what those interests were within the binary logic of the law, depended on whether Alex was deemed to be 'actually' male or female. For the most part, the court viewed Alex as either being a girl who (mistakenly) 'thinks' she is male, or as a male trapped in a female body. In both of these readings, sex is figured as a binary (male/female) and as something which does not change – a static being, rather than a fluid *becoming*.

Relying on these binaries, the court reached an impasse. Either Alex was already *really* male, and therefore treatment would be substantially redundant, or he was *really* female, thus making the treatment to become male no longer in his best interests. The way in which the court chose to get around this impasse was to reframe the treatment as something which would not really change Alex's sex but only the appearance of his sex. Alex's desire to become male in appearance could therefore be heard as a strictly *feminine* desire for a penis (psychoanalytic lack): thus leaving the masculine and the feminine as stable legal categories. Politically this is significant, for it inscribes the 'reality' of gendered existence and subjectivity in an unchangeable state.

Through Deleuze, we can envisage another way to make sense of Alex's paradoxical relation to a binary sexed world. Rather than sexual identity being understood as a stable reality in relation to an imagined or simply apparent 'hormonal' or aesthetic transformation, we could reframe the transformation itself as constitutive of the reality of sex, in relation to which 'identity' would become understood as simply a partitioned – and constructed – moment.

Coming from other worlds

In a report tendered to the Family Court, Alex is described as having not only thought that he was male, but also as having *'thought that the whole world was male'*.[11] In this statement, gender is shown to not only relate to different beings in the world; but also to the differentiation of the world itself and its very mode of being. The other participants in the case of *Re Alex* – the doctors, psychiatrists and teachers who gave evidence, and the judge who handed down the decision – behaved as if Alex had to be either male or female, masculine or feminine in a world

which was neither; in a world (or school or clinic) that itself had no gender.

What might it mean for Alex to have an experience of a whole world that is male? There are two things at least, from a Deleuzian perspective, that it would *not* mean. First, it would not necessarily mean that one could *want* to be a male. Within a 'male world' the experience of *wanting* to be male becomes possible only once the possibility of not being male has been introduced. For Alex, the possibility of this external world not present in experience is brought by others who express to Alex the possibility that his world may not be real: that he may in fact be female, lesbian or bisexual (etc.). Each of these suggestions seem banal or insulting to Alex. Secondly, the experience of a whole world as male would not necessarily mean that there is no possibility for the existence of the female. Rather, it would mean that females simply come from or condition a very different 'world'. If the whole world is male, this does not mean in other words that the feminine is suppressed or negated in this world, but that there is no other dimension through which being-male could be reduced to the subject of a judgment (as being not-female, for example). There are not gendered individuals in an ungendered world, but rather different genderings of the world.

These preliminary points emerge from two important theses in Deleuze's work: those of *immanence* and *the irreducibility of difference*. Deleuze's philosophy – from his very early works until his later collaborations with Félix Guattari – is concerned with thinking immanence and difference in direct ways. This means, first of all, refusing to consider the immanence of thoughts and beings in relation to any form of transcendence, and second, refusing to reduce or resolve difference to identity. For Deleuze, immanence is never immanence *to* something (a subject or object for example which would be transcendent), and difference is never simply difference *from* something; a 'something' which would necessarily remain identical. Rather, absolute immanence can be understood as the expression of pure difference in itself.

Feminist criticisms of Deleuze suggest that his theory of difference explodes, or at least decentralizes, the question of sexuality in political thought to the detriment of active feminist programs.[12] Over the past decade, the question of sexual difference in Deleuze's work – and the uneasy relation between his work and gender theory – has been revisited and given new political and theoretical resonances.[13] The challenge presented in these encounters has been to attempt to understand the foundational status that *sex* may have in the metaphysics of difference;

that is to say whether or not we can only understand differences through an understanding of sexual difference. I believe that a reconsideration of the structural configuration of sexuality that Deleuze presents in *Proust and Signs* is helpful in addressing this problem and illustrating the depth of his early engagement with the problem of sexual difference.

Law and sexual difference in *Proust and Signs*

How is it that the court experiences the determination of Alex's sex as a legal matter? For Alex, the law does not stop at the doors of the courtroom. It continues with his mother, who prohibits him from playing with other boys; and at school, where he is made to use the girl's toilets and line up with the girls. In each of these situations Alex finds a new way out. He wears nappies to school, or else does not drink during the day. He lines up with neither the girls nor the boys, but on his own in-between the two. To grapple with a sexed world is also, necessarily, to grapple with the law. Alex's presence before the court can therefore be understood as simply another one of these scenes in which the law is made to appear starkly and severely at the site of Alex's body.

Certainly Alex's presence before a court concerning the issue of his sex marks a peculiarly acute moment within law's imagination of sexual difference. In particular it invites the question: to what extent can the difference between the sexes be attributable to a form of judgment? Deleuze had begun to figure his theses of immanence and difference in relation to this problem of sexuality in two early works,[14] which would be brought together more fully in his work on Proust in *Proust and Signs*. Here Deleuze seeks to give sexuality an existence and an actuality beyond any kind of formal determining characteristic of the law. Keith W. Faulkner writes that in '*Proust and Signs* Deleuze determines that it is the law that divides the sexes',[15] which he says it does in order to make guilt bearable. Yet, to insist that sexual difference is a purely legal matter raises a problem that Deleuze is trying to displace. In fact, the relation to the two sexes is not juridical but fragmentary. Deleuze describes that the law only: 'measures their discrepancy, their remoteness, their distance, and their partitioning... inserting by force into one world the fragment of another world'.[16] The law cannot divide the sexes, because it can only be applied to parts that are already divided or disjunct – to bodies that have had their capacity for differentiation stripped.

In *Proust and Signs*, Deleuze makes clear that the problem of sexual difference is connected with certain consciousnesses of the law.[17] The

first of these is associated with Kafka and the second is associated with Proust. Both share a certain logic of the body. It is the body, rather than the intellect, that becomes conscious of the law, because the law does not refer to any ideal content but to a purely empty formality. The body according to Deleuze then becomes conscious of the law in two ways. First, there is a depressive consciousness in which the law cannot be known outside of the body which receives punishment and is therefore fundamentally guilty a priori. Deleuze writes: 'Strictly speaking unknowable, the law makes itself known only by applying the harshest punishments to our agonized body'.[18] Secondly, however, there is a schizoid consciousness. The body here enters into a fragmentary dimension beyond assigned or static identities and in which the prescriptions of the law are redundant and superficial.

For Alex, the depressive and schizoid consciousnesses of the law are particularly acute. Alex comes to the law depressed because no-one understands or takes seriously his claim to be male and his claim upon a male world.[19] Moreover, this rejection is turned against his own body, which for him is 'disgusting'[20] in so far as it is judged to be female. At the same time as Alex experiences this guilt of his own body, however, he also displays a coldness towards others, and toward connecting to others, which is truly bodily. Alex says: 'my heart is cold, like ice. I love no-one, I don't let anyone in. My mother had a key but chose not to use it'.[21] Here, guilt is no longer a structural reality, but is externalized and apparent. Guilt is projected outward and conceals something more fundamental in the complexities of sexual difference. Alex knows that there is a danger that to love and be loved is already to love and be loved only *as a girl*; whereas the movements of his sexuality in fact belong to another sphere entirely, more real than the sphere of familial and institutional loves.

In relation to sexual identity, the law institutes a stability and formality which prescribes that one cannot desire other than *as* either a male or a female. This is the sense in which the court thinks that the exceptional moment that it must authorize is really only the hormonal treatment, the transformation or 'change' of sex that would re-establish once-and-for-all the conformity between Alex's subjective and objective existence. I have argued that this perspective excludes another perspective in which the reality of sex is in fact this dimension of 'change', of which stable or statistical sexes are merely abstractions.

Transsexual

Deleuze's reading of Proust articulates a theory of sexuality and sexual difference on three levels. The first level he presents is that of heterosexual loves. This level of sexuality is social, public and superficial. To function properly in a sexed society on this level is to appear to be heterosexual, and to believe in – or affirm – everyone else's heterosexual appearances. Men and women meet, therefore, on this first level within an institution which, through its regimentation of signs and appearances, makes the sexuality of individuals artificially – yet *utterly* – 'readable'. This raises a certain question for Proust however: what is the truth behind these appearances, or behind these 'masks' of heterosexuality? There may be no such underlying truth, but the search itself introduces the form of a secret. A second level opens up. For the one who searches for the truth, all the superficial signs of heterosexuality and their interpretation become deceptive and converge upon a 'secret' homosexual world that excludes the other sex. On this second more profound 'secret' and 'accursed' level, the sexes shall never meet because they each express a homosexual world, or belong to a homosexual series, that ultimately excludes the other. Thus, belonging to separate worlds, the sexes enter into relation only by disguise and camouflage: men who really love men play the role of women for women who really love other women, and vice versa. It is on this level that the reality of guilt prevails in sexual desire.

But if, for Proust, homosexuality is more profound than heterosexuality, Deleuze's key move is to oppose the level of homosexual guilt or secrecy to an even more complex, concealed third level which he names the *transsexual*. 'Transsexual' does not refer here to an individual's transition from one sex to another, nor with an 'identity dysphoria' (as Alex's condition is described by the court). For Deleuze, the transsexual level in fact cannot sustain the form of individual sexual identities, since it: 'transcends the individual as well as the entity: it designates in the individual the coexistence of fragments of both sexes, [as] *partial objects* that do not communicate.'[22] This is why – in making sense of the previous two levels – the third is figured as an 'initial hermaphroditism',[23] because rather than either being united in the conventional world of heterosexuality, or consigned to secret homosexual worlds, the two sexes remain disjunct; disjoined on the *one body*.[24] The Proustian theory of sexuality for Deleuze 'will assume its entire meaning only if we consider that the two sexes are both present and separate in the same individual'.[25] The sexuality between two individuals can include any combination of their

non-communicating male and female parts, but in a transverse dimension reminiscent of the hermaphroditic sexuality of plants, in which one always requires a third party or species – a bird or a bee or the wind – in order to make possible '[i]ntersexual loves' or a 'vegetal innocence'[26] more profound than the guilt inscribed by the law.

Alex's own transsexuality is poorly understood by the social and legal institutions that he confronts. These institutions understand Alex's transsexuality first as an underlying desire to be or become the opposite sex, and secondly as a physical and administrative transformation from one sex to the other. Neither of these formulations – which position desire as lack and subordinate difference to identity – express Alex's world particularly well. In a *whole world that is male* there is nothing more foreign than a desire to become male. And conversely, there will be no bodily transformation or manipulation sufficient to traverse the distance between two sexes that Alex experiences. The transsexual does not survive the passage as an individual from one sex to the other; she or he affirms the irreducible difference of the sexes themselves, in a process that cannot sustain any 'self'. To lose oneself, in order to reclaim and reinterpret the difference in one's body, is the transsexual movement of desire. This movement of desire constitutes a particular dimension of the sexed world, which Deleuze attempts to express in *Proust and Signs*. It also forms the basis of a connection between sexual politics and sexual difference.

Conclusion: Immanence and sexual difference

Alex's case poses the social and legal problem of how to differentiate the sexes. Deleuze insists that the relation of gender to an individual be conceptualized not as a statistical or categorical relation, but as a differential relation, as *difference*. The individual contains, not a single sex, but the irreducible difference of the sexes.[27] This is why Alex is not just a female who thinks she is a male, or a male trapped in a female body. He can only be conceived in one of these two ways from a perspective in which sex is unified and singular, and in which sexuality *does not change*. For Alex, before there are masculine desires or a male way of thinking, there is the whole world, which is male: a world which does not lack anything and where one can no longer distinguish between the subjective and the objective, consciousness and matter. There is 'maleness'. It is not just the prescription of a legal judgment upon the body or upon the world, but first it is a world of its own, a body, a mode of existence, a singularity, a feeling.

In Deleuze's thought, immanence in no way implies homogeneity, the annulment of differences, or the unification of differences under a general principle. Sexual difference is not the point at which the sexes become the terms of a possible unification in judgment; it is the being or the body from which the feminine and the masculine diverge. The 'original Hermaphrodite',[28] as Deleuze puts it. Alex's experience of his sex is a fragment or an expression, but the fragment does not refer to a missing second half. It co-exists with other fragments, other experiences and other worlds, in a plural and non-totalizable relation. This means that to have any kind of sexuality implies a certain risk in the face of the law; a pact or dance with unknowable beings in a transverse dimension. If we are accustomed to think of beings as always simply *having* sexes and sexualities which we can judge and name, Deleuze's thought challenges us to think and to name the very being *of* sexuality, for we do not experience sex by remaining a male or a female but only by undergoing some change. Sexuality itself is a transsexual while experience is an hermaphrodite.

Notes

1. Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition* (French: 1968), Trans. P. Patton (London: Athlone, 1994), p. 139.
2. Deleuze, G. *Proust and Signs* (French: 1964), Trans. R. Howard (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).
3. *Re Alex* (2004), 31 Fam LR 503.
4. The masculine pronoun rather than the feminine will be used to refer to Alex throughout this chapter. As sexed subjectivities are embedded in linguistic operations, I cannot avoid privileging one gender over another from the position of the subject. When Alex demands to be called 'he', from a Deleuzian perspective, one would need to account for the specificity of what it is that only Alex can do or desire by being called 'he', which is not the same as when anyone else makes this demand. Desire in other words is not situated in language, rather language is a tool for desiring.
5. *Re Alex* (2004), op. cit., p. 506.
6. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (French: 1972), Trans. R. Hurley, M. Seem and H.R. Lane (London: Athlone, 1983).
7. Freud, S. *A General Selection from the Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1937).
8. See Edgar, G. 'Re Alex/Real Alex: Transsexual Narratives and their Possibilities for Resistance', *Australian Feminist Law Journal*, 23(2005), pp. 79–97; Baron, P. 'The Web of Desire and the Narcissistic Trap: A Psychoanalytical Reading of Re Alex', *Griffith Law Review*, 14(1)(2005), pp. 17–33; Atkins, K. 'Re Alex: Narrative Identity and the Case of Gender Dysphoria', *Griffith Law Review*, 14(1)(2005), pp. 1–16. For an overview of the media response to the case see

Sandor, D. 'Sex and Drugs and Media Roll: The Family Court's Decision in Re Alex', *Australian Children's Rights News*, 37(2004), pp. 21–27.

9. *Re Alex* (2004), op. cit., p. 519 (Report by Professor P).
10. Ibid., p. 518 (Report by Ms R).
11. Ibid., p. 518 (Report by Professor P) [emphasis added].
12. See especially, Braidotti, R. *Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 111–123.
13. See, for example, Colebrook, C. 'Is Sexual Difference a Problem?', in Buchanan, I. & Colebrook, C. (Eds) *Deleuze and Feminist Theory* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), pp. 110–127; Braidotti, R. *Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics* (Cambridge: Polity Press UK, 2006), pp. 182–189.
14. See Deleuze, G. 'Description of Woman: For a Philosophy of the Sexed Other', Trans. K.W. Faulkner, *Angelaki*, 7(3)(2002) pp. 17–24; Deleuze, G. 'Statements and Profiles', Trans. K.W. Faulkner, *Angelaki*, 8(3)(2003) pp. 85–93. These two texts were originally published in 1945 and 1946 respectively in the journal *Poésie*.
15. Faulkner, K. 'Deleuze in Utero: Deleuze-Sartre and the Essence of Woman', *Angelaki*, 7(3)(2002), pp. 25–43 (especially p. 37). Deleuze explains that it is the 'Hermaphrodite' rather than the law which divides or separates the sexes into two homosexual series. See Deleuze, G. *Proust and Signs*, op. cit., pp. 10–11.
16. Ibid., pp. 142–143.
17. Ibid., pp. 131–132.
18. Ibid., p. 132.
19. Alex's primary school principal Mr H. notes that: '[Alex] was in my office and [he] was definitely quite distraught and wanting to kill [himself] because no-one was taking this whole thing seriously about the gender'. *Re Alex* (2004), op. cit., p. 515.
20. Ibid., p. 519 (Report by Dr N).
21. Ibid., p. 520 (Alex quoted in report by Dr N).
22. Deleuze, G. *Proust and Signs*, op. cit., p. 136.
23. Ibid., p. 135.
24. If the hermaphrodite operates as this disjunctive synthesis in Deleuze's theory of sexuality, we should also incidentally expect her/his physical and historical existence to mark a problematic juncture in legality. Indeed, Michel Foucault writes some important passages on the legal and historical status of hermaphrodites in the middle and classical ages in which the question of a 'true sex' became a problem of institutional judgment historically related to judgments concerning the physical constitution of a 'monster'. In modern terms this genealogy marks the practice in which intersex infants are surgically assigned a sex soon after birth. See Foucault, M. 'Introduction', *Herculine Barbin: Being the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a Nineteenth Century French Hermaphrodite*, Trans. R. McDougall (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980), pp. vii–xvii; Foucault, M. *Abnormal: Lectures at the College de France, 1974–1975*, Trans. G. Burchell (New York: Picador, 2003).
25. Deleuze, G. *Proust and Signs*, op. cit., p. 135.
26. Ibid., pp. 176–177.

27. For a similar argument see especially Grosz, E. 'A Thousand Tiny Sexes: Feminism and Rhizomatics', *Topoi*, 12(2)(1993), pp. 167–179. This irreducible difference must not however be thought as a *multiplication* of sexes, which would again presuppose statistical or countable 'units'.
28. Deleuze, G. *Proust and Signs*, op. cit., pp. 10–11.

4
Deleuze and Suicide

Ashley Woodward

Introduction: The death of the philosopher of life

On 4 November 1995, the philosopher Gilles Deleuze threw himself from the third-storey window of his Paris apartment. He died as a result of the injuries sustained in his fall. Deleuze had suffered from a pulmonary ailment for many years, and was gravely ill when he took his own life. While suicides in such circumstances are perhaps unsurprising, Deleuze's case presents us with a paradox: he was a philosopher of life who took his own life. In his philosophical writings, Deleuze espouses a kind of vitalism; valorizing life and criticizing things that diminish it. For Deleuze, life is constituted by all the forces that *resist* death.[1] Yet he ceased to resist death and hastened his own. Quite a few attempts have been made to resolve this paradox by interpreting Deleuze's suicide through the lens of his philosophy, often presenting the suicide itself as a philosophical act, a fitting end to an exemplary philosophical life.[2] I shall take a somewhat different approach in this chapter.[3] Rather than focusing on the life and death of Deleuze, I examine the resources his philosophy provides for reflecting on suicide as a social phenomenon. I argue that while he rarely engages with the issue of suicide directly, the philosophical concepts Deleuze creates may be used to shed fresh light on this issue. His concepts contribute to the analysis of suicide as a general phenomenon; and they may also help us to understand individual suicides, including Deleuze's own.

The issue of suicide has been approached in a number of significantly different ways. The contemporary area of research known as 'suicidology' is multidisciplinary, incorporating approaches as diverse as literature, history, psychology, philosophy, sociology, medicine, biology, and neuroscience.[4] As a social concern, suicide is generally viewed as

a widespread and difficult problem: rates of suicide remain alarmingly high in many countries worldwide, and a solution to this problem remains elusive.[5] From this perspective, the negative value of suicide is often taken as given. Philosophers, for whom the issue of suicide inevitably raises difficult questions concerning the meaning and value of life, have adopted a different approach. Such thinkers have often considered suicide as a matter of individual ethical choice.[6] The approach I take here combines these two perspectives: taking suicide as a serious social problem, but also reflecting on the value of life philosophically. As I show, Deleuze's philosophy has important implications for both perspectives: it contributes to a rethinking of the meaning of life, and it provides the basis for a social ethics of suicide. We need an interpretive framework within which to understand our own approach to the meaningfulness of life and the temptation to suicide, to understand and deal with the suicide of others, and to form social policies regarding suicide (such as laws and programs for prevention). Deleuze contributes to a response to this need by engaging the philosophical issues and assumptions underlying our existing frameworks, and the concepts he creates may be developed for a new framework with which to understand suicide.

In order to show the value of Deleuze's contribution to these issues, I begin by contrasting it with two classic treatments of suicide: those given by Albert Camus and Émile Durkheim. Camus' *The Myth of Sisyphus*[7] is the most well-known contemporary philosophical reflection on suicide, while Durkheim's *Suicide*[8] is the classic source for the argument that suicide should be treated as a social phenomenon. These works are not the most recent research in suicidology, however they present frameworks for understanding suicide based on key assumptions which, arguably, have not been superseded in more recent approaches.[9] Yet both of these classic treatments and the frameworks they present remain problematic. While Camus argues against the personal temptation to suicide, his view of life as inherently meaningless or absurd leaves the individual in a precarious position with respect to this temptation. Durkheim, on the other hand, argues for greater social integration to counteract the social forces that cause suicide. However, such integration appears untenable in today's increasingly globalized world, and may in fact contribute to the causes of suicide. As we shall see, Deleuze's philosophy indicates a way to move beyond these problems, through a more affirmative philosophical interpretation of life, and a social philosophy with a greater range of application to contemporary social conditions.

Camus: The philosophy of suicide

In *The Myth of Sisyphus*, Camus famously asserts that: '[t]here is but one truly serious philosophical problem and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental problem of philosophy'.[10] Camus understands suicide as an individual problem: the judgment of whether or not life is worth living is one that each individual must make 'within the silence of the heart'.[11] The extreme judgment that life is not worth living, Camus argues, is prompted by the belief that it is *absurd*. Absurdity is not simply the meaninglessness of life, but is constituted by a tension between the human desire for meaning, on the one hand, and the objective meaninglessness of the world, on the other.

In *The Myth of Sisyphus*, Camus provides a number of arguments in an attempt to show this unbridgeable divide between the human desire for meaning and the meaninglessness of the world. Some of his arguments are epistemological, and assert the impossibility that human beings could know the meaning of the world. He writes:

> I don't know whether this world has a meaning that transcends it. But I know that I do not know that meaning and that it is impossible for me just now to know it. What can a meaning outside my condition mean to me? I can understand only in human terms.[12]

These epistemological arguments have an ontological dimension, because for Camus 'to understand is above all to unify'.[13] On Camus' account, understanding the meaning of the world would reconcile human beings with the world; the human being who desires significance would feel fulfilled as part of a meaningful whole. For Camus, overcoming absurdity thus depends on the possibility of an ontological unity that allows a feeling of 'oneness' with the world. However, he argues that such a unity is impossible. Camus' most explicit argument against the possibility of ontological unity is directed at Parmenides, who claimed that all of existence is 'One'.[14] For Camus, thought – which necessarily takes the world as its object – steps outside and differentiates itself from the world. In asserting 'All is One', the subject turns the world into an object in order to make a judgment about it. This very act divides existence into two different things, subject and object, belying the claim being made that there is a unity in being.

Camus thus argues that the absurdity of life is an undeniable fact, since unity between human thought (with its desire for meaning) and

the world (which resists such meaning) is impossible. He does not conclude from this, however, that suicide is philosophically justifiable. The impulse motivating *The Myth of Sisyphus* is the desire to determine whether it is possible to live a meaningful life in the face of absurdity, or in other words, without appeal to God or any other transcendent guarantor of meaning which we cannot ourselves verify. Camus argues that such a life is possible if we respond to absurdity with *passionate revolt*. Absurdity, he argues, may be taken as a fact against which we struggle in life, and this struggle gives life meaning by providing it with passion and intensity. While Camus gives an apparently optimistic and life-affirmative answer to the problem of suicide, the philosophical terms through which he discusses this problem arguably leave it as a strong temptation. The divide between thought and the world is a pessimistic interpretation of life that, as we will see with Deleuze, is not necessary.

Durkheim: The sociology of suicide

Émile Durkheim's classic study of suicide stands in stark contrast to Camus' reflections. Durkheim applies a sociological method to the phenomenon of suicide, arguing that it can only be adequately understood in terms of 'social facts'. Beginning with statistical data, Durkheim notes that the rate of suicide maintains stability in relation to social groupings. Some societies have higher suicide rates than others, and these rates are repeated (with marginal increases or decreases) year after year. On the basis of this data, Durkheim suggests that particular forms of society have a specific 'aptitude' for suicide and are predisposed to contribute a definite quota of suicides. The traditional view of suicide as a matter of individual psychology cannot explain this social distribution, Durkheim argues, and so we must look to facts about the organization of society for an explanation. In effect, Durkheim's view is that people do not kill themselves, but are killed by the social forces operative in the society in which they live.[15]

Durkheim identifies several types of suicide according to their social causes, the most prominent types in modern Western societies being *egoistic* and *anomic*. Egoistic suicide occurs when an individual is not sufficiently socially integrated. Durkheim reasons that excessive individualism leads to suicide because there is an essential social element to our moral constitution: if the individual loses the context in which to express him or her self as a social being, moral confusion, despair, and suicide may result. Durkheim argues, therefore, that social integration,

in which the individual feels him or her self to be part of a coherent group, acts as a prophylactic against suicide. Religion, the family unit, and strong traditions are typical vehicles of social integration in well-integrated societies. According to Durkheim, the rate of suicide differs between certain societies and social groups because of their differing degrees of integration.

Anomic suicide is a more complex phenomenon, which Durkheim introduces to explain why suicide rates increase in periods of rapid social and economic change. This increase applies even in periods of greater prosperity, and Durkheim argues that it is the disequilibrium associated with social change that is responsible for anomic suicide. He explains this by arguing that in order for people to be happy, their aspirations must be sufficiently proportioned to their means of attaining that to which they aspire. Since human aspirations are prone to excessive inflation, Durkheim argues, they must be regulated by social structures. In periods of social disequilibrium, however, when social roles are destabilized, society loses its power of effective regulation, and anomic suicides result from despair and frustration in relation to failed aspirations.

Durkheim considers suicide to be a normal and inevitable phenomenon in any society, but believes that the exponential rise in the suicide rate in Western Europe since the eighteenth century is a 'pathological' problem to which a solution should be sought. Since he identifies the problem as one of social structure, he believes the solution is to be found in restructuring society. Durkheim's proposed solution is to attack the social forces of egoism and anomie by implementing social structures that integrate the individual and regulate his or her aspirations more effectively.[16] While this seems to be a positive response to the problem of suicide, the call for social integration is arguably out of step with the realities of contemporary social life. Contemporary societies, at least in the West, are characterized by pluralism, fragmentation and disintegration; these characteristics appear consonant with the trend toward globalized economies and multicultural populations that are unlikely to abate. In the contemporary context, Durkheim's call for greater social integration seems conservative and reactionary, and would face strong resistance from social forces. As we shall see, Deleuze's social philosophy – in contrast to Durkheim's – works in consonance with pluralism and disintegration. As Paul Patton suggests, it thus has the advantage of setting itself with, rather than against, the contemporary social situation.[17]

Deleuze's ontology: The univocity of being

Deleuze's philosophy presents a number of innovations that challenge the perspectives of both Camus and Durkheim, and allow the issue of suicide to be considered in a fresh light. Camus' theory of the absurdity of life depends on a dualistic divide between thought and the world. This kind of dualism is common in the history of philosophy, and has been criticized by Friedrich Nietzsche and others as a fundamentally nihilistic, pessimistic interpretation of life: the value of the world is negated because it does not meet the demand for meaning imposed by thought.[18] One of the central and most significant elements of Deleuze's philosophy is the development of an ontology of 'pure immanence', in which there is a fundamental 'univocity of being'. This ontology, influenced by Nietzsche, is given its most important expression in *Difference and Repetition*.[19] It is a life-affirming ontology which avoids the pessimism implicit in the terms of Camus' thought because it succeeds in bypassing ontological dualism.

Ontological dualism is the thesis that 'being' is said, or expressed, in more than one way. A dualism which proposes that 'thought' and 'the world' are fundamentally different things, for example, asserts that when we say that the world '*is*' and that thought '*is*', a different sense is ascribed to the term 'is' in each case. Against this, Deleuze's thesis of the univocity of being asserts that being is only ever said in *one* way. For Deleuze, being itself has a certain unity or uniformity, but what being is said *of* differs. Deleuze's thesis of the univocity of being is in fact an ontology of difference and multiplicity which understands being as that which unifies different things. Different aspects of the world are unified not according to anything they have in common, but by the very fact that they are different. Deleuze explains:

> the essential in univocity is not that Being is said in a single and same sense, but that it is said, in a single and same sense, *of* all its individuating differences or intrinsic modalities. Being is the same for all these modalities, but these modalities are not the same... The essence of univocal being is to include individuating differences, while these differences do not have the same essence and do not change the essence of being – just as white includes various intensities, while remaining essentially the same white... Being is said in a single and same sense of everything of which it is said, but that of which it is said differs: it is said of difference itself.[20]

In order to appreciate Deleuze's thesis of the univocity of being, it is essential to note that he understands the fundamental level of reality as consisting only of differentiating and individuating forces. For Deleuze, the ontology of univocity is best expressed in Nietzsche's view of life as a 'will to power';[21] a play of differential forces which produce the world as we know it with all its multiple forms of existence by entering into various combinations. These differential forces are more fundamental than the individuated things to which they give rise. On the most fundamental level of reality, then, there are only differences, and being can be said in the same way for different things because being is itself difference.[22]

In showing how ontological unity may be ascribed to radically different things, Deleuze's thesis of the univocity of being shows that the distinctions Camus insists on need not be acceded to. From a Deleuzean perspective, at the most fundamental level of reality, the world and the thought that distinguishes itself from it are both part of the same immanent plane of differentiating forces. While Camus points to fundamental differences between thought and the world as evidence for the impossibility of their unity, univocity links things together by virtue of their differences. Considered in terms of Deleuze's ontology, then, the divide between the world and the human desire for meaning that Camus insists on is no longer tenable, and thought gains a freedom to affirm its unity with all life. Deleuze's thesis of the univocity of being may therefore be considered a philosophical innovation that removes much of the motivation for the judgment that life is not worth living. Moreover, Deleuze fulfils Camus' ambition in *The Myth of Sisyphus* by showing an alternative, more life-affirmative way of living without appeal to a transcendence of any kind. Considered as univocal, being is immanent, and there is no room in such an ontology for God or any other meaning-giving structure which transcends the world.

Deleuze and Guattari's ethics: Lines and their dangers

In the two volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*,[23] both written with Félix Guattari, Deleuze develops his philosophy for a political analysis of society. In line with his thesis of the univocity of being, Deleuze constructs an ontology that can be applied to individuals and social structures, both of which are conceptualized as individuated formations. Individuals and social structures are thus understood as being composed of fields of pre-individual, differential forces. This ontology consists of a variety of concepts, some of which may be developed for a social

ethics of suicide. While Deleuze holds, in accordance with the univocity of being, that all things partake equally of being (i.e., all things are equal in so far as they can be said to *be*), his ontology nonetheless makes selective, discriminatory distinctions. These distinctions are made according to how individuated things are organized. While from the perspective of the most fundamental level of reality everything is composed of differential forces, these forces combine in various ways to produce structures and beings of different types. For Deleuze, the most important ontological distinction is that between rigid structures that resist change, and fluid, metamorphosing movements. This distinction is expressed in many of the concepts developed throughout the two volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. For example, 'strata', 'segmentarity', 'Oedipalization', 'territorialization' and 'overcoding' are some of the terms which express rigid structuration, while 'schizophrenia', 'becoming', 'decoding', 'deterritorialization' and 'lines of flight' express fluidity and change. While these terms are often opposed, there are no strict distinctions between them. Particular things are always composed of combinations of forces, including those which tend toward stability and those which tend toward change.

Deleuze associates life with the processes of metamorphosis and change, and accords a certain privilege to those ontological terms that express them. As Patton argues, Deleuze's ontology can thus be understood as an ethics: the distinctions that provide evaluative criteria for ethical judgment and practical action are built into the ontological concepts themselves.[24] In the ninth plateau of *A Thousand Plateaus*, entitled '1933: Micropolitics and Segmentarity', Deleuze and Guattari develop a set of ontological distinctions which broach the issue of suicide. They suggest that individuals and social structures can be considered in terms of the 'lines' which compose them. These lines express or effectuate different kinds of organization, and the complex combination of lines in a particular formation expresses its varying tendencies toward different kinds of organization. Deleuze and Guattari distinguish three major types of line: the 'molar line', the 'molecular line', and the 'line of flight'. Molar lines organize by drawing strict boundaries, creating binary oppositions and dividing space into rigid segments with a hierarchical structure. Molecular lines organize in a more supple way, interlacing segments in a non-hierarchical fashion. The line of flight is the privileged line for Deleuze and Guattari, since it is the line of change and metamorphosis. The line of flight doesn't organize in a segmentary fashion, but is a pure movement of change,

which breaks out of one form of organization and moves towards another.

Since they are ontological concepts, these three lines may be used to understand the organization of society or of an individual life. On the social level, molar lines correspond to rigidly organized social structures and institutions, molecular lines to more flexible forms of social organization (such as some pre-literate societies), and lines of flight to revolution and rapid social change. On an individual level, molar lines correspond to 'normality' or majority status in society, molecular lines to minority or 'outsider' status, and lines of flight to the significant changes an individual undergoes in the course of their life. While Deleuze and Guattari give a certain privilege to the line of flight as a process of change, they complicate their ontological and ethical concepts by warning that each of the three lines has an associated danger. These dangers are 'Fear', 'Clarity', and the 'Passion for abolition'.[25] Fear is the danger of the molar line: it consists in clinging too strongly to rigid structures and entrenched patterns of behavior, stifling opportunities for change. Clarity, the danger of the molecular line, consists in the mistaken belief that one has discovered the Truth outside social norms, and reproduces the rigidity of the molar line on a molecular scale (e.g., in hierarchical cults and alternative communities).

The line of flight presents the greatest danger of all. The danger here is that the process of change, which breaks down an existing structure in order to move toward another form of organization, may fail to find the conditions necessary for creating a new organization, and remain a force of pure destruction. It is with respect to this failed attempt at change that Deleuze and Guattari indicate the possibility of suicide. They write:

> Why is the line of flight a war one risks coming back from defeated, destroyed, after having destroyed everything one could?... the line of flight crossing the wall, getting out of the black holes, but instead of connecting with other lines and each time augmenting its valence, *turning to destruction, abolition pure and simple, the passion of abolition*... like suicide, double suicide, a way out that turns the line of flight into a line of death.[26]

In order to appreciate this danger that the line of flight might become a line of death, it is important to note that although Deleuze and Guattari privilege change and difference as forces of life, pure change and difference are equivalent to chaos. Human beings are highly organized forms of life, and must retain a degree of organization in order to go on

living. Although Deleuze and Guattari advocate the process of change as essential to vitality, they advocate an extreme caution:

> How could unformed matter, anorganic life, nonhuman becoming be anything but chaos pure and simple? Every undertaking of destratification (for example, going beyond the organism, plunging into a becoming) must therefore observe concrete rules of extreme caution: a too-sudden destratification may be suicidal...[27]

While Deleuze and Guattari only identify suicide as a danger of a line of flight taken too far or too fast, I wish to suggest that, beyond the letter of their text, we may also understand suicide as an outcome of the molar line, of excessive molarization or rigid segmentation. Since Deleuze associates life with change, we can imagine a deeply molarized life as drained of all vitality, all passion for life, leading to depression and a desire for the end. Instead of a line of flight that overreaches organization and plunges into the void, this alternative model presents a rigidly segmented structure bereft of all joy and vitality. Deleuze's ontological ethics thus presents two extreme points at which the forces of life break down and suicide may result: excessive movements of change which destroy all structure, and excessive segmentation or molarization. The suicidal madness of the romantic artist or the moribund existence of the socially repressed.

These ontological distinctions provide the basis for an ethics of suicide in so far as they offer evaluative and practical criteria for understanding why suicide occurs, and how to avoid it. While such an ethics may operate at an individual level, it always has a social dimension. Because Deleuze's ontology includes a pre-individual level, individuals and social groups are not seen as fundamentally distinct: they are simply different levels of organization. Moreover, Deleuze sees individuals as fundamentally connected to, and shaped by, social conditions. Avoiding suicide is a matter of maintaining life and vitality in processes of change, relative to a necessary degree of stability. Individuals and groups can pursue these processes of becoming in their own ways, but these processes will always be contextualized by wider social structures that influence and limit them. A Deleuzean perspective on suicide is therefore in some agreement with Durkheim in that the structure of society is relevant to the phenomenon of suicide, but the solution it offers differs significantly. While Durkheim emphasizes the necessity of social integration and regulation, Deleuze believes that vitality depends upon movement and change within structures. Opportunities for such movement and

change would seem to be greater in pluralistic and somewhat disintegrated societies, and the integration Durkheim advocates may well encourage suicides associated with excessive molarization. Any consideration of a Deleuzean perspective on suicide for social policy would need to take into account the fact that, for Deleuze, the State is always a molarizing force, and lines of flight are taken in a direction that moves away from the norm. From this perspective, protecting individuals against suicide could not be accomplished through social control and normalization, but only through the cultivation of a vital and meaningful life by providing both relative stability and opportunities for change.

Conclusion: Affirming life

Deleuze's thought thus contributes to our understanding of suicide in two senses. The first sense is purely philosophical: against Camus, Deleuze's thesis of the univocity of being provides the basis for a philosophical perspective that affirms the unity of thought and the world, undermining the temptation to suicide which lies in the view of life as absurd. The second sense is social and ethical: Deleuze's ontology provides criteria for understanding the contexts in which suicides occur, and how they might be avoided. This Deleuzean outlook provides criteria for evaluating particular suicides, allowing a philosophical perspective beyond the moral condemnation of all suicides evidenced in many social treatments of the issue. Such criteria may be demonstrated by returning to the issue with which we began: the enigma of Deleuze's own suicide. While it is presumptuous to claim to know the meaning of someone's suicide, the distinctions established above furnish us with a provisional interpretation of Deleuze's death. At the time he took his own life, Deleuze's deteriorating body rigidly bound him into a mode of existence where change in any meaningful sense could no longer be effectuated. The lives of people in advanced stages of terminal illness are often akin to excessively molarized structures, bereft of vitality. Suicide can be understood in such cases not only as an escape from pain, but as the only possible escape from a rigid formation which is no longer able to metamorphose into another form of meaningful human life. In such cases, suicide should not be condemned as a failure to resist death. Indeed, Deleuze stated just days before he took his own life that he felt as if he were already dead.[28]

Deleuze's concepts also allow us to judge that many suicides are needless and tragic. When young or healthy people end their own lives, it is because the opportunities for growth and change, which

should be available to them, have not been. From the perspective of Deleuze's social ontology, such failures may be seen as operating on a number of levels, but have an intrinsic link with the organizational structures of society. Responding to suicide as a social problem from a Deleuzian perspective, then, would mean engaging with these structures to maximize the possibilities for experimentation open to citizens, but also to provide support networks for those who are in danger of taking lines of flight too fast or too far. The application of these insights to social policies and practices relating to suicide is certainly no simple or straightforward matter, and would itself require creative thought and experimentation. However, Deleuze provides us with a novel framework with which to understand suicide; one which might act as a basis on which to develop new responses to this recalcitrant issue.

Notes

1. See Colombat, A. 'November 4, 1995: Deleuze's Death as an Event', *Man and World*, 29(1996) pp. 235–249; see especially p. 245 and p. 247(n.19) which cites Deleuze quoting Claude Bernard from memory in his seminar on Foucault, Université de Vincennes in St. Denis, Fall 1985.
2. See Colombat, A. 'November 4, 1995', op. cit., which provides a thorough overview of the many published responses to Deleuze's death, and also constitutes a good example of the attempt to understand Deleuze's suicide in terms of his philosophy.
3. Thanks to Anna Szörényi and Jonathan Roffe for comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.
4. This list is not intended to be exhaustive. For an overview of these various approaches, see Lester, D. (Ed.) *Current Concepts of Suicide* (Philadelphia: The Charles Press, 1990); and Shneidman, E. *Comprehending Suicide: Landmarks in 20th-Century Suicidology* (Washington: American Psychological Association, 2001).
5. The World Health Organization reports the following on the basis of the latest global suicide statistics available (some nations only report these statistics every 5 years): 'According to WHO estimates, in the year 2000, approximately one million people died from suicide, and 10 to 20 times more people attempted suicide worldwide. This represents one death every 40 seconds, and one attempt every three seconds, on average. This also indicates that more people are dying from suicide than in all of the several armed conflicts around the world, and, in many places, about the same or more than those dying from traffic accidents. In all countries, suicide is now one of the three leading causes of death among people aged 15–34 years...' WHO also report that the suicide rate has risen by up to 60 per cent in some countries since 1945, and estimate that the global number of deaths by suicide may rise to 1.5 billion by 2020. See http://www.who.int/mental_health/media/en/382.pdf;

http://www.who.int/mental_health/management/en/SUPRE_flyer1.pdf; http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2004/pr61/en/

6. The seminal paper in this approach is Hume, D. 'On Suicide' [originally published 1826] Republished as Hume, D. *On Suicide* (London: Penguin, 2005).
7. Camus, A. *The Myth of Sisyphus* (French: 1942) Trans. J. O'Brien (London: Penguin, 2000).
8. Durkheim, É. *Suicide: A Study in Sociology* (French: 1897) Trans. J. Spaulding and G. Simpson (London: Routledge, 2002).
9. For more recent philosophical approaches to suicide, see Battin, M. & Mayo, D. *Suicide: The Philosophical Issues* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980). The continuing relevance of Durkheim's work on suicide in sociology is indicated by Steve Taylor's lamenting of 'the general lack of originality and creativity in attempts to explain the social dimensions of suicide. It is a sad comment that the best and only comprehensive sociological theory of suicide dates back to 1897.' See Taylor, S. 'Suicide, Durkheim, and Sociology', in Lester, D. (Ed.), *Current Concepts of Suicide* (Philadelphia: The Charles Press, 1990), p. 234. Taylor attributes this lack of originality to the increased focus on positivism in sociology, which has led sociologists to focus on gathering facts rather than developing theories which might explain those facts.
10. Camus, A. *The Myth of Sisyphus*, op. cit., p. 11.
11. Ibid., p. 12.
12. Ibid., p. 51.
13. Ibid., p. 22.
14. Specifically, Camus writes: '[I]f, bridging the gulf that separates desire from conquest, we assert with Parmenides the reality of the One (whatever it may be) we fall into the ridiculous contradiction of a mind that asserts total unity and proves by its very assertion its own difference and the diversity it claimed to resolve', Camus, A. *The Myth of Sisyphus*, op. cit., p. 23.
15. Walford, G. & Pickering, W. 'Introduction', in Walford, G. & Pickering, W. (Eds) *Durkheim's Suicide: A Century of Research and Debate* (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 4.
16. This summary of Durkheim draws in part on Jones, R. *Emile Durkheim: An Introduction to Four Major Works* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1986), pp. 82–114.
17. Patton, P. 'Deleuze and Guattari: Ethics and Post-modernity', in Genosko, G. (Ed.) *Deleuze & Guattari*, vol. 3 (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 1159–1160.
18. See Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, Trans. W. Kaufman and R. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1968), especially: 'Book I: European Nihilism'.
19. Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition* (French: 1968) Trans. P. Patton (London: Athlone, 1994).
20. Ibid., p. 36.
21. Nietzsche, F. *The Will to Power*, op. cit.
22. For a detailed scholarly treatment of the univocity of being, which I have only been able to briefly outline here, see Widder, N. 'The Rights of Simulacra: Deleuze and the Univocity of Being', *Continental Philosophy Review*, 34(2001), pp. 437–453.
23. That is, Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (French: 1972), Trans. R. Hurley, M. Seem and H.R. Lane (London: Athlone,

1983); and Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (French: 1980), Trans. B. Massumi (London: Athlone, 1987).

24. Patton, P. 'Deleuze and Guattari: Ethics and Post-modernity', op. cit., p. 1156.
25. Deleuze and Guattari also mention a fourth danger, 'Power'. I avoid discussion of this danger because it is not specific to any single line, and as such does not contribute to their individual characterization. See Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., pp. 228–229.
26. Ibid., p. 229.
27. Ibid., p. 503.
28. Boutang, P., cited in Colombat, A. 'November 4, 1995', op. cit., p. 236.

Part II
Ethico-Aesthetics

5

Intellectual Disability, Sensation and Thinking Through Affect

Anna Hickey-Moody

People with an intellectual disability, along with their families, carers and social workers, tend to live – or work – mainly in relation to paradigms of thought established by medical and sociological knowledges of intellectual disability.[1] These knowledges are important. They connect physiology and society, and offer frameworks for understanding and interacting with people with intellectual disability. Yet as discursive systems, they are limited.[2] Indeed, their utilitarianism often constitutes their limit. The narrow field within which issues relating to intellectual disability are thought means that there are extremely select ways in which people with intellectual disability can be known. Certain milieus of sense, feeling, and expectation become attached to the idea of intellectual disability and the body of the person with intellectual disability. For example, the sweet and simple minded person,[3] the dirty and evil idiot,[4] the social burden[5] are but a few popular social stereotypes that arise from medically and sociologically based knowledges of intellectual disability.

Dance theatre is one creative medium, amongst many, that has the potential to re-imagine intellectually disabled bodies.[6] Restless Dance is Australia's leading youth dance company inspired by cultures of disability (see Figure 5.1). Many of the dancers in Restless have Down syndrome, Autism, general developmental disabilities or Cerebral Palsy. Each of these conditions is a mode of acting in the world that affects other bodies in unique ways, and which prompts heterogeneous visions of the world. Other dancers in Restless do not have an intellectual disability, and are undertaking tertiary dance or theatre training. Restless is one of a select number of companies operating in this field of integrated dance[7] in Australia.

Figure 5.1 A close up from Proximal. Duet by Mario Spate and Nadia Ferencz (photograph and Copyright Eric Algra, reproduced courtesy of Restless Dance Company)

In 2001, I was a performer in Restless Dance Company's major work for the year, *Proximal*.[8] I was also undertaking ethnographic fieldwork on the Dance Company for my doctoral thesis. As a colleague and friend of the director of the performance, we discussed theoretical frameworks for thinking the body. Deleuze's reading of the body as surfaces of varied intensity and sites of connection across which forces flow, and his notions of smooth and striated space, inspired the directorial imperative to perform corporeal bodies as maps of life histories and to inscribe these corporeal patterns into space. I take *Proximal* as a case study through which to explore ways in which dance theatre can re-imagine intellectually disabled bodies. Specifically, I am interested in the performance ensemble as an expanded body that increases individuals' capacities to affect and to be affected. Following Spinoza, Deleuze takes material bodies as a challenge to think through the physical world. Deleuze states:

> Spinoza... proposes to establish the body as a model: 'we do not know what the body can do'... We speak of consciousness and its decrees, of the will and of its effects, of the thousand ways of moving the body, of dominating the body and the passions – but *we do not even know what a body can do*.[9]

Dance theatre sources and extends the limits of 'what a body can do', through evaluating the positive and/or negative affects created by movement. Bodies are no longer intellectually disabled, or not intellectually disabled. Rather, there are bodies which enter into equation with spectators through affect; forming assemblages in which the intellectually disabled body becomes known through kinaesthetic economies that no longer pertain primarily to notions of intellectual disability. For example, spectator + affect + extended dance body = a new kinaesthetic system of relation. I employ the term '[+_bodies]' to articulate the corporeal form produced through these kinaesthetic economies that do not rely principally on notions of intellectual disability.

In this chapter[10] I take up Deleuzian[11] concepts of affect[12] and sensation[13] in arguing that integrated dance theatre is an affective realm that – through the production of [+_bodies] in a performance ensemble – changes the ways that bodies with intellectual disability are thought. Integrated dance theatre is expressive of change within social imaginaries. It shifts the understandings of viewing bodies by staging relationships between dancers and audience members. The aesthetic, embodied labour of Restless dancers affectively disrupts medically based discourses of intellectual disability. Through mobilizing Deleuze's reading of Baruch Spinoza[14] and Deleuze and Guattari's writings on affect and sensation,[15] I argue that dance theatre doesn't try to create or imagine change, but is itself an instance of change. By constructing a relationship between the choreographic processes employed in the Restless Dance performance *Proximal*, and Deleuzian conceptions of corporeal capacity, I explicate the physical ways in which Restless Dance imagines fleshy bodies positively; in terms of context and capability. For Deleuze, and within Restless, embodied capacity is always defined through collective relations.

Proximal: Place, space and the virtual dance body

I am interested in the temporality of *Proximal*, as manifest in the different times that constitute rehearsing and performing dance theatre. Times of rehearsal and performance fold back to compose various elements of this chapter, as do the different times of writing. As an accordion-like compression of a range of different writing, performing and rehearsing times, this chapter also incorporates different modes of writing, such as journal writing, description and analysis, which have taken place across an extended period of time.[16] Bodies, ultimately the instruments that write dance, are living testimonies to the fact

that all texts are a composition of different times. Physical features, such as scars, eye colour and a person's walk, function as signifiers of different temporalities and other places. People's histories are primarily embodied, and the histories of people with intellectual disabilities are often *solely* embodied, their physicality constituting the sites where their personal stories are recorded. Dance texts created by people with intellectual disability are therefore unique articulations of their histories, and are in themselves, like all texts, compositions of different times.

The concept of bodies as collections of temporalities allows the practice of integrated dance theatre to be seen as [+_bodies] re-articulating their histories and experiences. This is not to say that the concept of corporeality as a collection of temporalities must necessarily play a conscious role in the lives of these [+_bodies]. Cultural histories of people with intellectual disabilities are lived out through social attitudes, lifestyle options and modes of mainstream representation, all of which fold into bodies to create signifiers of history. Hence the histories and identities of individuals with intellectual disability are specific aspects of these individuals' embodiment. Points of a body that tell a particular story, such as prostheses, shunts, scars, tattoos, piercings, stretch marks and corporeal brandings of various forms, create different intensities and lines of latitude and longitude across which to read life stories. These are connected and re-articulated through the process of making and performing dance theatre.

Place

> Deleuze and Guattari tell us that, 'architecture is the first of all the arts' and that its most crucial task requires that it 'endlessly produces and joins up planes and sections'... According to this formulation, architecture [and spatial design] operate... as a sieve of chaos, that uncertain realm we discover just beyond our familiar thresholds.
>
> Frichot[17]

Spatial design can push the viewer beyond their comfort zone. It can ask spectators to leave familiar thresholds and enter new conceptual and aesthetic terrains. *Proximal* was a place-making project, as much as it was a new dance work. It was designed to create an 'uncertain realm we discover just beyond our familiar thresholds'.[18] Ingrid Voorendt choreographed and directed the work, in collaboration with the Youth Performance Ensemble dancers.[19] Composer and musician, Heather Frahn, developed and performed an original score for the work and the Company's resident designer, Gaelle Mellis, conceived the set and

costumes for production.[20] *Proximal* was the Company's first substantial foray into video technologies. Restless collaborated with Tamsin Sharp, a film and video maker, in devising video text that spoke to the choreography and constituted a core component of the performance. *Proximal* was devised in the Restless Dance Studio,[21] and was performed at the South Australian State Opera Studio, from 23–26 October 2001. The dancers' work began in July that year. As such, the production was a 4-month project for the dancers and a longer, more extensive process for the Company Manager, Artistic Director, Company Director and Stage Manager.

Gaelle Mellis' design highlighted the dancers' bodies. The stage was bare and stark white, against which the dancers' forms were very distinct. It consisted of a large floor and seven-foot wall that ran across the rear. The bright white paint that covered these surfaces was cracked, resulting in a textural appearance reminiscent of, although much whiter than, skin. The paint cracks gave the impression of giant pores, upon which the dancers overlayed inscriptions of their embodied histories through movement. This barren appearance was inflected with elements of landscape through small clusters of dried tree branches, which sporadically lined both sides of the stage. The right hand side of the back wall contained a white screen, which featured Tamsin Sharp's video work. Videotext played for the duration of the performance. The simple set constituted an extension of the aesthetics[22] that were articulated in costume design. Women were dressed in supple, 1950's style frocks and the men in cotton pants and shirts. Dancers performed in bare feet, without any jewellery, makeup or artifice other than clothes. Themes of starkness, simplicity and softness, each developed in different ways through the costumes and set, also provided the basis for the production's lighting design. David Gadsden, production lighting designer, plotted lighting states that moved from enfolding the dancers' bodies in a warm glow, to piercing through choreography and the clustered branches with bright white rays of light. The soundscape also built in intensity across the duration of the performance. Sonic ambience was created by Frahn's initial womb-like sounds of heartbeats, rushing blood and breathing. This gradually increased into a fervent wall of vocal percussion, song and pre-recorded digital effects. The production's set; costume, lighting and soundscape harmonized and became critically enmeshed with the choreography. So too did Sharp's video, which detailed aspects of the dancers' bodies and constituted a core element of the performance text.

Videotext was an articulation of the concepts guiding the production. Taking the body as a site in (and upon) which individuals' histories are performed, video images scoured the dancers' bodies for eloquent points: scars, birthmarks, stretchmarks, tattoos; corporeal inscriptions which told stories without words. All video footage was shot close-up, the focal range moving between a framed shot of a dancer's face, to skin filmed so closely that its location on the body was unclear. Eyes, tongues, fingers, backbones, nipples and navels were edited together with front-on face shots, scars, birthmarks: an itinerary of corporeal features specific to the dancers' bodies. Video recording took place over 2 days and occurred in relation to the process of devising choreographic material. Editing occurred once the dance theatre text had been composed. As such, the video included 'beginning' and 'end' moments, as well as a rhythm of progression, which complemented the dance theatre text. It added an intensity and intimacy to the performance that was specific to the capabilities of this medium. Offering a 'peep hole' into the dancers' bodies and lives, shots were unnervingly close-up, and thus confronting, yet at moments they also rendered the dancers in a particularly fragile light: creases of flesh, moments of vulnerable nakedness that are particular to human bodies, bring the viewer to the remembrance that bodies are sensitive foldings of soft tissue, smooth skin and striated muscle. The intense, laborious and inquisitive perspective on the body articulated in video technologies was also expressed in the choreography of the production.

Space

> Human beings not only inhabit extensive spaces, they themselves are extensive spaces.
>
> DeLanda[23]

The body is an extensive physical mass: it fills space. But the body is also a liminal[24] space that connects context to subjectivity[25] through a network of affective systems. As Graham[26] notes, we cannot assume 'a clear boundary between objects and persons'. We must remember virtual[27] possibilities for body-space connections and changes, and an absolute belief in unambiguous boundaries 'must be abandoned... [as] persons do not finish at their skins'.[28] The body is extensive space, it produces virtual spaces and it inhabits shared spaces.

Playing with notions of the body-in-space, the body as space and the possibilities of virtual space, Voorendt, the *Proximal* performance director, modelled the choreographic techniques employed to devise the

work around the dancer's body as a spatialized map of life histories, and their bodily actions as (re)positionings of embodied histories. The title of the work highlighted the importance of in-between bodily spaces, those that we simultaneously inhabit and move away from unwittingly in the pedestrian experience of living. It is in, and through, proximal spaces that embodied histories are carried, performed and re-framed.

In choreographic terms, proximal space is the area closest to a dancer's body; a virtual extension of corporeal surface area. The personal atmosphere one moves through in life is an inextricable part of how we actualize the virtual, what we 'are'; what we can and cannot do. Taking this notion as a starting point for devising performance material, Voorendt encouraged the dancers to extend their proximal space in order to encompass an entire performance venue. As such, embodied histories of corporeality and spatiality were re-territorialized[29] through the dancers' work in *Proximal*. The space that bodies performed in became more than a given condition of performance: it was acknowledged as a historical, political artefact. This is what Deleuze and Guattari[30] call a 'smooth space': an environment in which ratios between matter and virtual possibilities are reworked.

The process of devising and performing Restless Dance Company's *Proximal*, occurred in relation to the re-production of dancers' smooth, embodied and proximal spaces. This development involved 'small tactile and manual actions of contact',[31] actions which constituted the process of mining dancers' corporeal specificities. How much power can environment have? How effectively can the politics of a physical space inform the way a body moves, breathes, feels, sees, senses? And how does one create a space with an atmosphere that positively transforms the ways in which bodies can be thought? These are questions posed by *Proximal* in a space filled with singularities brought together in sensation. Dancers created, through movement, answers to questions such as: How can you write yourself into space? How can you become void?

Body

> There are psychic clichés just as there are physical clichés – ready-made perceptions, memories, phantasms... The fight against clichés is a terrible thing... Only when one leaves them behind, through rejection, can the work begin.
>
> Deleuze[32]

Creativity challenges ready-made perceptions. It slips between cracks in consciousness, assumption and the 'known' through making new

bodies and creating original ways of knowing. Collective creativity redefines communities through articulating a virtual body of difference. The devising process for *Proximal* began with erasing clichés and creating a virtual dance-body of difference that I call 'Ballet's little Frankenstein': an energetic (virtual) body of dance movement and film, inscribed flesh and past experiences. This process of creation began in a collection of in-between spaces, compiled from dancers, sites of corporeal rupture (burns, piercings, tattoos, scars, birthmarks), which performers were asked to identify and articulate creatively through movement (see Figure 5.2). Dancers responded to this task by categorizing parts of their body that open out and connect with other assemblages:[33] one dancer's armpit is scarred with a razor cut, which connects her to socialized ideas of gender, 'femininity' and consumerism. Another's childhood knee injury – the product of an unfortunately positioned stick when falling – has left traces of white scar tissue running across her leg. These silvery lines tie her to childhood memories, her family, and her engagement with sympathy as a powerful social tool. A purple welt on Orla's thigh marks a cut from a surfboard, connecting her to 'surfie' youth subcultures and her idea of being a young person in Australia. The burn on Trent's leg from a match links his body with practices of sadomasochism, dissent, subversion, and his addictions. The connections that are forged by making dances on such sites of corporeal rupture are immanent. For example, Violet's grown out piercing scar in the webbing between her thumb and index finger embodies subcultural practices of body modification, a friendship bonding ritual between two girls, and the years that it has taken for the jewellery to be rejected by her flesh. This scar is inseparable from these processes. These bodily marks are a performance of the ways in which we are always already part of a range of different machines[34] at any given moment in time. Violet's scar is but one cog in a subcultural machine of body modifications; a small component of a friendship machine and it is a marker of the passing of time. These bodily marks are not symbols or metaphors for something, but are themselves connections between present and past and conjunctions of certain people in particular places.

The number of sites of rupture upon the Company members' corporealities as a whole, and the multiple significances of these sites for Company members, is potentially infinite. The lines of connection between these sites are moments of union between the corporeal forms of the dancers, their virtual futures, their embodied histories and their styles of dance. Such union is a body – it is a 'Body without Organs';[35] the virtual power of a collection of singularities, which produces the



Figure 5.2 Dancing women. Duet by Gemma Coley and Lisa Englaar (Photograph and Copyright Eric Algra, reproduced courtesy of Restless Dance Company)

energy and intensity that offers these performers the force they give form to in creating *sensation*. This particular 'Body without Organs' is 'Ballet's little Frankenstein'; the body of virtual possibilities afforded by the relational space of the Company's corporeal ruptures and unorthodox dance styles; it is a virtual stitching together of methods of movement, histories of dance, and medical ideals, with dancers' body parts, stories and corporeal markings.

As well as inspiring choreographic material, the dancers' assortments of corporeal brandings formed material for filming. These bodily marks are personal intensities, erogenous zones of the body that are coded through duration (embodied time) rather than processes of psychoanalytic sexualization. The often hetero-normative libidinal economies of the body, economies that are invested and coded through psychoanalytic sexualization, are re-worked here. Individually specific personal intensities of the body are shot close up and cut together in an unlikely series of connections. In the videotext, to re-appropriate a traditional Afro-American Gospel song:[36] 'the backbone's connected to the eyeball, the eyeball's connected to the fingertip... the fingertip's connected to the nipple...'. This ever increasing 'body machine' (body parts complied on to video) was screened during the performance of *Proximal*, serving as a poignant reminder of the constructed nature of libidinal economies of anatomy.

This employment of videotext, and the accompanying creative method of sourcing choreographic material from the dancer, is an artistic articulation of Deleuzian theory – in *Proximal* and for Deleuze: 'the body is a surface where forces play'.[37] Proximal spaces become corporeality, as dancers extend and embrace space as 'an intensive discontinuity in which the subject degenerates'.[38]

Material thinking

> A thinker may... modify what thinking means, draw up a new image of thought... But instead of creating new concepts that occupy it, they populate it with other instances, with other poetic, novelistic, or even pictorial or musical entities... These thinkers are 'half' philosophers but also much more than philosophers... They are hybrid geniuses who neither erase nor cover over differences in kind but, on the contrary, use all the resources of their 'athleticism' to install themselves within this very difference, like acrobats torn apart in a perpetual show of strength.
>
> Deleuze and Guattari[39]

For Deleuze and Guattari, artists are material thinkers, 'hybrid geniuses', 'philosophers but also much more than philosophers'. As material thinkers, artists give form to new aspects of the world. The 'very difference',[40] to which Deleuze and Guattari refer in the quote above, is sensation, the aesthetic compounds created by artists. Such aesthetic compounds – such sensations – are a material realization of a new aspect

of reality. In dance theatre, dancers themselves are installed within the entity of sensation. The dance becomes an aesthetic compound that articulates new differences and speaks to emerging images of thought. Creating a being of sensation in dance theatre is a way of conceptualizing bodies differently.

Through producing 'beings of sensation'[41] – sensible inhabitants of a work of art – performers re-territorialize their bodies through affectively disrupting medical and sociological territorializations of their bodies.[42] They generate new affects through crafting sensory beings that transform and augment existing milieus of sense in which the intellectually disabled body is positioned. In vernacular discourses, generating new affects is a way of fighting back, a constructive way of refusing stereotypes. In the case of the Restless dance piece, *Proximal*, dancers resist implications of uselessness and inaction associated with medical ideas of intellectual disability by pushing their bodies into a space where capitalist uses of the body become radically use-less. The dance work *Proximal* is an articulation of a space in which new beings are formed:

> This stage space is shockingly white, though at times, warmly lit. Its paint is splintered with a thousand tiny cracks. The dancers' bodies are framed by clumps of willow, foliage that articulates notions of youth, possibility and immanent futures. Although this space is a 'forest' of sorts, it's a forest that's not of this world. The world to which this space belongs is timeless and opaque; speaking of the possibilities of youth and generations of pain. This is a universe perched close to the edge of a Body without Organs[43] produced by bodies with intellectual disability; a social/psychological mass of majoritarian cultural denial, anger, fear, and prospective genetic annihilation. This Body without Organs is constantly feeding into the Restless Dancers' practice of 'nomad art'[44] – as bodies on stage perform generations of embodied and institutionalized majoritarian social disavowal.
>
> A film screen fixed upon the splintered white surface that marks the back of the stage shows up minutiae of physical details. The body is objectified; scrutinized, and seemingly unrelated corporeal parts are connected. The viewer is a voyeur of sites of human fracture, and their potential for destabilizing ways of thinking about bodies. The screen becomes a technology of the dancers' corporeality as it performs the interconnectedness of singularities inscribed in flesh. It traces life histories through corporeal inscriptions, connecting the audience and the performer in a nexus of different understandings. The viewer

> is attached to the eye of the camera, as it fixes on a dancer's extensive head scar, which links us up to the surgeon's scalpel and an operating theatre. Body technologies, and the embodied histories (durations) that constitute them, are coupled through the eye of the camera and the viewer. Movement excerpts that are included in the film allow the screen to morph into dance, in a becoming-movement of this usually stable display. Dancers' bodies echo the sensations that inhabit the film screening on the wall behind them. Bright garbs cheer the scarred bodies that move through this thickened atmosphere, which pulses with sounds of amplified heartbeats and rushing blood.
>
> To get lost in your own body is a terrifying proposition; yet here bodies willingly step into a gallery of corporeal inscriptions in order to etch themselves again through movement.[45]

This descriptive passage illustrates the interface of political resistance and aesthetic labour that folds in to make *Proximal* as a dance theatre text: a performance that is a way of creatively refuting negative stereotypes of intellectual disability. Raw unformed flesh, mistakes, inertia, laziness, daydreaming, bodyscapes, and the prospect of dissolving, are re-invented as aesthetic compounds that make up this work (see Figure 5.3).

Figure 5.3 Girls writing their lives in space. Dancers: Gemma Coley, Anna Hickey-Moody, Rachel High and Lisa Englaar (Photograph and Copyright Eric Algra, reproduced courtesy of Restless Dance Company)

Sensory becoming and beings of sensation

In Deleuze and Guattari's[46] thought, the human body is an effect of its own movements and processes of connection. The body doesn't precede the flow of time through which it becomes. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that we do not begin as fixed subjects who then have to know a fixed world. Rather, they argue that there is experience and *from* this experience we form an image of ourselves as distinct subjects. All life is a series of 'foldings'. Every cell, every organism (and the human body) are folds of the milieu of life. Our bodies are the becoming-actual of aspects of our virtual possibility. The body is a limit set in chaos that is a resolution of infinite speeds. Subjectivity is an effect of our processes of becoming. For dancers in Restless, such processes of becoming, of becoming subject, incorporate dance theatre work into a performer's subjectivity. The collective virtual and material bodies created in making a dance theatre work change what individual bodies are capable of and how they can become.

Thinking through the concept of becoming, bodies are multiplicities; sites of intersecting multiple surfaces: [+_bodies]. In a dance theatre performance [+_bodies] become part of an assemblage that includes movement, film text, sound and space. A dance performance produces a being of sensation; a synergy of movement, music, design, staging and conceptual development which constructs a whole that is more than the sum of its parts. Then the spectator becomes connected to this being of sensation, creating a sensory assemblage in which the viewing body is modulated in relation to sensation and the extended dance body.

A being of sensation is an aesthetic compound which, even if it only lasts for 'a few seconds... will give sensation the power to exist and be preserved in itself *in the eternity that coexists with this short duration*'.[47] There is a virtual eternity that accompanies new images of thought, in this instance, it is a re-territorialization of Ballet's little Frankenstein; a virtual dance-body that remakes medical ideas of the body and orthodox methods of producing dance.

Becoming in art, the sensory becoming the dance theatre work undertakes in crafting a bloc of sensations, will always push the dancing body and the viewing body past their purported limits. Sensory becoming creates textual aesthetic affect (a change produced by a work of art) and corporeal affect (a change produced in an embodied human subject). There is an economy of sensation here: art imagines virtual possible words through sensations. These sensations are compounds of aesthetic affects (a being of sensation in dance is a compound of movement, bodies, design, sound). The subjective modulation that these affects

produce in the viewer can alter, if not reconfigure, the viewer's kinaesthetic response to bodies. A new catalogue of feeling and response is established.

The trajectories of blocs of sensation cut across the territories of those who produce them: dancers, directors, technicians, musicians, designers, and also those who behold the sensation: audience members. In *Proximal*, embodied percepts, the product of ensemble process, collect along with other synthetic media in order to create a being of sensation that is generated by bodies 'with intellectual disability', yet which does not frame these bodies in terms of discourses of intellectual disability. It deviates from, and perverts the affective logics articulated by medical and social ideas of 'intellectual disability'. Here, extended dance bodies – [+_bodies], ideas, media, movement styles, choreographies, milieus of a certain aesthetic terrain – 'cut across the [medical] territories of other species... forming interspecies junction points'.[48] These 'interspecies junction points' are places in which bodies inhabit a nomad's land of in-between-ness, no longer a singular 'human', neither an open space; they are remade as a collective. Dancers create 'junction points' marked by the production of *blocs of sensation*. Choreography, sets, music, costumes and lights all affect ensemble dynamics, and in turn affect the production of sensibility in a performance text. These junction points are movements of destratification; corporeal transformations undertaken through group process. Their limit, which is never reached, is chaos.

Affective disruptions

Deleuze and Guattari's[49] discussion of substance as that which is distinguished by 'movement and rest, slowness and speed... (longitude)',[50] lays a broad conceptual framework within which a body and its capacities are determined in relation to corporeal context and affective capacity. Context forms the latitude, or accessible power, that defines what the longitude, or consolidated matter can perform. Movement (longitude) is immeasurable. It can be known only through what it does. A body's movements are both internal and external, in the respect that bodies – individuals, institutions, Nation States – have capacitates for self regulation. This self-regulation exists in relation to external forces that act upon bodies. A force produced by art – a work of integrated dance theatre or an image – can inform, or be folded into, individual processes. Movement is the ongoing process of becoming by which bodies continuously evolve in relation to greater and lesser bodies. The

affective force of *Proximal* is a sensory disruption of dominant affective compounds of 'movement and rest, slowness and speed',[51] which are articulated by discourses of intellectual disability.

The being of sensation created by *Proximal* is a liminal zone;[52] a place in which the borders of bodies and the disciplinary lines that mark the outside of ways of thinking about bodies are reworked: 'liminality is... a time and place of withdrawal from normal modes of social action, it can be seen as potentially a period of scrutinization of the central values or axioms of the culture in which it occurs'.[53] As a kinaesthetic force, the liminal affect of *Proximal* cuts across closed ways of reading bodies, positing a reality in process, as yet unformed, in which assumed conceptual boundaries and ways of knowing are re-worked. This liminal[54] reality has the capacity to alter the ways in which audience members think about [+_bodies] and about intellectual disability. When experienced by an observer, sensation produced by integrated dance theatre is a site of multiple processes of becoming-other, which involve renegotiations of viewers' subjective limits.

Sensation can create movements within thought, journeys conducted by 'aesthetic figures'[55] that exist in meta-contextual relationships with other works of art. Aesthetic figures[56] dialogue – or resonate – with other aesthetic figures and conceptual personae.[57] It is through exchanges between aesthetic figures and conceptual personae,[58] through a conversation between art and thought, that art can instigate becomings of thought.

By inviting us to think outside the boundaries of 'majoritarian' thought, aesthetic figures push sensory becomings into the realm of the conceptual, creating experiences in which one is challenged to partake in 'the action by which the common event itself eludes what it is'.[59] Here, the event of a body on stage is no longer the performance of accepted or predictable cultural norms. Rather, within the work of Restless, bodies pose questions that the audience must endeavour to answer, such as: What is intelligence? What can a body do? What bodies can hold power? How are bodies with intellectual disability transformed thorough their relations with others? It is through creating sensation that the work of Restless Dance produces aesthetic figures that actively question the nature/s of assumptions in thought. Such figures draw upon what Deleuze and Guattari have called 'the possible as an aesthetic category'[60] and refute 'intellectual disability' through re-imagining bodies that are given this name.

Notes

1. Scholars in Disability Studies make this point in different ways. Moreover, numerous projects in this area take the premise that medical and sociological knowledges of intellectual disability are definitive aspects of the lives of people with an intellectual disability as their point of departure. See the following references for examples of both trajectories of thought: Cocks, E., Fox, C., Brogan, M. & Lee, M. (Eds) *Under Blue Skies: The Social Construction of Intellectual Disability in Western Australia* (Perth: Edith Cowen University Press, 1996); Goodley, D. & Rapley, M. 'Changing the Subject: Postmodernity & People with Learning Difficulties', in Corker, M. & Shakespeare, T. (Eds) *Disability/Postmodernity: Embodying Disability Theory* (London: Continuum, 2002), pp. 127–142; Manion, M. & Bersani, H. 'Mental Retardation as a Western Sociological Construct: A Cross-Cultural Analysis', *Disability, Handicap & Society,* 2(3)(1987), pp. 231–245; Osburn, J. 'An Overview of Social Role Valorization Theory', *The International Social Role Valorisation Journal,* 3(1)(1998), pp. 7–12; Rock, P. 'Eugenics & Euthanasia: A Cause for Concern for Disabled People, Particularly Disabled Women', *Disability &* Society, 11(1)(1996), pp. 121–127; Rushton, P. 'Idiocy, The Family & The Community in Early Modern North-East England', in Wright, D. & Digby, A. (Eds) *From Idiocy to Mental Deficiency* (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 44–64; Ryan, P. 'Unnatural Selection: Intelligence Testing, Eugenics, & American Political Cultures', *Journal of Social History,* 3(1997), pp. 669–685; Simpson, M. 'The Moral Government of Idiots: Moral Treatment in Seguin', *History of Psychiatry,* 10(2)(1999), pp. 227–243; Simpson, M. 'Idiocy, Incompetence, Power' Paper presented at 'Power/Resistance', *British Sociological Association* Annual Conference, 7–10 April 1997, University of York.
2. These discourses, such as those established by the work of Édouard Seguin, see Seguin, É. 'Origin of the Treatment & Training of Idiots', *American Journal of Education,* 2(1856), pp. 145–152; and Thomas Merton, see Merton, T. *Mankind in the Unmaking: The Anthropology of Mongolism* (Sydney: Bloxham & Chambers, 1968), are clearly reflected in the later model for disability service provision developed by Wolf Wolfensberger. This model for disability service provision is exemplified by texts such as: Wolfensberger, W. *A Brief Introduction to Social Role Valorisation as a High – Order Concept for Structuring Human Services* (Syracuse: Training Institute for Human Service Planning, Leadership & Change Agentry, 1991); Wolfensberger, W. *The Origin & Nature of our Institutional Models* (Syracuse: Human Policy Press, 1975); Wolfensberger, W. 'Eulogy for a Mentally Retarded Jester', *Mental Retardation,* 20(6)(1982), pp. 269–270; Wolfensberger, W. 'The Story of the "Cruickshank Chairs" at Syracuse University: A Contribution to the History of the Brain Injury Construct', *Mental Retardation,* 39(6)(2001), pp. 472–481; Wolfensberger, W. 'Human Service Policies: The Rhetoric Versus the Reality', in Barton, L. (Ed.) *Disability & Dependency* (London: Falmer Press, 1989), pp. 23–41. Contemporary scholars such as Edgar Miller, see Miller, E. 'Idiocy in the Nineteenth Century', *History of Psychiatry,* 7(3)(1996), pp. 361–373; and Mark Rapley, see Rapley, M. *The Social Construction of Intellectual Disability* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) have critically reflected on the ways in

which such early projects led to circumstances in which bodies with intellectual disability are popularly understood in negative or patronizing ways. I extend such critical arguments by explicating the physiology of audience – performer relations, associated emotional connections and possibilities for constructing images in thought, which are made by integrated dance theatre.

3. In 'Challenges for Adults with Autism', *NorthJersey.com* 29 September 2006, staff writer Bob Ivry notes that: 'The public face of autism is young and cute. When most people think of autism, they think of children. But children grow up. They stop being cute. At 21, they stop getting the help they need.' Accessed 8 January 2007 from: http://www.northjersey.com.
4. For an example of the power that the trope of the dirty, evil idiot holds see Larsen, R. & Haller, B. 'The Case of "Freaks": Public Reception of a Real Disability', *Journal of Film & Popular Television,* 29(4)(2002), pp. 164–169.
5. For further discussion, see Gillgren, C. 'Once a Defective, always a Defective: Public Sector Residential Care 1900–1965', in Cocks, E., Fox, C., Brogan, M. & Lee, M. (Eds) *Under Blue Skies: The Social Construction of Intellectual Disability in Western Australia* (Perth: Edith Cowen University, 1996).
6. Scholarship that supports this argument includes, but is not limited to, Goodley, D. & Moore, M. *Arts against Disability: The Performing Arts of People with Learning Difficulties* (Plymouth: BILD, 2002); Kueppers, P. *Disability & Contemporary Performance: Bodies on the Edge* (New York: Routledge, 2003). Texts that make this argument in relation to integrated dance theatre more broadly include Benjamin, A. *Making an Entrance: Theory & Practice For Disabled & Non-Disabled Dancers* (London: Taylor & Francis Books Ltd, 2001); Cooper Albright, A. *Choreographing Difference: The Body & Identity in Contemporary Dance* (London: University Press of New England for Wesleyan University Press, 1997); and Levete, G. *No Handicap to Dance* (London: Souvenir Press, 1982).
7. I employ the term 'integrated dance theatre' to discuss dance theatre devised and performed by people who identify as being with and without intellectual disability. In contexts other than this chapter, the term 'integrated dance theatre' is employed to discuss dance theatre performed by people who identify more broadly as being with and without disabilities, not specifically intellectual disabilities.
8. Restless Dance Company *Proximal.* Directed by Ingrid Voorendt, State Opera Studio, Netley, SA, 23–26 October 2001. *Proximal* was primarily funded by the Australia Council Dance Fund and the South Australian Youth Arts Board.
9. Deleuze, G. *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* (French: 1970) Trans. R. Hurley (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1988), p. 18.
10. I would like to extend my thanks to Christian McCrea from The University of Melbourne for his comments on an early draft of this work and Simon O'Sullivan from Goldsmiths University, London for his feedback on a later draft.
11. The texts I draw on here are: Deleuze, G. *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation* (French: 1981) Trans. D. Smith (London: Continuum, 2004); Deleuze, G. *Spinoza,* op. cit.; Deleuze, G. *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* (French: 1968) Trans. M. Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1990); Deleuze, G. *The Logic of Sense* (French: 1969) Trans. M. Lester and C. Stivale (New York: Columbia

University Press, 1990); and Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?* (French: 1991) Trans. G. Burchell and H. Tomlinson (London: Verso, 1994).

12. Affect is a term developed by Deleuze, and Deleuze and Guattari, to refer to changes in bodily capability. The body to which Deleuze refers is not necessarily human. Rather, it is a degree of power. Affects extend or decrease the limits of 'what a body can do'. An affect is the margin of modulation effected by change in capacity: a material section in its own right that articulates an increase or decrease in a body's capacity to act.
13. Sensation is described by Deleuze as a means of rendering virtual forces material. The act of articulating the virtual transforms or augments the virtual force through giving it form. Deleuze states: 'Force is closely related to sensation: for a sensation to exist, a force must be exerted on a body, on a point of the wave. But if force is the condition of sensation, it is nonetheless not the force that is sensed, since the sensation "gives" something completely different from the forces that condition it.' Deleuze, G. *The Logic of Sense*, op. cit., p. 48.
14. Deleuze, G. *Spinoza*, op. cit.; and Deleuze, G. *Expressionism in Philosophy*, op. cit.
15. Deleuze, G. *Francis Bacon,* op. cit.; Deleuze, G. *The Logic of Sense,* op. cit.; and Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?,* op. cit.
16. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that a book is a folding of time and space back onto itself. See Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (French: 1980) Trans. B. Massumi (London: Athlone, 1987), p. 3.
17. Frichot, H. 'Stealing into Gilles Deleuze's Baroque House', in Buchanan, I. & Lambert, G. (Eds) *Deleuze and Space* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), p. 64. Parenthesis my own.
18. Ibid., p. 64.
19. Sally Chance, the (then) Company Artistic Director, also worked on the later stages of the project.
20. The production lighting designer was David Gadsden, and sound technician was Nick O'Connor.
21. In Franklin Street, Adelaide.
22. I employ a Deleuzian notion of aesthetics which articulates the capacity of art to challenge and re-define epistemological structures through altering people's perception and sensibilities. Here, aesthetics is a synthesis of an ethics of practice (making and viewing art) and a trope of affects constructed within an artwork (the materiality of the art and margin of change the art effects). Aesthetics are signifiers of emergent epistemologies. Deleuze suggests there is a 'whole ethics... [and] an aesthetics too' in 'what we are capable of seeing and saying'. Deleuze, G. *Negotiations* (French: 1990) Trans. M. Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 100.
23. DeLanda, M. 'Space: Extensive and Intensive, Actual and Virtual', in Buchanan, I. & Lambert, G. (Eds) *Deleuze and Space*, op. cit., p. 82.
24. For a discussion of liminality, see Turner, V. *From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play* (New York: PAJ, 1982).
25. After Deleuze, I read subjectivity as 'a specific or collective individuation relating to an event' Deleuze, G. *Negotiations*, op. cit., p. 99. Human subjectivity is a collection of individuations which are activated differently in various machinic arrangements.

26. Graham, M. 'Sexual Things', *GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies,* 10(2)(2004), pp. 299–307, see p. 299.
27. Deleuze develops a specific notion of the virtual. After Henri Bergson, Deleuze characterizes the virtual as possibilities for the actual: as the non – material aspect of the actual world. The virtual has a different temporal structure from the actual and as such it folds in upon the actual in ways that bring the past into the present and connect the present to the future. While the actual and the virtual are distinct, they are also two halves of a whole; one exists in relation to the other.
28. Graham, M. 'Sexual Things', op. cit., p. 299, parentheses my own.
29. The act of re-territorialization changes the aesthetic tropes and bodies of knowledge through which a spatialized body is known. In so doing, re-territorialization augments what the spatialized body 'is' and what is can become.
30. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 488.
31. Ibid., p. 371.
32. Deleuze, G. *Francis Bacon*, op. cit., pp. 71, 73 and 76.
33. An assemblage is a contextual arrangement in which heterogeneous times, spaces, bodies and modes of operation are connected. The examples in this chapter show assemblages of personal biographies, histories, bodies of medical knowledge, dance practices, times and spaces of performance being arranged into the collective body of a performance piece called *Proximal.* Diverse components become aspects of one assemblage. See also the note on 'Machine' in this chapter.
34. I employ the term 'machine' to express Deleuze and Guattari's notion of 'assemblage', that is the arrangement, organization and connection of bodies.
35. Here I use 'Body without Organs' (or BwO) to mean immanent possibility. BwO can be read as the *immanent possibility of matter*; degree zero of form, open and unstructured potential. The Body without Organs is also the outside of form, disarticulated matter.
36. 'Dry Bones' or 'Dem Dry Bones' is a traditional African American Gospel song. The melody was written by James Weldon Johnson and the lyrics are based on the Biblical passage 'Ezekiel 37:14', in which the Prophet Ezekiel visits the 'Valley of the Dry Bones' and animates these bones through bringing in his religious beliefs. Parallels to white colonization and the role played by the Christian religion in this process are embedded in this story, as much as the political agency exhibited by African American peoples in advocating Gospel song is part of the 'Dry Bones' melody.
37. Braidotti, R. *Patterns of Dissonance* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 74.
38. Ibid.
39. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., pp. 66–67.
40. Ibid., p. 67.
41. Ibid., p. 165.
42. In Hickey-Moody, A. 'Folding the Flesh Into Thought', *Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities*, 2(1)(2006) pp. 187–195, I critique aspects of medical discourses of intellectual disability, on the premise that Cartesian methods for thinking about the body are implied and affirmed within such discourses. Cartesian ways of conceiving corporeality can be traced through select studies of the social construction of intellectual disability. In opposition to

Cartesian methods of thought, I argue for an understanding of corporeality that medical and sociological discourses of intellectual disability are not able to realize.

43. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (French: 1972) Trans. R. Hurley, M. Seem and H.R. Lane (London: Athlone, 1983); and Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit.
44. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit.
45. Ethnographic field notes – *Proximal*, Restless Dance Company, 2001.
46. See Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit.; and Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit.
47. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 166.
48. Ibid., p. 185.
49. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus,* op. cit., pp. 41, 43, 52 and 252–254.
50. Ibid., p. 254.
51. Ibid.
52. Turner, V. *From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play* (New York: PAJ, 1982). Here, Turner draws upon the work of Arnold Van Gennep who wrote a classic anthropological exploration of liminal space called *The Rites of Passage* (French: 1909) (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960). For further discussion of liminality, see also: Turner, V. 'Betwixt & Between: The Liminal Period in Rites de Passage', in *Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967).
53. Turner, V. *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 167.
54. Ibid.; and Turner, V. 'Betwixt & Between: The Liminal Period in Rites de Passage', op. cit.
55. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 177.
56. Note that Deleuze and Guattari contend, aesthetic figures, and the style that creates them, have nothing to do with rhetoric:

> 'They are sensations, percepts and affects, landscapes and faces, visions and becomings... Aesthetic figures are not the same as conceptual personae. It may be that they pass into one another, in either direction... insofar as there are sensations of concepts and concepts of sensations.'

Idid.

57. 'The conceptual persona is not the philosopher's representative but, rather, the reverse: the philosopher is only the envelope of his principal conceptual personae and of all the other personae who are the intercessors... the real subjects of his philosophy'. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 64.
58. 'The difference between conceptual personae and aesthetic figures consists first of all in this: the former are the powers of concepts, and the latter are the power of percepts and affects', ibid., p. 65.
59. Ibid., p. 177.
60. Ibid.

6
Toward a Pedagogy of Affect

Christa Albrecht-Crane and Jennifer Daryl Slack

> Pedagogy as a social relationship is very close in. It gets right in there in your brain, your body, your heart, in your sense of self, of the world, of others, and of possibilities and impossibilities in all those realms.
>
> Elizabeth Ellsworth[1]

The social space of the classroom is a rich and complex arena in which much more happens than is generally acknowledged. What happens in the classroom, its 'thisness', often exceeds what is perceived as the 'task at hand' and engulfs teachers and students in spaces of 'affect' in ways that matter in the politics of everyday life. This is not just a space of learning but a political space where social beings interact with implications in larger political and cultural struggles. The classroom is where life takes place and where politics happens, even – perhaps especially – in moments that are seemingly insignificant or mundane. Teachers and students are often caught up in encounters that conjure affective 'sense-sations' – moments of energetic and resonant connection – which indicate that something significant is at work.

The importance of affect in the classroom is inadequately considered in scholarship on pedagogy. Although useful contributions on some aspects of emotion and desire in teaching have been offered, scholarship on pedagogy has not explored the significance of affect as a primary element in understanding what happens in the classroom and its relation to the world outside the classroom.[2] Brian Massumi points out that even though contemporary late-capitalist culture is characterized by a profusion of affect, 'there is no cultural theoretical vocabulary specific to affect',[3] and thus no adequate concepts with which to engage why and

how affect matters. Massumi's observation holds true for scholarship on pedagogy as well.[4]

This chapter animates aspects of the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in an effort to illuminate the affective dimension in teaching. Deleuze and Guattari's concepts generate an analytical and theoretical vocabulary that can engage the context of the classroom in a productive way. This chapter proposes that cultural critics, activists, teachers, and scholars who are interested in progressive politics must find a way to address, both convincingly and rigorously, the struggles people wage in and over the affective plane in the educational arena and beyond. Affect matters; it is a pivotal element of individuals' acting and becoming.[5] Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy – an 'explanation formulated in terms of desire'[6] – offers useful tools for thinking with and through affect and its significance for pedagogy.

What can a body do?

In most pedagogical models, individuals are defined or positioned to take up posts or places in terms of who they are; that is, in terms of their social identities: gender, race, class, ethnicity, and so forth, and they are seen as possessing varying degrees of agency – that is, an ability to act – as an attribute of who they are.[7] In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari do not begin with the question *What is a body?* but *What can a body do?* and *Of what affects is a body capable?* This reconfiguration draws on their reading of Spinoza, in which they define bodies in terms of their relations of movement and rest (longitude) and their capacity to affect and be affected (latitude).[8] Defining bodies in this way marks the distinctive move toward creating the concepts and vocabulary that open onto the terrain of affect that matters so much in pedagogy. As Deleuze and Guattari explain:

> We know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other words, what its affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, with the affects of another body, either to destroy that body or to be destroyed by it, either to exchange actions and passions with it or to join with it in composing a more powerful body.[9]

A body's singularity lies in its specific affective composition: 'The speed or slowness of metabolisms, perceptions, actions, and reactions link together to constitute a particular individual in the world.'[10]

In Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of life, these bodies with their varying affective capacities are constantly exposed to, generated by, and composed of the various forces and lines of segmentarity that constitute the socius. In his introduction to the English translation of *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze draws attention to the work of the socius and the lines – or forces – that compose it when he writes that 'we will never find the sense of something (of a human, a biological or even a physical phenomenon) if we do not know the force which appropriates the thing, which exploits it, which takes possession of it or is expressed in it'.[11] Deleuze and Guattari's project of rhizomatics maps three types of lines that are central to understanding the work of the socius: molar lines, molecular lines, and lines of flight.

Molar lines 'overcode' dual segmentations that follow 'the great major dualist oppositions: social classes, but also men-women, adults-children, and so on'.[12] Molar lines express binary effects and cut up bodies to direct flows into rigid lines. An effect of these molar lines is to identify, and become identifiable in, rigidly molar structures: man or woman, adult or child, black or white. Even those individuals who seemingly evade binary categorizations can be contained in the logic of binaries – thus the half-breed and hermaphrodite.[13]

At the same time that molar segmentarity operates to order a system, the second line of segmentarity, the molecular, distributes 'territorial and lineal segmentations',[14] a 'supple fabric without which their [molar lines] rigid segments would not hold'.[15] These are lines that secure segmentarity at the capillary, micropolitical level and complement the work of molar lines. Molecular distribution 'is a micro politics of perception, affection, conversation, and so forth'.[16] Michel Foucault attends to this level of micropower when he discusses, for example, the 'government of individualization',[17] a process that translates the forces of molar segmentation into the realm of individual conduct where 'power is put into action'[18] at the level of the family, the school, the factory, the army, and so forth. In this milieu, molar lines break down, multiply into innumerable other lines, and enter into relations with bodies and things surrounding them.

The third line, the line of flight, is also a molecular line (as opposed to a molar line), 'one of several lines of flight, marked by quanta and defined by decoding and deterritorializations'.[19] This third line enacts lines of mutation, of decoding; it is 'the ultimate quantum line'.[20] If the molar line codes, rigidifies, and blocks, then the line of flight decodes, unmakes, and modifies. Whereas molarity constitutes 'arborescence', that is, 'the submission of the line to the point'[21] (such as an overcoded

binary identity), lines of flight constitute the movement away from and breaking up of points.

Lines of flight are instantiations of desire, the primal force upon which society is built. As such, they form a productive, affirmative, and positive dynamism pointing to the nexus of change. Desire, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is critical; it names that force that breaks up the reductive molar workings of social organizations. 'Active, positive lines of flight... open up desire, desire's machines, and the organization of a social field of desire: it's not a matter of escaping 'personally', from oneself, but of allowing something to escape, like bursting a pipe or a boil'.[22] The political potential of desire and lines of flight lies in their capacity to undermine the working of the social machine, to open 'up flows beneath the social codes that seek to channel and block them'.[23]

Lines of flight do not, however, form a binary with molar lines. Rather, lines of flight, and their economy – desire – are primary forces, the material of which that existence is made. The molecular lines of flight form the 'field of immanence', the terrain upon which life comes to be. To suggest, then, that desire must be seen 'as a process of production',[24] means that desire as a primary force is always present and that molar lines effect a coding and organization of that primary force. Molar lines construct what we commonly call 'the self', binding that primary desire in ways that make the subject possible according to the needs of the molar system. Yet at the same time, given that molar lines code desire in contingent ways, there is still desire and, therefore, lines of flight that evade or escape the molar coding. For this reason, Deleuze and Guattari are centrally concerned with these lines of flight and what they term the 'Body without Organs', which names the process of detaching from the social strata that bind bodies. Thus, the Body without Organs, the body that is not a (social) organism – the body that is made up of desire – marks a process of destabilization. Deleuze and Guattari urge, 'Find your body without organs. Find out how to make it. It's a question of life and death, youth and old age, sadness and joy. It is where everything is played out'.[25]

Rhizomatics attends to the capacity of these lines for creation as well as to their capacity for destruction, understood in terms of four 'dangers': 'first, Fear, then Clarity, then Power, and finally the great Disgust, the longing to kill and to die, the Passion for abolition'.[26] Fear indicates the anxiety over loss of control that leads to resting in the security and comfort of molarity. Clarity marks the self-celebratory moment in which the infinitude of possibilities becomes an end in itself. Power is the ability to shift and 'stop' the proliferation of possibilities to suit

particular ends. The great Disgust rises out of and gives rise to a kind of perpetual revolutionary overturning of any consistent sense of stability: a line of death, a despair that impassions only destruction.

To map the classroom in terms of its affective capacities is to consider the work of all three lines: molar lines, molecular lines, and lines of flight – both productive and dangerous.

What can a body do in the classroom?

Addressing public education in general, Elizabeth Ellsworth writes, 'nothing, not a thing that I remember in my public school experience, ever addressed the part of me that was passionate about learning'.[27] Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of affect and social space can inform a pedagogy that accounts for the passion of which Ellsworth writes. The Deleuze-Guattarian vocabulary and concept of affect, and the attendant terrain of molar and molecular lines, are capable of addressing a dimension of teaching and learning that otherwise remains inconspicuous, despite the fact of, or more accurately because of, its omnipresence.[28] Affect permeates the space of the classroom. What might this mean? What are the lines one can draw to map and mark the singularity of this classroom?

First, molar lines of institutional learning territorialize, control, and segment space and bodies in ways that establish the binary structures of the classroom. By virtue of molar segmentation, bodies become identifiable in their roles as teacher and students. The teacher teaches; the students learn. David Tyack and Larry Cuban explain, for example, that education in the West has been segmented along the lines of institutional and political norms that have been systematized and rigidified: 'Over long periods of time schools have remained basically similar in their core operation, so much so that these regularities have imprinted themselves on students, educators, and the public as the essential features of a "real school" '.[29] Tyack and Cuban call these essential features 'the grammar of schooling', evident in such 'normal' (molar) practices as age-grading, the division of knowledge into separate subjects, and the self-contained classroom with one teacher.[30]

Second, coterminous with the work of molar lines, molecular lines work in and through bodies. These more supple, diffused lines complement and supplement the rigid segmentation of molar lines. Molecular lines are localized and reach into the capillary realms of social space. Deleuze and Guattari write: 'the molar segments are necessarily immersed in the molecular soup that nourishes them and makes their

outlines waver'.[31] In fact, the molecular work of the individual classroom makes or breaks the ability of (molar) institutional learning to function. In describing how she makes the (molar) classroom 'work', that is, how she enforces what Tyack and Cuban called the 'grammar of schooling', Ashton-Warner demonstrates the work of the molecular.[32] She takes up, for instance, the (molar) role of 'teacher' in addressing the issue of discipline, which she defines, following a school inspector at her school, as 'a matter of being able to get attention when you want it'.[33] Her particular molecular technique for getting attention is to summon the students with music, specifically with the first eight notes from Beethoven's Fifth Symphony played on the piano.[34] At the sound of these notes played by the teacher, the children attend to the music, which is a molecular response. At the same time, however, prompted by the music, they turn their molar attention to the teacher. In this way the normative (molar) structure of the classroom – students attending to the teacher's instructions – is upheld by a molecular pattern of relational exchanges.

Third, 'chaos' – that intensity Ashton-Warner warns 'none of us allows in teaching' – marks the third line, 'the line of flight', the fabric of immanence that makes all creation and life possible. This line is characterized by excess; that is, by what is left or escapes the territorializing work of the molar lines. Lines of flight decode and deterritorialize, but can be – and always eventually are – recaptured or reterritorialized in molar processes such as institutionalized and bureaucratic education practices that translate the desire of bodies into the line segments necessary to make 'education' happen. Therefore, this process is 'both the principle of their power and the basis of their impotence'.[35] Why? Because by virtue of desire being immanent to life and creation, it cannot be absolutely territorialized, bound forever. A 'zone of impotence'[36] ensures that the territorializations by the molar line remain provisional, albeit at times surely strong. It is the immanence of this third line that spurs Ashton-Warner to write repeatedly about 'an energy that is almost frightening when released', that 'so severely opposes a teacher when imposing knowledge'.[37] This 'energy' constitutes a line of flight that escapes the molar function of the classroom. It is a line she both values and fears.

Molecular supplements in molar classrooms

Affect matters in the classroom... and beyond. Beyond its appearance in the elementary classroom as described by Ashton-Warner,[38]

affect doubly articulates what happens inside the classroom with larger cultural and social struggles, and it does so without reducing those struggles to questions of identity. The vocabulary and concept of affect encourage recognition that bodies don't always (or necessarily) respond as men, women, young, old, heterosexual, homosexual, teacher, student, and so on. Rather, bodies are individuated by particular affective thresholds and thus enact variable investments in social space. What 'happens' in the classroom cannot be understood, therefore, without also taking into account affective investments that exceed the molar coding of institutionalized learning and the coding of bodies as particular molar identities. Paying attention to the affective dimension bursts the seams of the classroom and encourages us to address – more broadly – what Grossberg calls 'the affective dimension of belonging, affiliation and identification'.[39]

Reading the classroom in terms of pre-established identity affiliations reduces the ability to see what bodies can do, reduces, in fact, what bodies do. What 'happens' in the classroom is diminished, its 'thisness' violated. In contrast, a focus on affect – always a process of affirmation – acknowledges and maps any body's capacity and its singular relation to the socius in relation with other bodies. The line of flight opened up by a pedagogy of affect recognizes the work of the molar, binary lines, but is no longer hostage to them.

If one defines bodies in terms of their composition of movement and rest and by their capacity to affect and be affected, the analytical framework shifts to matters of affective capacities and relations. Thus, one would not ask anymore who the participants are, but what they can do, what they do, and how they enter into composition with other bodies. These questions are always asked in the affirmative, because all bodies are composed of positive affective thresholds that enter into composition with other bodies' affective thresholds, thus reproducing molar processes or setting in motion something new – whether productive or dangerous.

What we are arguing, then, is that Deleuze-Guattarian concepts offer an approach that can address the intensities and possibilities of a present moment as it reflects and engages affect. As Richard Miller,[40] following Ian Hunter,[41] explains, too much effort by educational theorists is spent on painting a picture of schooling that seeks to overcome the present in an effort to attain the utopian school of the future, free of oppression, subjectification, and victimization. Miller observes that 'to think of agency only as the ability to alter massive cultural structures, to shift the thinking of large numbers of people, or to perform any number of

similarly grand feats of conversion is to effectively remove agency from the realm of human action'.[42] Instead, what we see Deleuze and Guattari advocating is thinking about agency in terms of how connections 'happen'. A pedagogy of affect can focus on these 'happenings', those affects of which people are capable at every moment, thus taking into account 'local' struggles fought at the level of encounters and connections between individuals.

Mapping lines of flight in the classroom

In and of themselves, lines – molar, molecular, and lines of flight – are neither good nor bad. As we have argued, lines of flight in particular can be productive as well as destructive. Understanding the work of the most potent of the four dangers, 'the great Disgust', makes it possible to appreciate the full range of the affective dimension in the classroom and appreciate its implications in larger political and cultural struggles. The 'great Disgust' is:

> the line of flight crossing the wall, getting out of the black holes, but instead of connecting with other lines and each time augmenting its valence, *turning to destruction, abolition pure and simple, the passion of abolition*... Like suicide, double suicide, a way out that turns the line of flight into a line of death.[43]

So even though, fundamentally, lines of flight are directed against those forces that bind and territorialize desire, they carry the danger of destruction. Mapping the productive and dangerous possibilities of lines of flight can help evaluate what Ashton-Warner called the 'chaos' of the classroom.

The direction we are pursuing is to explode pre-established notions of what 'happens' in the classroom, to explore what students and teachers actually 'do', to link the way people act in the classroom with the context outside the classroom walls, and to understand agency and affect without grounding the actions of individuals in molar identity categories. In so doing, the classroom becomes a messier but more exciting and potentially productive space.

Conclusion: Critique as affirmation

We would like to conclude by reasserting the affirmative nature of a pedagogy of affect. What this pedagogy yields – what it can do – is to explain and critique agency and action in relational terms. In

Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze addresses this characteristic when he writes that 'Nietzsche's "yes" is opposed to the dialectical "no"; affirmation to dialectical negation; difference to dialectical contradiction; joy, enjoyment, to dialectical labour; lightness, dance, to dialectical responsibilities'.[44] As Deleuze argues, 'to affirm is not to take responsibility for, to take on the burden of what is, but to release, to set free what lives'.[45] In regard to the classroom, this suggests that to affirm the presence and significance of desire is not to take responsibility for how education has been configured, but to release that which lives. By not engaging in a dualistic struggle that mirrors those forces that set up hierarchies, inequalities, oppression, and repression in the first place, a pedagogy of affect works with a different, molecular logic. Critique consists of the possibility to discern moments of escape from territorializations in a profoundly positive way, as desire is unleashed to generate new sensations, to create new lines of flight.

We finish with an image from Deleuze. In his many encounters with books, he has developed what he calls the habit of 'reading with love'.[46] To 'love' is to engage affectively. Deleuze puts it this way:

> This intensive way of reading, in contact with what's outside the book, as a flow meeting other flows, one machine among others, as a series of experiments for each reader in the midst of events that have nothing to do with books, as tearing the book into pieces, getting it to interact with other things, absolutely anything... is reading with love.[47]

What we propose is to develop a practice of teaching and learning with love, that is, to engage pedagogy affectively. To put this in Deleuze's terms, *mutatis mutandis*. This intensive way of teaching and learning, in contact with what's outside the construct of the classroom, as a flow meeting other flows, one machine among others, as a series of experiments for each learner in the midst of events that have nothing to do with the school, as tearing the classroom into pieces, getting it to interact with other things, absolutely anything... is learning and teaching with love.

Notes

1. Ellsworth, E. *Teaching Positions: Difference, Pedagogy, and the Power of Address* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1997), p. 6.
2. Three discourses consider aspects of desire, emotion, and feelings in educational settings: (1) sexual harassment discourse; (2) Jane Gallop's pedagogy

of desire; and (3) feminist pedagogies of emotion. The contributions and limitations of these in providing the vocabulary and concepts of affect that might inform a pedagogy of affect are discussed in: Albrecht-Crane, C. *Affect Matters: Agency and Desire in Pedagogy*, Unpublished doctoral dissertation (Michigan: Michigan Technological University, 2001).

3. Massumi, B. 'The Autonomy of Affect', *Cultural Critique*, 31(1995), pp. 83–109, see p. 88. For analyses of affect in cultural studies also see Grossberg, L. 'Cultural Studies, Modern Logics, and Theories of Globalisation', in McRobbie, A. (Ed.) *Back to Reality? Social Experience and Cultural Studies* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), pp. 7–35; Grossberg, L. *We Gotta Get Out of This Place* (New York: Routledge, 1992); Grossberg, L. 'Postmodernity and Affect: All Dressed Up with No Place to Go', *Communication*, 10(1988), pp. 271–293; and Seigworth, G. 'Sound Affects', *Magazine*, 13(1995), pp. 21–25.
4. Lynn Worsham, writing in composition studies, most directly calls for integrating discussions about affect in pedagogy. See Worsham, L. 'Going Postal: Pedagogic Violence and the Schooling of Emotion', *JAC: A Journal of Composition Theory*, 18(2)(1998), pp. 213–245. Worsham points to a 'hidden curriculum' of emotion, 'grief, hatred, bitterness, anger, rage, terror, and apathy' (p. 216) as a marker of individuals' 'affective relation to the world' (p. 212). She also points to the need for a 'sex/affective system that sustains and justifies pedagogic violence of all kinds' (p. 238), including a segregation along gender lines in teaching situations according to which women alone are expected to deal with 'emotional' issues. Leach and Boler and Boler address Deleuzian implication generally for pedagogy, as does Hicks. See Boler, M. *Feeling Power: Emotions and Education* (New York: Routledge, 1999); Hicks, E. *Ninety-five Languages and Seven Forms of Intelligence: Education in the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Peter Lang, 1999); and Leach, M. & Boler M. 'Gilles Deleuze: Practicing Education Through Flight and Gossip', in Peters, M. (Ed.) *Naming the Multiple: Poststructuralism and Education* (Westport, CT: Bergin & Garbey, 1998), pp. 149–172. In the discipline of composition and rhetoric, Vitanza has been arguing for many years for a 'sub/versive' historiography of rhetoric, informed by Nietzsche, Bataille, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, Derrida, Lyotard, J. Butler, Cixous. See Vitanza, V. *Negation, Subjectivity, and the History of Rhetoric* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997); Vitanza, V. 'Three countertheses: Or, a critical in(ter)vention into composition theories and pedagogies', in Harkin, P. & Schilb, J. (Eds) *Contending with Words: Composition and Rhetoric in a Postmodern Age* (New York: Modern Language Association, 1991), pp. 139–172; and Vitanza, V. ' "Notes" towards historiographies of rhetorics; or the rhetorics of the histories of rhetorics: Traditional, revisionary, and sub/versive', *PRE/TEXT*, 8(1–2)(1987), pp. 63–125. Vitanza focuses on the history of rhetoric and how rhetoric might be revisioned, in which affect plays a role. Our emphasis, in contrast, lies more centrally on how an understanding of 'affect' as it has been theorized in cultural studies following Deleuze and Guattari radically transforms, not just rhetoric and composition, but teaching practice generally.
5. Grossberg, Massumi and Scatamburlo all point out that the political Right has been much more attuned to understanding the role of the affective dimension in political struggle. See Grossberg, L. *We Gotta Get Out of This*

Place, op. cit., p. 83; Massumi, B. 'The autonomy of affect', op. cit., pp. 101–107; and Scatamburlo, V. *Soldiers of Misfortune: The New Right's Culture War and the Politics of Political Correctness* (New York: Peter Lang, 1998).

6. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (French: 1972) Trans. R. Hurley, M. Seem and H.R. Lane (London: Athlone, 1983), p. 29.
7. For an analysis and critique of pedagogical approaches in composition studies that invoke the sign of identity as the primary marker of how and why individuals act, see Ballif, M. 'Seducing Composition: A Challenge to Identity-disclosing Pedagogies', in *Rhetoric Review,* 16(1)(1997), pp. 76–91.
8. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (French: 1980) Trans. B. Massumi (London: Athlone, 1987), pp. 253–260; Deleuze, G. *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* (French: 1970) Trans. R. Hurley (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1988), pp. 123–130; Deleuze, G. (1978). 'Seminar session on Spinoza' (Trans. T. Murphy), Accessed 6 February 2001 from: http://www.imaginet.fr/deleuze.
9. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus,* op. cit., p. 257.
10. Deleuze, G. *Spinoza,* op. cit., p. 125.
11. Deleuze, G. *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (French: 1962) Trans. H. Tomlinson (London: Athlone, 1983), p. 3.
12. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus,* op. cit., p. 208.
13. Deleuze, G. & Parnet, C. *Dialogues* (French: 1977) Trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam (London: Athlone, 1987), p. 128.
14. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus,* op. cit., p. 222.
15. Ibid., p. 213.
16. Ibid.
17. Foucault, M. 'The Subject and Power', in Dreyfus, H. & Rabinow, P. (Eds) *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 208–226, see p. 212.
18. Ibid., p. 219.
19. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus,* op. cit., p. 222.
20. Ibid., p. 225.
21. Ibid., p. 293.
22. Deleuze, G. *Negotiations* (French: 1990) Trans. M. Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 19.
23. Ibid.
24. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus,* op. cit., p. 154.
25. Ibid., p. 151.
26. Ibid., p. 227.
27. Ellsworth, E. *Teaching Positions,* op. cit., p. 4.
28. In this formulation we play with a comment from Massumi: 'Affect is itself a real condition, an intrinsic variable of the late-capitalist system, as infrastructural as a factory. Actually, it is beyond infrastructural, it is everywhere, in effect. Its ability to come second-hand, to switch domains and produce effects across them all, gives it a meta-factorial ubiquity. It is beyond infrastructural. It is transversal'. Massumi, B. 'The Autonomy of Affect', op. cit., pp. 106–107.
29. Tyack, D. & Cuban, L. *Tinkering Toward Utopia: A Century of Public School Reform* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 7.

30. Ibid., p. 9. In her study of early education, Walkerdine emphasized some time ago the point that molar processes produce the parameters of how learning is to be conducted. Walkerdine writes that such apparatuses from 'teacher-training, to work-cards, to classroom layout... provide a norm, a standard of good and possible practice. We would find no classroom which stood outside the orbit or some constellation of discursive and administrative apparatuses'. See Walkerdine, V. 'Developmental Psychology and the Child-Centered Pedagogy: The Insertion of Piaget into Early Education', in Henriques, J., Hollway, W., Urwin, C., Venn, C. & Walkerdine, V. (Eds) *Changing the Subject: Psychology, Social Regulation and Subjectivity* (London: Routledge, 1984), pp. 153–202, see p. 162. Walkerdine asserts that these apparatuses come to function as commonsensical for both teachers and students (p. 162) – in fact, that 'teachers' and 'students' themselves are actualized as objects of scientific and pedagogical gazes (pp. 187–197).
31. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 225.
32. Ashton-Warner, S. *Teacher* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986) (Original work published 1963).
33. Ibid., p. 15.
34. Ibid., p. 16.
35. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 225.
36. Ibid., p. 226.
37. Ashton-Warner, S. *Teacher*, op. cit., p. 64.
38. It is interesting to note that Deleuze and Guattari frequently comment on the capacity of young children to be 'Spinozists', that is, to live on an affective level lost to most adults. See, for example, Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 256.
39. Grossberg, L. 'Cultural Studies, Modern Logics, and Theories of Globalisation', op. cit., pp. 10–11.
40. Miller, R. *As If Learning Mattered: Reforming Higher Education* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
41. Hunter, I. *Rethinking the School: Subjectivity, Bureaucracy, Criticism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).
42. Miller, R. *As If Learning Mattered*, op. cit., p. 211.
43. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 229, emphasis in original.
44. Deleuze, G. *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 9.
45. Ibid., p. 185.
46. Deleuze, G. *Negotiations*, op. cit., p. 9.
47. Ibid.

7
Sensing Beyond Security

Erin Manning

A politics of touch is not a politics in general. It is a politics that challenges the limits of timing and spacing in its every gesture. It is a politics that asks the body to touch the untouchable, locating touch not as the sense above all senses, but as a sense that brings other senses to movement, synesthetically. 'All senses are included in this corpus of tact, not only touch, but also vision, hearing, smell, taste.'[1] A politics of touch reaches toward the untouchability of the senses as senses, of the body as body, asking of the body that it reach toward that which will always remain unknowable, the flesh not as apparatus of the body, but as the body's imminent excess.

To touch is to caress a limit, a surface, an edge. To touch is to evoke the excess through a movement toward that elicits a differing body. It is not (simply) the organic body that I reach toward, but vectors and surfaces. These are vectors-in-movement, intensities that create timed-spaces and spaced-times. When I reach towards you, I locate you elsewhere. I touch what is untouchable: the between. This between evokes the politics at stake in the movement toward: a politics of the body in potential. I can never touch you. I touch the you that you will become through my touch. In this sense, my touch never secures your body. My movement towards you brings to the fore not the insecurity of your body (or its security) but the impossibility of thinking security and bodies-in-movement together. The static quality of security privileges a bounded body that must remain static.

Bodies articulate. They cannot do otherwise: they operate in the crease where past and future coexist. Bodies are in movement and to move they must fold-in, fold-out. 'The moments of time are dimensions of each other's unity of movement into and out of each other. They are co-operating dimensions of transition'.[2] Bodies – and especially the bodies

constrained to the discourse of the national body-politic – have been sequestered in a discourse of the concrete. Bodies cannot be strictly concrete because they are never strictly actual to their movements. They are virtual in the sense that they are always reaching-toward. The abstraction of the body is the reconceptualization of the difference between actuality and virtuality. 'Incorporeal: abstract'.[3]

But bodies are not only virtual. Virtuality must become empirical. This is the paradox of the senses: sensing renders the body virtual by exposing it to continual movement, yet sensing and senses render the body's fleshiness actual. My experience of touch is empirical (I touch to 'know' the sensation) but radically so: I touch what is always already not yet there. Bodies as experience shift between proportions of mixed actuality and virtuality. Virtuality phases into actuality abstractly. This movement toward the actual is abstract because despite its actuality it is difficult to trace exactly its beginning and its end. As Massumi writes, 'The limits as such must be conceived as unmixed but in enough dynamic proximity to interfere with each other in their actual effects as attractors'.[4] Lurking on many levels happens here. Plateaus are evoked even as the engagement between sense-events are localized. Sense-events are reminders that the virtual and the empirical pass into one-another, challenging body times and spaces, creating and modulating bodies.

Expressing the incorporeal

For Spinoza the expressiveness of the body denies any hierarchy between flesh and soul. Thought is that which is at stake: through the body we must think further than we have thought, we must express beyond a thinking of consciousness that has driven us so far. Bodies exceed our knowledge of them. Meetings between 'bodies' incite us to create Bodies without Organs. In relation, we begin to think not the order of causes (and effects) but the play of compositions and decompositions at work. We compose with bodies. Bodies emerge not only as what they are but what they expressively can become.

According to Spinoza, a body (however miniscule) is composed of an infinity of particles that express themselves through modulations of rest and movement. Movement and rest categorize the body's incessant movements-toward. Bodies affect other bodies. Expression happens in the in-between of bodies, in the process of reaching-toward. Individuation takes place in this exchange. Bodies are not defined through functions but through modalities, becomings. Forms or functions are replaced by effects of slowness or speed and their interrelation. 'Even the

development of a form, the course of the developing of a form depends on its relation, not the inverse'.[5] What is important is to conceptualize – to express – a life, an individuation, not as form but as a complex relation between differential speeds. 'A composition of speeds and slownesses on the plane of immanence'.[6]

I do not desire a body because of its form.[7] I do not touch that which is already formed. I am attracted to the potential of attraction. I am attracted to the potential of creating a spaced-time and a timed-space through the process of reaching out. Together, we engage in an express movement toward touch. This attraction gives a certain vitality to a politics of touch. What is essential is movement: what the body can *do*. We must think bodies as modes. We must engage in a patient thinking of the potential of modulation: an ethology[8] of the body-becoming.

Ethology studies the composition of relations or powers between different things. Ethologies are not about knowledge as end-points but about accumulation and difference. They are about extension, about expressions, about events, about becomings. '[Ethology] is not about usages or capture, but about sociabilities and communities.'[9] Ethology is about longitude and latitude. A body can be anything. Touch operates as the directionality of this seeking. Touch takes place in the intensity of a movement-toward, the body becoming other through relation. 'The ensemble of longitudes and latitudes constitutes the Nature, the plane of immanence or of consistency, always variable, that never ceases to be re-adjusted, composed, recomposed, by individuals and collectivities.'[10]

For Spinoza, bodies (substances) are not prior to attributes. The cause does not precede its effects. There is no thought of wholeness, of unity, of division. Rather, 'substance is "its" infinite diversity itself; it is realized in this diversity and is nothing other than the process of production without beginning or end (beyond teleology, without goals or direction) of itself through the infinity of its attributes'.[11] Effects create experiments. Experiments of and on the body are composed of expression, affects, concepts, percepts. For Spinoza a sign is always an effect. An effect marks the trace of one body upon another, affectively registering a duration. Touch is affect.

Affects are variations of power (*puissance*). Affects call forth mixtures of bodies in relation to bodies through chance, accident, confusion. Bodies without Organs always meet in surprising ways. To reach out and touch is to touch not only the untouchable but the unimaginable. There are no causal linkages between Bodies without Organs. Affects do not organize the body. They play on the surfaces. They are surface-events that expose not the organism but its movements. 'We know bodies only through

the shadow they cast upon us, and it is through our own shadow that we know ourselves, ourselves and our bodies'.[12] Affects collude. Collide.

A politics of touch cannot be devoid of a concern for 'a body', or for 'the body' of the sovereign. The concern remains. What changes is the exposure. A politics of touch suggests that even those bodies who seem to conform to the laws of static Being are potentially becoming: the sovereign would not have the power evoked by his or her presence were it not for the capacity to defy our expectations, to lure us, to capture. All bodies are becoming. Static bodies are a myth, a stabilizing projection of the nation-state's desire to construct an imaginary that can be reproduced only meiotically. The trick here is to find a way to relate the static body to that very same body which is becoming. The challenge: to expose affects in their becomings, even when the bodies they inhabit are imposing stability.

Of pacts and politics

Balibar writes, referring to Spinoza: 'it is to the extent that individuals always preserve an incompressible part of their "right" that they can completely transfer sovereignty to the state'.[13] The relation between the becoming-body and the becoming-state takes the form of a pact. In Spinoza, the concept of the pact is central to an understanding of politics. The pact exists as specified by historical circumstances: 'there are as many real states as there are forms of pact'.[14] The pact in this case refers to the relation between nature and the state. 'What is important is not so much to know if, hypothetically or not, the state of nature chronologically precedes the civil state. It is above all the question of the exteriority of one in relation to an other.'[15] Spinoza's work suggests that nature and the state coexist and even depend on and instantiate one another:

> In Spinoza the thesis according to which the civil state does not abolish the state of nature has as its correlate – despite the fears that can be inspired in it by the revolutions and seditions that try to change the form of government – the affirmation that the civil state can never be entirely dissolved. It is not by an external 'nature' but by its very social form that every state is permanently threatened from inside.[16]

Bodies are never completely enslaved to the state because bodies are never completely reducible to either nature or the state. Bodies become

on a continuum which evolves in relation with pacts formed around institutions of power and compliance. Bodies cannot be stopped.

A pact is not an inherently good or bad proposition. A pact is a decision, a practice of setting up new velocities and new directionalities. It is a stratification, certainly, but it can always lead to new destratifications, and in most cases, it does just that. Pacts are political in a most interesting manner: 'every civil society, from the moment it can be thought of as the realization of a pact, is naturally democratic'.[17] No populous is original, neither in Nature or in the state: 'in history there is not a unique form of the democratic imperium, but there are necessarily several: as many as there are "regimes" corresponding to the imaginary representation of the common interest'.[18] Within the imaginary representation of the common interest there need be no opposition between bodies, between states, between Reason and Nonreason. Such oppositions are written into pacts. The movement from the imaginary to the rational or explicable is the historical process through which bodies become bodies in relation with other bodies, the process through which Nature passes into states and states become Nature. But this is only rational to the extent that it can be back-gridded. 'And what is rational in the second degree (as an idea of reflection) is the concept that the philosopher or historian can form from this combination, in other words, the definition of the pact.'[19]

The pact projects onto politics the internal contradictions of institutions, of bodies, while at the same time expressing the passional conflicts of the multitude. Through the pact, production (of time, of space) becomes operative. 'Institutions by themselves have no other power than that of the masses, including when it is a matter of a power of decomposition.'[20] This is a multi-way process: it is most often through institutions that the masses organize themselves into tendencies, into lines of flight that in turn destabilize or destroy the very institution through which power was instantiated. Institutions breed their own demise. Democracy is not only the potential to work together to form institutional bonds. Revolutions are internal to the system. Revolutions in the name of a politics of touch are about moving the matter and mattering the movement.

Will to politics

For Balibar, 'what the pact institutes is a collective power that assumed after the fact the form of a relation between wills'.[21] This suggests

that wills do not exist before the formation of the pact, that the pact itself is the formation of a will, or better, the transformation of a will of the multitude. 'Theoretically speaking, individual or collective wills do not exist before the pact but are constituted under its effect, this very effect that places the summa potestas in the place in which the law that must be observed is stated.'[22] The will is a retroactive effect of the pact, a consequence of a decision, a movement-toward a politics of touch. Movements are willed but solutions or goals cannot be willed. The will exposes a directionality already decided upon in the writing of the pact. Yet the will does not dissolve with the passing of the pact. In this sense, it is not as transitory as the pact itself. The will continues to move, to pre-exist the next pact, yet only coming into itself with the subsequent re-writing of the becoming-pact. There is no individual will, therefore. The will is a vector, an intensity, a connectivity that gives power (*potestas*) to the directionality of the reaching-toward.

Will-less politics would be politics without movement. Dictatorial politics, perhaps. Or politics of boredom: politics of the One. A politics of touch calls forth the will in the decision to reach toward another who will and must remain untouchable, unreachable. There is no ultimate stability here. We are still talking about bodies. What there is, however, is a sense of response-ability, a translation of a vision into a movement, a relation of forces. For Spinoza, this notion of force does not promise a departure from servitude. That we live in *potentia* only means that we can choose our pacts, it does not mean that we will not write servile ones. For this reason, Spinoza does not seek to oppose autonomy and heteronomy, spontaneity and obedience. The pact promises nothing. Power is not hierarchical. It is an expression, an event in and of the body, a projection of bodies onto and into the world, a worlding of bodies in movement.

The pact is not a limit-concept, though limits are often perceived and even reached. For Spinoza, the constitution of societies is 'the chain of actions and passions of the multitude: a multitude reducible to the totality of individual powers that compose it, but irreducible to a sum of bilateral relations (or of exchanges) among individuals'.[23] Causality is not what is at stake here. Sovereignty is never entirely certain of where it is going: 'the *potestas* is only effective to the extent that the individuals who have constituted it permanently recognize it as constituting a law for their will'.[24]

Parts of parts

Touch is of the body but not strictly on the body. A politics of touch is of the between, an engagement in the potentialities of its own making. To touch is to make a pact. Touch is a mode composed of many parts. It is a mode that is capable of being affected while affecting. Parts are affected by parts. The body is part of touch, touch is part of politics, politics is part of the body. The nature of these extensive parts is that they affect one another *ad infinitum*. Extensive parts belong to a certain mode in relation. A mode has affections by virtue of its capacity for being affected.

Deleuze writes: 'A mode ceases to exist when it can no longer maintain between its parts the relation that characterizes it and it ceases to exist when "it is rendered completely incapable of being affected in many ways" '.[25] Nothing is stable here. Modes are transient. A politics of touch is only as productive as its bodies. There are no guarantees. A body's structure depends on the composition of its relations. 'What a body can do corresponds to the nature and limits of its capacity to be affected.'[26] A politics of touch does not exist by virtue of its 'nature'. Modes are composed of extensive parts that are affected and determined by intensities traveling through them. Every existing mode is affected by modes adjacent to it. Every existing mode is altered by its relation to other modes. Politics of touch are politics of relation, emergent politics. Politics of touch are ethological.

A politics of touch cannot be about moral harmony. Bodies do not necessarily get along. This is not about subjectivity. It is about intensity, about potential relations. Affections can slow down the body as much as they can incite it to movement. Before bodies are anything, they are renewable. Politics of touch are composite politics, politics composed of infinite variances of affects, politics reaching toward not an end but a potential. An expressive politics finds no ultimate correspondence. A politics of touch is a concatenation of various effects. Perhaps the way to think of a politics of touch is to imagine a machine creating itself incessantly against and beyond whatever you imagine politics to be. A politics of touch is adjacent, relational: it never stands alone. This machine does not necessarily correspond to politics as you imagine it, but it does feed on it, one way or another. Strangely, what it feeds on is not its mechanics of essences, its mechanics of phenomena. No. What it feeds on are its intensities, its potential, its force. A politics of touch is every time in every instance a different and differing politics. In this regard, a politics of touch can be imagined to stand alongside Spinoza's

complex assessment of Nature as that which is always already 'physical': 'a physics of intensive quantity corresponding to modal essences; a physics of extensive quantity, that is, a mechanism through which modes themselves come into existence; a physics of force, that is, a dynamism through which essence asserts itself in existence, espousing the variations of the power of action'.[27]

A politics of touch is at the mercy of encounters. Insecure, a politics of touch must actualize its power, again and again, virtually. I actualize, I move, I virtualize, I move, I actualize. This is the relation. There is no stable point where I am fully stopped. I rest to move to rest to move, always relationally. 'My power is itself actual, because the affections that I experience each moment, whatever these may be, have full right to determine and exercise it.'[28] This is where the pact comes in. I organize my encounter according to what is useful.

> But there is a great difference between seeking what is useful through chance (that is, striving to destroy bodies incompatible with our own) and seeking to organize what is useful (striving to encounter bodies agreeing in nature with us, in relations in which they agree). Only the second type of effort defines proper or true utility.[29]

Politics spaces time and times space in such a way as to make them indiscernible to themselves. I cannot locate politics in space and time. I locate space and time in politics. I space time and time space by generating bodies in movement, in-formation, trans-mattering. Of course, 'I' don't generate them in a strict sense: bodies in movement 'are' generated through encounters that modulate such concepts as action, reason, freedom. 'Reason,[30] strength and freedom are in Spinoza inseparable from a development, a formative process, a culture. Nobody is born free, nobody is born reasonable'.[31]

What a body can do depends on many things, amongst them its locatedness in the potentiality of relation. But since bodies-in-the-making not only seek out but create the relation, this is never altogether a passive endeavor. A politics of touch is affirmative when it embodies a double movement that navigates between the expresser and the expressed, and then between the expresser and expression. A spiral movement: eternal return. There is resistance to dualities here. A politics of touch expresses in such a way as to always intervene in the imaginary process of *Aufhebung*. There is no synthesis here: 'what is expressed is discovered as a third term that makes distinctions infinitely more real and identity infinitely better

thought. What is expressed is sense, deeper than the relation of causality, deeper than the relation of representation'.[32]

What is expressed is the incommensurability of sense. This is politics at its best. A politics not of consensus or causality, but a sensing politics of bodies-in-movement: a politics of touch. Sense, not *sens* (direction). Direction but not goal-directed. An affirmation of a movement toward. This is what it is to sense(s). Sense is multiple: to sense is to multiply bodies, to exceed and extend the flesh through various instantiations of bodies-in-the-making. To sense is to deviate from the organic capacities of the body, to challenge the interstices between insides and outsides, spaces and times. To sense is to world in all directions at once. Through the senses, bodies become mixtures, incorporeal relations of visions and touches, smells and sights, tastes and sounds. Senses lead us without taking us by the hand. Senses draw us toward an object as they modulate our own responses, relaying insides and outsides into a conglomerate that deviates, always, from the implied borders of our skins. There are no sense-borders: sense is not a limit-concept. To sense is to world unlimitedly.

> Becoming unlimited comes to be the ideational and incorporeal event, with all of its characteristic reversals between future and past, active and passive, cause and effect, more and less, too much and not enough, already and not yet. It is eternally that which has just happened and that which is about to happen, but never that which is happening...[33]

Sense-events are incorporeal to the extent that they allow active and passive, actual and virtual to interrelate and interchange. Sense-events are a movement-toward that inspires bodies to proliferate, to extend beyond 'themselves'.

I return to my initial question: how does politics secure sense? The better question at this point is perhaps: is security part of the pact(s) of a politics of touch? Security is perhaps the very antithesis of 'what bodies can do'. As Nietzsche writes:

> Coldly it tells lies too, and this lie crawls out of its mouth: 'I the state, am the people'... it is annihilators who set traps for the many and call them State; they hang a sword and a hundred appetites over them... State I call where all drink is poison, the good and the wicked; State, where all lose themselves, the good and the wicked; State, where the slow suicide of all is called 'life'.[34]

Notes

1. Derrida, J. *Le Toucher – Jean-Luc Nancy* (Paris: Galilée, 2000), p. 90.
2. For further elaboration, please see Massumi, B. *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), p. 204.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 159.
5. Deleuze, G. *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* (French: 1970) Trans. R. Hurley (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1988), p. 123.
6. Ibid.
7. See Gilbert Simondon on form and matter in Simondon, G. *L'individu et sa genèse physico-biologique* (Grenoble: Gérôme Millon, 1995).
8. Spinoza's ethics have nothing to do with morality. Ethics are an ethology: the construction of a plane of immanence that is at once an ethics and an ecology. A composition of speeds and slownesses. The power to affect and be affected. Ethology is therefore first the relation between accelerations and decelerations in the composition of each body. Variations are at stake here, as well as transformations. 'Never I an animal, a thing, separate from its relations with the world: the interior is only a selected exterior, the exterior a projected interior; the speed or the slowness of metabolisms, perceptions, actions and reactions work together to constitute this individual in the world': Deleuze, G. *Spinoza*, op. cit., p. 125.
9. Ibid., p. 126.
10. Ibid., p. 128.
11. Montag, W. 'Preface', in Montag, W. & Stolze, T. (Eds) *The New Spinoza* (Minneapolis: Minnesota, 1997), p. xvii.
12. Deleuze, in Montag, W. & Stolze, T. (Eds) *The New Spinoza*, op. cit., p. 24.
13. Balibar, in Montag, W. & Stolze, T. (Eds) *The New Spinoza*, op. cit., p. 175.
14. Ibid., p. 177.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 184.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., p. 185.
21. Ibid., p. 187.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., p. 193.
24. Ibid., p. 194.
25. Deleuze, G. *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* (French: 1968) Trans. M. Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1990), pp. 217–218.
26. Ibid., p. 218.
27. Ibid., p. 233.
28. Ibid., p. 260.
29. Ibid., p. 261.
30. 'The state of reason, in its initial aspect, already has a complex relation to the state of nature. On the one hand the state of nature is not subject to the laws of reason: reason relates to the proper and true utility of man, and tends solely to his preservation; Nature on an other hand has no regard for

the preservation of man and comprises an infinity of other laws concerning the universe as a whole, of which man is but a small part': Deleuze, G. *Expressionism in Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 263.

31. Ibid., p. 262.
32. Ibid., p. 335.
33. Deleuze, G. *The Logic of Sense* (French: 1969) Trans. M. Lester and C. Stivale (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 8.
34. Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Penguin Books, 1978), pp. 49–50.

8
Affective Terrorism

Felicity Colman

> The worldwide understanding among states and the organization of a world police force with worldwide jurisdiction, currently under way, necessarily lead to an expansion in which more and more people are classified as virtual 'terrorists'.
>
> Gilles Deleuze[1]

Introduction

There is a common saying that goes something along the following lines: 'one person's freedom fighter is another person's terrorist'. What some see as independence, others fear; what some count as control, others invest in as security. Actions seen as inhumane and unjust by some are considered by others to be acceptable means of retribution, discipline, or as necessary cautionary measures. 'Terrorism', in other words, is contextual. Yet as the 1970s escalation of aggressive political protests (including the destruction of public and commercial property) gathered momentum at the turn of the twenty-first century, it was increasingly argued that all fights in the name of a revolution be seen as acts of 'terrorism'. Not all revolutionaries make bombs in their kitchen. Yet today it appears – particularly within the limited field of the Western media – that anyone who is not pursuing the joys of capitalist accumulation must be becoming (a) terrorist.[2]

How has this shift come about? How is it that governments have been able to harness 'terrorism' in such a way as to turn it back against the people: against democracy and civil liberties; against our capacity to fight injustice? How is it that, as Deleuze suggests above, we have reached a situation in which more and more people come to be

classified as 'terrorists'? For Deleuze and Guattari, this condition has formed through a logic of conjecture; a *doxa* arrived at through 'a given perceptive-affective lived situation'.[3] The current situation of 'terrorism' can be understood by looking at the ways in which a *terrorist affect* is produced and mobilized in the social field, and the ways in which these affects shape what it is possible to think, say, and perceive. Affective aspects of all forms of terrorism have implications for how we understand the impact of aesthetic forces on bodies and, more broadly, the relationship of these forces to the production of knowledge, perception, and social action.

Deleuze, terrorism and affect

When Deleuze died in 1995, the word 'terrorism' did not yet have the 'war on terror' association that it gained in the 2000s. Terrorism is nonetheless a word that registers several times in the Deleuzian lexicon, operating as part of his interventionist call for a 'revolutionary' philosophy. This has nothing to do with 'the history of revolutions', but instead seeks a response to the conditions, relations, and social formations of life under capitalist driven systems.[4] For Deleuze and Guattari, all forms of social organization (information, language, communication, categories, and structural relations between things) can be understood as restrictive of flows (flows of desire and life). Social organization works by ordering these flows; controlling movements of life through the regulation and mechanization of desires.[5] In this sense, the axiom of 'terrorism' can be understood as a model of distribution (directed, restricted, and excessive) of particular social flows. More specifically, it can be understood as the realization or capitalization (through what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as 'the war machine') of 'financial, industrial, and military technological complexes that are in continuity with one another'.[6]

Deleuze's methodology is the practice of a radical empiricism, that is, his philosophy is based on approaches to thinking through the power and the potential of the actual.[7] Inspired in part by the philosopher David Hume, Deleuze pursued a philosophy that would explore the conditions of concepts in the service of belief, making knowledge and truth the result of an 'associationism' of our actions, imagination, and passions, that is in turn generative of new concepts.[8] Later, with Guattari, Deleuze expands Hume's concept of association to imply a more extensive meaning. Instead of implying the separation and relational 'match' of pieces or events, Deleuze takes association to be a

concept that concerns outcomes as well as instigative features or things. This is a philosophy of *assemblages* and the connections and deterritorializations between zones and territories, designed to inspire new ways of thinking.[9] This chapter[10] considers Deleuze's thoughts on the issue of terrorism in the context of his consideration of the effects of associationism; effects which in turn give rise to forms of *terrorist affect*.

'Affect' is a term utilized by Deleuze to articulate the product of actions between bodies (animate and inanimate). An action causes a response – a movement, transition, or transformation – and this response takes many forms: perhaps an inspiration, or an instance of action. I see my house intentionally destroyed, and I respond with outrage. I see my friend/enemy hurt, and my own body reacts. Actions between bodies are never static, but continuously changing. Deleuze develops his notion of affect through the work of three major theorists: Baruch Spinoza, Henri Bergson, and Friedrich Nietzsche, who each discuss the metaphysics of forces. In their books *A Thousand Plateaus* and *What is Philosophy?*, Deleuze and Guattari discuss the concept of affect as a dynamic, connective movement that details processes of 'becoming'.[11] For Deleuze and Guattari, affective modes and structures are the product of an infinite number of parts that comprise a body – those determined by forces such as habits and repetitions (cultural and social), circumstances of bodies (rhizomatic and historically determined events – as in the case of the Israel-Palestine circumstance), and imagination (the creation of art, the imagination of power). 'Affects transpierce the body like arrows', Deleuze and Guattari remind us, 'they are weapons of war'.[12]

It was not until the two Persian Gulf Wars (1990–1991 and 2003–) that the affective political power of imagery was fully utilized by the media, and by political and disenfranchised groups.[13] Media theorist McKenzie Wark discussed the dislocated embodied sense of watching the 'night vision' of Gulf War 1 (GW1). Wark's account addressed the 'effects' of the converging global media directions in the 1990s – the mixing of the bodies of 'reality' and 'propaganda' – and discussed the corporeal terms of spectacular engagement with affective circumstance and affective imagination of the war screen.[14] Like those accounts of experiences with the televisual colonizing impact of the imagery of '9/11', 2001, and the following day's declaration of 'the war on terror', the audio-visual impact of these events forever shifted the 'virtual terrorist' out of the abstract and singular realm and into a larger global sphere of daily life.[15]

Thinking with terrorism

The word 'terrorism' brings to mind many singular events, names and dates: the hijacking of four commercial airliners by the PLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) (1970); the Lockerbie disaster (1988); the bombing attacks of airports in Rome (1985) and Athens (1985); the bombing attacks that paralysed Bombay (1993); the Sarin nerve-gas attack on the Tokyo subway (1995); kamikaze plane attacks (of World War II; of 11 September 2001); and the suicide-bombers (in Lebanon and Palestine) of the early 2000s, to name but a few. Although Deleuze noted the judicial expansion of the classification of 'terrorist' in 1978, it was not until after the 11 September 2001 attacks by al-Qaida on the United States that a global, media and State driven movement developed the current, 2000s sense of 'terrorism', with devastating social and cultural consequences. A machiavellian revenge wave surged across the world, with more defining events resounding with affective terror: the 'Bali bombing' (October 2002); the US led 'War on Terror' (2003–) and the bombing of Baghdad; the bombing of Madrid trains (March 2004); and the bombing of London's city transport network (July 2005).[16]

Of course, the activities of all forms of terrorism cannot be subsumed into one large struggle. Terrorist-style activities from all positions are desperate, radical, selfish, and vicious means of protest. At the minor level of our individual daily lives, we all fight for different things – yet we do this under social systems that are not only sadistic, but increasingly careless and dangerous in their pursuit of particular kinds of wealth.[17] As an affective social factor, 'terrorism' now indicates a range of positions and ideas – from a religious service, historical necessity, to a component of economics – it has always been a commodity with social leverage.

The United Nations in 2002 defined terrorism as 'essentially a political act. It is meant to inflict dramatic and deadly injury on civilians and to create an atmosphere of fear, generally for a political or ideological (whether secular or religious) purpose'.[18] In Deleuze's political schema, the meaning of 'terrorism' is one that draws its terms from the types of structures and trajectories created from an event; an event that in turn acts as both a model and 'an experimental laboratory for a far more terrible future'.[19]

Deleuze's position on terrorism is a result of the events that occurred during the time of his life as a philosopher and public intellectual. In an interview with Michel Foucault in 1972, Deleuze commented on the vital, yet 'fragmentary and partial' relationship that was produced by

theory in relation to praxis.[20] Deleuze saw the two domains as distinct, yet mutually constitutive. As his ontological approach to the practice of philosophy demonstrates, each actual state of things informs, positions, and is relational to the other. Born in Paris in 1925, Deleuze's critical commentary on the world spans many significant events and decades of the second half of the twentieth century in Europe.[21] Deleuze categorizes his own work as a product of specific junctures, which he and Guattari surmised to be in the order of 'a pure event'. For example, they viewed the global unrests of 1968 not as the result of an historical causality, but rather as a 'series of amplified instabilities and fluctuations'.[22] Such corralling events function in Deleuze's life as indirect affects for his own ontological methodology, directing his philosophical enquiries. Deleuze's engagement with political issues concerning human life, focus all of his philosophical questions. Deleuze's friendship and intellectual involvement with Félix Guattari and his further connections with a collective of diverse, but politically engaged intellectuals, including Michel Foucault, Jean-Luc Godard, and Toni Negri contribute to his socially aware philosophy.[23] Deleuze published many opinion pieces and interviews in newspapers and journals, commenting on diverse situations and subjects including the GIP (The Group for Information on Prisons, which Deleuze joined in 1971), events surrounding the Baader-Meinhoff Gang, and the Palestinian situation.[24] It was in the context of the latter, that he published his comment on the conception of the 'virtual "terrorist" ' in 1978 (as cited in the epigraph).[25] Deleuze's identification of this point in the shift of our social fabric – the point wherein more and more people are regarded as potential terrorists – has come to be further actualized.

New modes of 'anti-terrorism' are arising, creating new social forms. For example, the behavior and products of citizens in Commonwealth countries has been curtailed and censored, after the implementation of 'preventative detention', and 'sedition' laws used to maintain the State's imperial social fabric.[26] New world orders are further enforced; mandated territories of being, where the individual is advised on what to say, how to act, what to carry, and what to wear. These forms of restrictions, controls, and censorships are occurring particularly in civic spaces, but also within communicative, private realms, where the virtual is increasingly recorded, delineated, and criminalized (often retrospectively).[27] The pursuit of economic and military power by nation States has also contributed to the modes of affective terrorism witnessed today. In a commentary on 'Pacifism' in 1983 (during the 'arms race' between the 'superpowers' that came close to another world war),

Deleuze discussed how the United States has established what he referred to as a 'narrow economic orbit' for all other countries.[28] In an article published in *Libération* in 1991, Deleuze commented on France's position of servitude to the US position on GW1, writing: 'Under the pretext of destroying strategic targets, they are killing civilians with mass bombardments; communications, bridges and roads are being destroyed far from the front; historical sites are menaced with destruction'. He continued: 'The Pentagon is in command today. It is a branch of state terrorism testing its weapons'.[29]

The virtual axiom of terrorism was actualized through the media screen acts of GW1. This 'reality' demonstrated the confused domain of 'freedom=capitalism', and exercised a new form of sovereign control, instantly cataloguing exceptional events into relational paradigms of identifiable behavior; restricting our vision of the future by the continual mirror of naturalization. We are learning to think with this virtual realm – not with the forms of pain that Blanchot or Nietzsche described last century – but with terror; creating a new register of affective images of civic life. Affective terrorism has given rise to the absolute orders of being we are living within today, where faith in politics comes before belief in the body; a terrorist praxis that is today real through its virtual generation by the ecology of torture, fear, subjugation, war, and death. This culture provides us with many images and concepts concerning terrorist activity, but not the means to analyse their meanings at the level of the production of specific social locales and subjectivities.

The issue of terrorism arises from situational strategies created by the market-place, and by governments eager to control and regulate that place. The affective qualities of 'terrorist systems' are primarily defined by economic beliefs, and other factors such as religion provide leverage and impetus for the maintenance of these terrorist regimes. Thinking with terrorism propels us into situational trajectories that conduct four affective 'dangers', which Deleuze and Guattari describe as: fear (loss of security, status, stability); clarity (determining control, 'petty insecurities'); power ('impotence'); and disgust ('the longing to kill and to die', 'the passion of abolition').[30] These defined paths of 'affective terrorism' provide a critical agenda for consideration of how we might begin to think of the paradoxical controls (of revolution, of fascism) operating in any given social realm. Affective terror(ism) is the register of mutant blooms after the evisceration in Hiroshima–Nagasaki in 1945; terrorism is the revulsion of the discharge of ashed flesh and economic pillars across New York City in September 2001; terrorism is the invocation of pornographic affect by the US army over their captive Iraqi prisoners in 2003 in

the Bagdad prison, Abu Ghraib; terrorism describes the New World Order where lexicons of reason have been replaced by economies of humiliation, rape, and an absolute disregard for the rights of individuals.[31] As Deleuze noted, 'the virtual is not opposed to the real; it possesses a full reality by itself. The process it undergoes is that of actualization.'[32]

Conclusion: Control society

After an act of terror, the tonal properties of the world change. To discern this change, we can look to the movement of affect as a register of any change in perception (and actualization) of a situation, environment, social sphere. As Deleuze and Guattari describe it, change can be articulated by attending to the quantitative dimensions of objects. There are many methods that concentrate on the articulation of this shift in the perceptible registration of social events and their affective resonance in the world, without recourse to *doxa*. Emmanuel Lévinas, a philosopher concerned with issues surrounding the ethics of a Spinozan being, described this concern to break with naming oppositional essences as:

> a matter of our finding a vantage point from which man ceases to concern us in terms of the horizon of being, i.e., ceases to offer himself to our powers. The being as such (and not an incarnation of universal being) can only be in a relation in which he is invoked... The other is the only being I can want to kill.[33]

Monitoring affective movements – such as the movement of 'terrorism' – can quantitatively describe 'the limit' of relations between objects and subjects.[34] Within specific societies, different social forms of machinic control – whether sword, saddle, Sony play-station, or spectacle – are 'expressive' of those particular societies' forms of affective movement. Such controls are, as Deleuze noted, 'capable of generating [those machines] and using them'.[35] When (sound) images (such as the modern warfare tactic used to create a spectacular encounter with New York City's Twin Towers buildings in 2001) work to reconfigure, destabilize, or reinforce social values, perceivable shifts can be discerned in social practices such as compassion, empathy, caring, hope, and joy.[36] As war-machines, nation-state led powers rely on the organizational power of affective actions and imagery to rally economic support for further actions, often directing desires toward suicidal trajectories, and the crushing of any individual (existential) life.

The affective power of terrorism constitutes a force that, in its claims upon the future, is productive of a trajectory of fear. It works by controlling desire, channelling disgust, and feeding upon unbalanced power relations. Deleuze's concepts can assist in articulating the terms of our own socialized bodies, as we come to understand the power of terrorism. We can enact a critical relation to these controlling powers by becoming more aware of the affective power of events, and of the ways in which forms of control rely on modes of terrorist affect to oppress individuals and communities, and infringe upon their freedoms.[37]

Notes

1. Deleuze, G. 'The Troublemakers', Trans. T.S. Murphy, *Discourse*, 20(3)(1998), pp. 23–24.
2. Tariq Ali details the evidence of the 'neutering' of diversity in both editorial opinion and controlled media frameworks for reporting surrounding the lead up to and early days of the Iraq War. See Ali, T. *Rough Music: Blair, Bombs, Bagdad, London, Terror* (London & New York: Verso, 2005), pp. 25–43.
3. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?* (French: 1991) Trans. G. Burchell and H. Tomlinson (London: Verso, 1994), p. 145.
4. See Deleuze and Guattari's Interview with Didier Eribon 'We Invented the Ritornello', in Deleuze, G. *Two Regimes of Madness* (French: 1975–1995) Trans. A. Hodges and M. Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2006), pp. 378–379.
5. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (French: 1980) Trans. B. Massumi (London: Athlone, 1987), see pp. 435–439 and 461–473.
6. Ibid., pp. 454–467.
7. See Constantin Boundas's discussion of Deleuze's radical empiricism in his translator's introductory essay, 'Deleuze, Empiricism, and the Struggle for Subjectivity', in Deleuze, G. *Empiricism and Subjectivity* (French: 1953) Trans. C. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 1–19.
8. Deleuze, G. *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, op. cit., pp. 24–27.
9. Refer to their definitions of 'Assemblages' and 'Rhizome', in Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., pp. 503–506.
10. Thanks to Luke Stickels from the University of Melbourne for his research assistance and his ongoing discussions on these issues.
11. For further discussion on Deleuzian affect see Colman, F. 'Affect', in Parr, A. (Ed.) *The Deleuze Dictionary* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), pp. 11–13; and Seigworth, G. 'From Affection to Soul', in Stivale, C. (Ed.) *Gilles Deleuze: Key Concepts* (London: Acumen, 2005), pp. 159–169. For the relationship between affect, territory, and emotion see Colman, F. 'Hope: An E-Modulating Motion of Deterritorialization', *Drain: Journal of Contemporary Art and Culture*, 1(3)(2004): http://www.drainmag.com.
12. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 356.

13. For an insightful analysis of this pre 2001, see Maurice Berger's essay 'Visual Terrorism', in Brown, D. & Merrill, R. (Eds) *Violent Persuasions: The Politics and Imagery of Terrorism* (Seattle: Bay Press, 1993), pp. 17–26. For a preliminary overview of the affective power of images of violence post 2001, see Young, A. *Judging the Image: Art, Value, Law* (London: Routledge, 2005); and Sontag, S. *Regarding the Pain of Others* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2003).
14. Wark, M. *Virtual Geography: Living with Global Media Events* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).
15. For an overview of the events of September 2001, refer to Falkenrath, R. 'The 9/11 Commission Report', *International Security*, 29(3)(2004), pp. 170–190.
16. Tariq Ali discusses the 'terrorist' history and 'blowback' aspect to the 11 September 2001 event, and the 2002 event, 'The Road to Bali', in his book *The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity* (London: Verso, 2003), pp. 316–328 and 341–393.
17. For a critique on revolutionary terror, see Merleau-Ponty, M. *Humanism and Terror: An Essay on the Communist Problem*, Trans. J. O'Neill (Boston: Beacon, 1969).
18. The United Nations (UN) maintains a web site with their terms on terrorism: http://qwww.un.org/terrorism.
19. Deleuze, G. 'Spoilers of Peace', in Deleuze, G. *Two Regimes of Madness*, op. cit., p. 162.
20. Deleuze, G. & Foucault, M. 'Intellectuals and Power', in Deleuze, G. *Desert Islands and Other Texts* (French: 1953–1974) Trans. M. Taormina (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004), pp. 206–213.
21. Deleuze's milieu, personal chronology, photographs, and opinion statements on his life/work are to be found in *Deleuze épars: Approches et portraits*, Textes receuillis par André Bernold et Richard Pinhaus (Paris: Hermann Editeurs, 2005); *Deleuze, Un Album* Paini, D. (Ed.) (Paris: Éditions du centre Pompidou, 2005).
22. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. 'May '68 Did Not Take Place', in Deleuze, G. *Two Regimes of Madness,* op. cit., p. 233.
23. See Patton, P. *Deleuze and the Political* (London: Routledge, 2000).
24. See Deleuze, G. 'What Our Prisoners Want From Us...', in Deleuze, G. *Desert Islands and Other Texts,* op. cit.; and Deleuze, G. 'Europe the Wrong Way', 'Open Letter to Negri's Judges', and 'Foucault and Prison', in Deleuze, G. *Two Regimes of Madness*, op. cit.
25. Deleuze, G. 'The Troublemakers', Trans. T.S. Murphy, *Discourse*, 20(3)(1998) pp. 23–24.
26. See Ali, T. *Rough Music*, op. cit., p. 67.
27. For example, see the 'Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism', Washington DC, USA, Executive Order 13224, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2002/16181.htm and Australia's responses to this order in, Hancock, N., 'Terrorism and the Law in Australia: Legislation, Commentary and Constraints' (Parliamentary Library: Parliament of Australia, 19 March 2002), http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/2001-02/02rp12.htm#part1.
28. Deleuze, G. 'Pacifism Today', in Deleuze, G. *Two Regimes of Madness*, op. cit., pp. 222–232.
29. Deleuze, G. with René Scherer, 'The Gulf War: A Despicable War', in Deleuze, G. *Two Regimes of Madness,* op. cit., p. 375 (originally published

as 'La Guerre immonde', *Libération*, 4 March 1991, also published as 'The Unclean War', Trans. T.S. Murphy, *Discourse*, 20(3)(Fall 1998), pp. 170–171.

30. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., pp. 226–231.
31. See Boal, I., Clark, T.J., Matthews, J. & Watts, M. *Afflicted Powers: Capital and Spectacle in a New Age of War* (London & New York: Verso, 2005).
32. Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition* (French: 1968) Trans. P. Patton (London: Athlone, 1994), p. 211.
33. Lévinas, E. *Entre nous: On thinking-of-the-other*, Trans. M.B. Smith and B. Harshav (London: Athlone Press, 1998), p. 9.
34. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., pp. 280–282.
35. Deleuze, G. 'Postscript on Control Societies', in Deleuze, G. *Negotiations* (French: 1990) Trans. M. Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 169–182.
36. Susan Buck-Morss provides an insight into the Islamist position on globalization in Buck-Morss, S. *Thinking Past Terror: Islamism and Critical Theory on the Left* (London: Verso, 2003).
37. See Michel Foucault's interview with Gilles Deleuze, in Deleuze, G. & Foucault, M. 'Intellectuals and Power', op. cit., For an extensive history of non-violent approaches of non-tolerance, see Carter, A., Clark, H. & Randle, M. (Eds) *People Power and Protest since 1945: A Bibliography of Nonviolent Action* (London: Housmans, 2006).

Part III
Socio-Spatiality

9

Molar Ecology: What can the (Full) Body of an Eco-Tourist Do?

Mark Halsey

The Great Australian Bight Marine Park is located in a remote region of South Australia and ostensibly contains one of the world's premier whale watching sites. My memories of the region prior to it becoming a Marine Park are of a place yet to succumb to the speeds and intensities usually associated with industrialization; a place of wildness that made me sense I was part of the planet's ecosystems, not separate from them. At the time, the only marking of the land was the narrow dirt road leading from the highway to the edge of the Southern Ocean (see Figure 9.1) and the thin dirt paths that had been worn in to the tops of the cliffs by the feet of other travellers. I have a memory of camping near the cliffs and being able to hear whales blowing water through their spout. I also recall being able to walk directly to the edge of the cliff and sit and watch whales about 30 m directly below. This can no longer occur.

The Marine Park is divided into two sections. The first of these is called the 'Whale Sanctuary': it is about 45 km long and extends 3 nautical miles (nm) out to sea from the cliffs of the Great Australian Bight. One of the key management objectives of this zone is to provide habitat protection to the breeding and calving areas of the endangered Southern Right Whale, to enhance the species' long-term viability.[1] It is this expanse of water that provides the opportunity for whale-watching. The rest of the Marine Park is called the 'Great Australian Bight Marine National Park' and is located on either side of the Whale Sanctuary; running to the west for about 170 km, to the east for about 40 km, and extending out to the sea for more than 3 nm.

The terrestrial area abutting the Marine Park is also divided into two zones. To the north-west, a region called the Nullarbor National Park adjoins the Marine National Park and a small section of the Whale Sanctuary. Adjoining the Nullarbor NP to the east, lies an area called Yalata

Figure 9.1 Old hand-drawn sign marking the dirt road leading to the edge of the ocean (Image courtesy of the author)

Aboriginal Lands, which has been home to the Pitjantjajara people for at least 40,000 years. Descendants of these people still occupy the region and have custodianship of the Yalata Aboriginal Lands Lease, which covers some 458,000 hectares of the far west of South Australia and unfurls along one sixth of the total length of the Great Australian Bight. The Yalata Lands provide the key area from which to view whales swimming in the Sanctuary waters.

Since the Marine Park was established, the Yalata Lands have undergone a vivid transformation. In 1996, Yalata Community Incorporated, funded by the South Australian Government, oversaw the erection of infrastructures that would cater to those wanting to view whales from the Lands. These infrastructures include roads, gates, toilets, a shelter shed and picnic area, walkways, viewing platforms, fencing, signs, and a visitor permit system. The Yalata Lands opened its gates to the public on the 15 May 1997. In its first year 11,000 people used the Aboriginal Lands to experience the Marine Park Whale Sanctuary. During 1998 this figure had risen to 17,000 visitors, and in 2005 visitor numbers were 21,700.[2]

For the purposes of this story, however, it does not matter who manages the Lands nor how many people have visited or are expected

to visit the Park. What I'm interested in is the kind of 'eco-experience' the Marine Park makes possible. In essence, the management of the terrestrial area abutting the Marine Park Whale Sanctuary has to do with configurations of *space* and *people* (or bodies). The tendency has been to think that the 'real' action – the 'authentic' spectacle – occurs in the waters of the Sanctuary. This, after all, is where the whales live. But I believe – and aim to show – that what takes place on the terrestrial zone abutting the Whale Sanctuary is every bit as important as what takes place in the marine zone. This is because the terrestrial zone, stretching from the main highway to the edge of the Southern Ocean, can be understood as having become a kind of *terrestrial membrane* which purposefully regulates the flow of bodies in search of a 'marine experience' or 'an encounter with nature'. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that the intensity of the marine experience is *entirely* dependent on the intensity or quality of the terrestrial experience. The question is: At what socio-environmental cost does this management of bodies occur?

In the remainder of this chapter, I explore the ways in which this membrane currently works against the production of an intense and diverse 'eco-experience' and instead produces a contrived series of interruptions or striations which lead to static as opposed to free-flowing encounters. These striations and static encounters reinforce dichotomies – such as inside/outside, self/other, here/there, observer/observed, marine/terrestrial, person/animal and human/nature – which impact on broader 'everyday' interactions with the world (in the sense that they structurally compel us to inhabit the world in segmented, disconnected fashion). I suggest that Deleuze and Guattari's concept of *haecceity* might provide a way of thinking about and participating in the world that resists such rigid distinctions and dichotomies. By doing so, I hope to encourage the creation of spaces that allow for diverse and intense interactions, as opposed to the proliferation of sterile and serialized 'eco-experiences'.

Assembling the eco-tourist

By road, the distance from Adelaide (South Australia's capital city) to the Marine Park is about 1100 km. The last time I travelled to the area prior to it being declared a Marine Park was in 1992. Several years later, however, things had markedly changed – in terms of 'infrastructure', in terms of administration, and in terms of the possible relationships and experiences possible to draw from the region. In 1998, my encounter with the Marine Park Whale Sanctuary began (paradoxically) about 85 km from

the Marine Park itself. This occurred when my travelling companions and I reached a service station and rest area called Yalata roadhouse. The roadhouse was one of two locations from which we could purchase a permit to visit the Whale Sanctuary. When purchasing our permit we were required to give a contact name and phone number. The paper permit included a cut-out of a whale's tail flukes at the top. There was also an imprinted number which informed us where along the line of visitors to the Sanctuary we fell (we were number 10,260). On the reverse side of the permit was a list of the rules we were expected to follow whilst using Yalata Lands to view the Whale Sanctuary. Beside each rule appeared a little blue imprint of a Southern Right Whale. The provisions began with the following statement: 'Yalata Community Incorporated are responsible for the management of these lands. Visitors are asked to abide by the following conditions, to ensure the fragile natural beauty of this place and your own safety is maintained'. This was followed by a series of rules, including the provisions that visitors must: display the permit on the dashboard of their vehicle; keep their vehicle to defined tracks; walk on established pathways only; and avoid making loud noises. Just below the list of rules was an illustration about the size of a small coin which depicted a stick figure falling off the edge of a cliff.

Along with the permit, we received a ten-page information package headed 'Welcome to the Yalata Aboriginal Lands'. The first page displayed a list of rules to be obeyed while occupying the Lands generally, as opposed to occupying only that portion which abuts the Whale Sanctuary. With three exceptions, these prescriptions were the same as those listed on the back of the permit. The additional rules stipulated that visitors must camp in designated areas only, stay 'at least 2 m back from cliff edges to avoid danger', and bring their own supply of firewood since 'Native timber must not be removed or burnt'. Six of the remaining ten pages were devoted to the Southern Right Whale and informed visitors that 'The Head of the Bight offers the best cliff based viewing for Southern Right Whales in Australia'. There was also a 'Facts and Figures' section containing information on the length, weight, longevity, swimming speed, and distances travelled for the 'average' Southern Right Whale. The same page also informed us that there were only about 3500 to 4000 of these whales remaining worldwide and that 'Australia has a visiting population of 600–800'.

From Yalata Roadhouse it took us about 40 minutes to near the turn-off to the Yalata Aboriginal Lands/Marine Park Whale Sanctuary. The first indication that we were in the vicinity of a 'whale-watching' area

was a sign about 2 km from the main turn-off depicting a 'cartoon' whale telling us that the turn-off to the Sanctuary was just up ahead. A little further on there was another sign saying 'Head of Bight, Turn Left 300 m'. Eventually, when we had reached the turn-off there were more signs. One of these, which included an emblem of a whale's tail, pointed in the direction of the Bight and said 'Head of Bight, Whale Watching, June–October' (see Figure 9.2). There were also two gates

Figure 9.2 Sign marking the turn-off (Image courtesy of the author)

which, when closed, were wide enough to prevent cars driving through before and after official 'Park Hours'. To the left of the gates was a stone cairn (or structure) framing a sign which said 'Welcome to the Head of the Bight' and requested that visitors 'Please stop at White Well Ranger Station (2 km) prior to visiting the Head of the Bight Whale Viewing Area (12 km)'.

Previous to the Marine Park there were no gates, no fences and no signs saying who owned or leased what. Instead there was a dirt track which preserved the feeling of continuity of the land, sky and sea that often builds over the course of travelling in a car, or on a bike or on foot for long periods. There was, in other words, no sense of entering a place of *dis*continuity – of moving *in*to a place. A gate is the concrete manifestation of a discontinuity. It is a means for establishing relations of power through the erection of insides and outsides – significances and insignificances. Things 'outside' are usually thought of as foreign or waste (*other*) whereas things 'inside' are usually thought of as endemic or useful (*self*). The implication for Yalata Lands/Whale Sanctuary is that things 'inside' the membrane are more 'valuable' than everything 'exterior' to it. It is then a small step to argue that people's primary environmental concern should be to conserve what lies 'within' the membrane and ignore what occurs 'outside' this privileged space. A gate is therefore a means of intimating that the forces which occur beyond its dimensions have a 'beginning' and 'end' and can therefore be 'contained'. Once this has occurred, such forces are likely to be 'revealed' to those 'outside' only at a *price*, for a certain *time* and in a certain *manner*. Another way of saying all this is that once an 'inside' has been established, what becomes important are the lines formed 'between two points' (the beginning and ending) rather than the points formed 'between two lines' (the entire field or 'plane' of possible movement).[3] Deleuze and Guattari call the former of these situations the creation of *striated space* and the latter the maintenance of *smooth space*.[4]

Striated spaces tend to share an affinity with (post)industrial trajectories and speeds. Think of the way one usually moves around a city and the constant interruptions brought by the presence of linear things (traffic signals, footpaths, roads) and solid things (buildings, cars, monuments). Moving in a city usually involves conducting oneself along a plethora of grid-like trajectories – straight down this street, right at that intersection, left at that street and so forth. Importantly, it also involves the adoption of certain speeds so as to complement opening and closing times and to avoid rush hours and/or peak hour traffic. Intentionally or otherwise, the introduction of Park opening and closing times has

brought with it a need to negotiate precisely the kinds of trajectories and speeds common to most cities. The trajectories of those who occupy the membrane are interrupted by all manner of linear things (roads, signs, walkways) and solid things (permit, gate, Ranger Station). Moreover, the speed at which these negotiations occur has changed markedly. Decisions to visit the Whale Sanctuary no longer have recourse to such matters as when the sun will be rising or setting or when it is convenient for someone to venture off the main highway (continuities). Instead, permeating the membrane now involves taking stock of when it will be open and/or when the least number of people are likely to be there (discontinuities).

A series of striations marked the rest of our journey to the Whale Sanctuary. Along the bitumen road to the viewing area, a set of different speed limits had been imposed. After 2 km we pulled up at White Well Ranger Station, where we were required to show our permit and again supply our personal details. Inside the Station was a makeshift desk with four notices pinned to the front of it. The first of these displayed instructions for those travelling with caravans. The second gave details of how to obtain a permit if the Station was unattended. The third was a list of Yalata Lands prescriptions – a reproduction of the rules contained on the back of the permit. The fourth notice outlined the charges for different types of vehicles carrying Park visitors. Researchers were let in for free because they helped 'towards increasing knowledge of the Southern Right Whale', however each researcher had to be accompanied by a Ranger 'at all times'. Similarly, anyone filming in the area, whether for commercial or educational purposes, could only do so when accompanied by a Ranger. The notice further stipulated that only pre-booked groups of ten or more people were permitted to camp in the area (at a fee). No individual camping was permitted in the Park.

Leaving the Ranger Station we passed through another gate and drove a further 10 km to reach the Head of the Bight. Here, we were required to park the car somewhere within the perimeter of a carpark which had obviously been built to cater for large tourist buses as well as smaller vehicles. It was surrounded (or marked out) by a series of pine posts about 30 cm high connected to each other by wire covered in black plastic sheathing. In the middle of the carpark was a public toilet block complete with stainless steel urinals. At the southern end of the carpark there was a break in the posts and plastic guide-wires. This provided room for the path that led down to the walkways and viewing areas.

Movements of a (serialized) whale watcher

My aim this section is to relay – through a fairly detailed recounting – the weight and number of prescriptions which impress upon the tourist body within the Park. In subsequent sections I will move from description to a more explicit application of Deleuze's work in an attempt to pull apart the molarization of the whale watcher body.

The kinds of experiences a body encounters has a lot to do with the way it moves through space. In the striated space of the Marine Park, the movement of bodies is regulated and delineated. A person no longer enters the Park's terrestrial membrane as a force willing their own trajectory, but instead enters as a (tourist) body to be given a number and told where, when and how to move. The path to the walkways was about 4 m wide, made of bitumen and extended without deviating for about 120 m until it formed a T-junction with the walkways. Like the carpark, the boundaries of the path had been marked out by low wooden posts connected by wire. When walking on this path it was possible to see the Southern Ocean some way ahead and the sandhills far away to the left. At this point each of us was surrounded by a 360° horizon interrupted only by the bodies of other tourists and the infrastructure of the carpark. However, each of our movements were limited to a path not more than 4 m wide. About 10 m before the path joined the walkway the low posts were replaced by higher posts about 1.5 m high. These were spaced about 2 m apart and were joined by wire meshing. A horizontal piece of wood connected the tops of one post to another and provided a 'railing' for people to lean on while looking for or at whales. This was the kind of fencing used for the remainder of the path and walkways.

At the path/walkway T-junction there was another sign. It displayed a picture of a Southern Right Whale and more information about their 'average' length, weight, mating habits and so forth. It then continued 'For public safety we request that you remain within the fenced area, access beyond this point is strictly prohibited. Issued by: Yalata Land Management and the Aboriginal Lands Trust'. There was a dozen or more of these signs attached to the fencing along the walkways. At all times the width of the walkways was less than 3 m.

The eastern arm of the walkway extended for about 70 m until it resolved in an area no larger than 4 m by 3 m. Here, there was a sign attached to the fence which said 'Please do not climb on railings'. From this location it was possible to see a rock formation known as Twin Rocks and part of the bay in which it stood about 2 km to the east. The distance from the edge of the cliffs to the viewing area ranged from being

60–120 m away: well in excess of the 2 m safety margin recommended everywhere else on the Lands. I saw one whale about half a kilometer out to sea from the eastern viewing area. Another whale moved in closer to the cliff-line but eventually moved so close to the cliffs that it could not be seen from the viewing area or from any point on the eastern path.

The western arm of the walkway extended about 150 m and was generally considered to lead to the 'best' viewing area. There were two flights of steps spaced about 50 m apart heading downwards between the T-junction and the western viewing platform (see Figure 9.3). While walking on this path I was able to look out over some of the cleanest and most brilliantly colored water in the world. And so could the people hemmed in next to me, and the people hemmed in beside them. The viewing platform covered an area about 20 m by 4 m – room enough for about two dozen onlookers to get an unfettered view of the whales; any more than this and people were required to peer around the person in front of them. It was supported by about 20 wooden posts which had been sunk into the cliff and looked to be set in concrete. Again, the closest cliff-edge was at least 60 m away. I saw 18 whales from this point – the closest would have been about 250 m away. Many whales

Figure 9.3 Walkway and steps leading to the viewing platform (Image courtesy of the author)

could be seen further along the Bunda Cliffs but walking along the cliffs was prohibited. Previously, one could follow in slow and reflexive fashion the trajectory of a whale as it/we moved along the cliff face. Now, however, the encounter occurred not only at a discrete moment in time, but a discrete point in space as well. The viewer had been rendered motionless.

Whilst on the platform I asked a middle-aged woman what she thought of the Park. She told me that it was 'quite good' but that 'it was a shame you couldn't move along with the whales'. Her husband said that they had driven along every dirt road off the main highway for 50 km to the west of the Sanctuary in the hope of seeing a whale 'for themselves'. But they hadn't seen any. After about 20 minutes I decided that standing on a small wooden deck alongside others standing in exactly the same manner was not very conducive to watching whales. During previous visits I had spent hours looking at the water, the waves, the cliffs and the whales. On this visit I stayed for considerably less time and spent most of it taking pictures of the walkway and remaining infrastructures. On my way out I asked an (Aboriginal) Ranger what he thought of the new facilities that had been erected on (his) Yalata Lands. He told me that they were 'good' because 'they get people in'. 'Getting people in', though, is clearly not the same as granting people the space to take responsibility for their own movements.

Molar terrains and molecular becomings

Ecologically, the ocean is not separate to the visitors of the Marine Park: it is an extension of their bodies. If the ocean suddenly dries up so will human bodies. Walkways and viewing platforms do not allow for this feeling of connection and extension to be played out. They function as static points from which to view the world in terms of separate, discrete and segmented frames, rather than as a continuous becoming or flow. They work to instill in each person that 'nature' is an *other* (an outside), and that they *themselves* are an 'other' to nature. Striated space, Deleuze and Guattari write, 'is defined by the requirements of long-distance vision: constancy of orientation, invariance of distance... constitution of a central perspective'.[5] The Marine Park infrastructure delineates the perspective and orientation of its visitors in relation to nature. It thus serves to block and redirect flows, particularly those *flows of desire* which take people beyond the hierarchies and significations that mark them and organize them most days of their lives. In blocking these flows the terrestrial membrane largely prevents or discourages people from

drawing a connection between the forces which they gaze upon and the forces of which they themselves are composed.

The forces in and around the Marine Park are also placed within a hierarchy of significance with 'animated' forces taking precedent over 'inert' forces – whales, seals, little penguins, then cliffs, sandhills, beaches and vegetation. This model of eco-tourism carves up the world and its 'objects', and ascribes a definitive (commercial) value to them. The Southern Right Whale is (re)produced as the 'centre-piece' or 'crowning moment' of the Park while the cliffs and surrounding vegetation are cast as its 'peripheral' features. It is the experience of whale-watching – rather than, say, watching the horizon, smelling the plants, listening to the ocean, or feeling the texture of the earth – around which all else is arranged and judged. The opportunity to see a whale subsequently becomes the 'whole' story of the membrane rather than one of many possible stories (or experiences and intensities). Rather than producing events to be experienced, the Marine Park exhibits things to be learned, recounted and placed within a hierarchy of significance. This doesn't mean that studying whales should be discouraged or that discussions of cliff formations should cease. Instead it suggests that certain ways of presenting and arranging things (such as 'nature') can lessen the spontaneity and individuality (*singularity*) of experience. Does knowing, for instance, the dimensions of the 'average whale' necessarily make for a more intense or worthwhile experience?

In contrast to striated space, smooth space is a space 'filled by events or haecceities far more than by formed or perceived things'.[6] Haecceities are those aspects of the world that escape articulation or enunciation but nonetheless play an important role in shaping the intensity of (inter)personal experience. Think of the feeling one sometimes has while watching the sun sink slowly below the horizon. As Deleuze and Guattari write:

> There is a mode of individuation very different from that of a person, subject, thing, or substance. We reserve the name *haecceity* for it. A season, a winter, a summer, an hour, a date have a perfect individuality lacking nothing, even though this individuality is different from that of a thing or a subject. They are haecceities in the sense that they consist of relations of movement and rest between molecules or particles, capacities to affect and be affected.[7]

Haecceities are crucial to matters of ecology because they make no distinction between centre and periphery, inside and outside, subject

and object and, therefore, humans and nature. They have a continuous quality. Haecceities interrupt what Deleuze and Guattari call 'states of affairs' or the 'geometric coordinates of supposedly closed systems' – closed systems such as the striated terrestrial membrane of the Marine Park.[8] Haecceities break with, or collapse, the discursive frames typically used to decode or understand 'reality'. A haecceity is a moment of pure speed and intensity (an *individuation*) – like when a swimming body becomes-wave and is momentarily suspended in nothing but an intensity of forces and rhythms. Or like when a body becomes-horizon such that it feels only the interplay between curves and surfaces and knows nothing of here and there, observer and observed.

I think places such as the Great Australian Bight Marine Park need to facilitate experiences such as these. They need to grant people the space to become-wave, become-whale, become-plant, become-horizon, become-cliff-face and all manner of other *non*things and in-between states. They need in short, to allow people to become *Bodies without Organs* – bodies without molar/rigid forms of organization. I'm talking here about the way spaces can enable or impede a body's capacity to merge or become part of a milieu as opposed to being an observer of it (i.e., a subject peering out at an object). Striated spaces tend to work against these ways of becoming. Structures like walkways and wooden railings reinforce subject/object dichotomies. There is, in short, a very different kind of intensity to becoming-whale or becoming-ocean when one's feet are placed directly on the heterogeneous surfaces of a 70 million year old cliff than when they are confined to the homogenous surface of chemically treated wooded platforms and walkways.

Unlike striated space, a person does not occupy smooth space in order to enumerate or list 'objects' ('I saw 20 whales today'): smooth space 'is occupied without being counted'.[9] The only things that are quantified in smooth space are *affects*, and 'no one knows ahead of time the affects one is capable of; it is a long affair of experimentation, requiring a lasting prudence'.[10] When a space has been pre-packaged and (re)presented it becomes homogenous and the capacity to engage in such experimentation is diminished. In a smooth space it would not be the whales which would give the Sanctuary its significance. Instead the 'significance' of such a space would have to do with the interplay between one's own 'humanity' and the multiplicity of forces which make people *forget* their human form: geological forces, geomorphological forces, hydrological forces, botanical forces, zoological forces and countless others. Smooth

space is not homogenous space: it is *heterogeneous* space; it facilitates the greatest number of affects or interminglings of bodies. Smooth spaces are nonlinear and allow for multiple trajectories and speeds to be deployed by the forces that move across them. They are spaces which often share an affinity with geological time-scales – that is, with the kinds of flows, speeds and trajectories which have arisen over thousands of years and which permit an ecologically sustainable relationship between rejuvenation and decay.

Dis*organ*izing the eco-tourist experience

In a world tending toward the colonization of smooth spaces – spaces which obey no categorical rule and are bound by no overarching institutionalized limit – I think it critical to look for and maintain spaces that allow proximities to becomings – ocean, whale, cliff, seashell, horizon and so on. Broader problems like the depletion of biodiversity, habitat fragmentation, urban sprawls and air and water pollution cannot be separated from the distributions and interplays of smooth and striated spaces and the particular modes of relating to the environment they make possible. Nor can they be separated from the kinds of bodies that occupy and move through those spaces.

Smoothing the terrestrial membrane of the Marine Park would allow people to experience the Sanctuary as part of a much larger bioregion. The whale breeding grounds are the result of a complex interplay between geological and hydrological forces – of water shaping rock, of rock influencing the flow of water, and of water, wind and rock giving shape to the nearby cliffs, beaches, vegetation and the organisms which inhabit these areas. Instead of a hierarchy of ecological significance, I would say there is a *synergy of ecological affects* unfurling across and beyond the terrestrial membrane. I say this because the Sanctuary (and the Marine Park generally) is not, indeed cannot be, a discretely bounded area.

In spite of legislative decree, the Marine Park possesses no 'inside'. It has no 'outside'. Rather, it undergoes a continuous exchange of forces and flows. Fish 'enter' and 'exit' the Sanctuary's waters from moment to moment. Birds nest in the cliff-face and take fish from the Sanctuary's waters. The waters in the Sanctuary wear slowly but surely away at the cliffs. The waves which begin hundreds, if not thousands of kilometers 'beyond' the Sanctuary make their way to the shores of the Head of the Bight and deposit sand from 'within' the Sanctuary onto the beach. This

sand, which at one time was 'in' the Southern Ocean, and at another was 'in' the Whale Sanctuary, is eventually picked up by the winds from Antarctica and dispersed in a manner which helps build the surrounding sandhills. These are examples of flows and becomings. An incessant intermingling and transformation of forces. Smoothing the terrestrial membrane – restoring to each person a responsibility for their own trajectories and actions – would help to implode inside/outside dichotomies. It would release people from the confines of the walkways and the manicured paths and enable each to obtain a tangible sense of the amorphous or ever-changing thresholds dividing sea from beach, beach from cliffs, beach from sandhills, cliffs from vegetation, sandhills from vegetation, vegetation from fauna. And, it would, I acknowledge, open up the terrain to forms of abuse (degradation of cliff tops, risk of injury to overly zealous or less able-bodied visitors). But it is always a question of which flow of harm (or speed of decay) should be tolerated – the occasional trampling of vegetation resulting from the different paths people tread or the permanent loss of the capacity to experience the world in a non-serialized manner and all that this entails. One of these losses is no more abstract than the other – both have material consequences, and my aim here is simply to give voice to the loss which traditionally accompanies the formal management of 'natural' areas.

(Dis)organizing the membrane in a smooth rather than striated fashion would thus bring with it new *proximities*. It would restore to people their motion and distances and literally extend their horizons. An unfurling of smooth space would enable visitors to walk along the cliff-face and follow the movements of a whale – to gain a sense of their speeds and velocities, their pauses and rhythms. Visitors could obtain a direct rather than vicarious sense of the time-scales in operation at the Head of the Bight. This is important since the restoration of the opportunity to reflect on, or attune to, animal and geological time-scales has implications for the way in which people relate to broader spaces and ecosystems. For one thing it can lead them to question the speeds engaged during everyday interactions with the world – like those linked to transport, production of waste, resource extraction and consumption.

The production of a smoother membrane would, I believe, also have practical consequences in terms of the safety of those visiting the Whale Sanctuary. The heavily striated membrane abutting the Whale Sanctuary currently has a *sedentary* effect on the bodies which occupy it. The confined and linear walkways (i.e., the lines between two points) concentrate people in *one* small area. The effect of this is to concentrate risk of injury and/or death as well. If the cliff-face collapses in the vicinity

of the walkway then there is a very high probability that *all* those on it would be injured or killed. In smooth space there would be a radical redistribution of risk because there would be a radical redistribution or dispersion of bodies/sightseers.

If the challenge of political-ecology is something other than to create – as one commentator has termed them – a series of contrived 'wilderness prisons', then I think there is a need to question the ways in which 'humans' and 'nature' interact in areas devoted to experiencing 'nature'.[11] The way 'nature' is *perceived* has everything to do with the way 'nature' is regulated (or constructed as an *object* of discourse).

Concluding remarks

In the early 1980s I was fortunate enough to be one of a select group of persons to witness the return of the Southern Right Whale to the Great Australian Bight (the species having been hunted into near extinction throughout the twentieth century). Although I visited this area many times in the wake of that first encounter, I have not returned to this place since the advent (imposition) of the infrastructure associated with the Marine Park. In many senses, then, the narrative recounted above is something of a lament for a place (and time) which, of course, can never be returned to. But it is something more than this as well. Specifically, this story is a reminder that whilst it is important to take the time to visit 'nature' in places like Marine Parks, such journeys have also become symbolic of the extent to which 'the natural environment' stands as something 'removed' or *dis*located from everyday practice. Wherever there is the thought or requirement to 'go to' nature there is the implicit or explicit configuration of ecosystems as an 'after-thought' (as a periphery, an outside, an excess) to the way people 'normally' articulate themselves.

Only in a grammatical sense is it possible to say that an ecosystem is 'outside' a human body. Long-term ecological well-being pertains directly to a capacity to conceive the world as a combination of flows which incessantly recur rather than as a set of objects that have discrete beginnings and ends.[12] Heavily regulated or (pre)scripted experiences of 'nature' are not conducive to extended, continuous or expansive experiences. A serious consequence of this is that people are increasingly robbed of the opportunity to develop their *own* environmental ethic or sense of restraint with regard to how they interact with 'nature'. Put another way, 'solutions' to environmental problems need, arguably, to enhance people's capacity to experience earth as something other

than an artifact confined to the molarized terrains they themselves have created.

Notes

1. Natural Resources Group. *Great Australian Bight Marine Park Draft Management Plan, Part A, Management Prescriptions* (Adelaide: Department of Environment & Natural Resources, 1997), p. 13.
2. In conversation, Simon Clarke, Park Manager, 15 May 2006 (figures are for whale season only: May to October).
3. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (French: 1980) Trans. B. Massumi (London: Athlone, 1987), pp. 480–481.
4. Ibid., pp. 474–500.
5. Ibid., p. 494.
6. Ibid., p. 479.
7. Ibid., p. 261.
8. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?* (French: 1991) Trans. G. Burchell and H. Tomlinson (London: Verso, 1994), p. 123.
9. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 362.
10. Deleuze, G. *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* (French: 1970) Trans. R. Hurley (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1988), p. 125.
11. Birch, T. 'The Incarceration of Wilderness: Wilderness Areas as Prisons', *Environmental Ethics*, 12(3)(1990), p. 26.
12. See Halsey, M. *Deleuze and Environmental Damage: Violence of the Text* (London: Ashgate, 2006).

10

City Folds: Injecting Drug Use and Urban Space

Peta Malins

> We are not in the world, we *become with the world.*
>
> Deleuze and Guattari[1]

In Australia illicit drug use is predominantly governed in relation to principals of harm minimization. These principals are based on a recognition that the criminalization of drug use cannot prevent the use of drugs, nor can it prevent the harms associated with it. Rather than attempting to stop drug use, harm minimization strategies aim to reduce the impact of drug use on those who use them, as well as their friends and families, and the broader community. Examples of successful harm minimization campaigns include the provision of free sterile injecting equipment, drug purity testing, safe-use education, drug related health promotion, and supervised injecting facilities. Such strategies have been responsible for preventing HIV epidemics in many countries,[2] and have also reduced the incidence of Hepatitis C, bacterial infection and overdose death.[3] Yet not all harm minimization strategies are as successful as they could be, due to the limited ways in which drug users – and their relationships to the world around them – are understood. Health promotion strategies, for example, are often based on the assumption that people are autonomous, rational actors, and that improved knowledge will lead to a change in both attitude and behavior. Many strategies also rely on a limited understanding of the relationship between bodies and space and, as such, are devised and implemented with little regard for spatial context and for the ways in which particular spaces might impact upon gendered social relations and social practice.

In this chapter[4] I take up Deleuze's concept of the fold – in connection with a range of select bodily and spatial concepts developed by Deleuze and Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus* – to rethink the relationships

between injecting drug user bodies and urban space. Looking specifically at the space of Melbourne's Central Business District (CBD), and drawing on discussions with ten women who regularly inject in its laneways, alcoves, car-parks and toilets, I explore the various ways in which urban spaces come to affect social – and bodily – potentials.

Rethinking the drug-using body

> As an assemblage, a [drug-using body] has only itself, in connection with other assemblages and in relation to other bodies... We will never ask what a [drug-using body] means, as signified or signifier; we will not look for anything to understand in it. We will ask what it functions with, in connection with what other things it does or does not transmit intensities... A [drug-using body] exists only through the outside and on the outside. A [drug-using body] itself is a little machine.
>
> Deleuze and Guattari[5]

Although the excerpt above – from Deleuze and Guattari's introduction to *A Thousand Plateaus* – originally refers to 'books' and not 'drug using bodies', it provides a useful way of introducing Deleuze and Guattari's approach to the body and to an ethics of social inquiry. For Deleuze and Guattari, the body is a machine which functions by forming assemblages with other machines. These assemblages continually transform the body; enhancing, or diminishing, its operational capacity. Rather than looking for internal meanings, causes and essences, Deleuze and Guattari are interested in looking at how things work: at the kinds of connections bodies form and the kinds of intensive capacities they produce. Inspired by the work of Spinoza, they write:

> We know nothing about a body until we know *what it can do*, in other words, what its affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, with the affects of another body.[6]

What matters is whether a particular assemblage enhances or diminishes a body's life force; in other words, whether it increases or reduces the body's power to act and its potential to go on forming new relations. A body, substance, or assemblage is not thought of as being bad, but only as becoming bad – or good – in relation to the specific affects it produces. A particular drug is not intrinsically bad: it only becomes bad when it harms a body (overdose, liver failure) or good when it benefits

a body (pain relief, joy, enhanced sensation, new modes of perception). What is important is not whether a particular body uses a drug, but whether the interaction between the two increases or diminishes the body's power to act; its capacity to go on connecting with other bodies; its capacity for life.

I would like, therefore, to problematize the idea that there is such thing as an 'addict' or 'drug user' – existing over time – and instead to speak only of the 'drug-using body': as a machine that exists only in the event; in the moment of connection with a drug and the specific affects it enables.[7] This is not to say that a body cannot form assemblages which move toward an addictive tendency; but here addictiveness is a tendency – a specific potential, judged according to how much a relation or an assemblage tends toward this limit – not something tied to a body or drug. This limit is one that is never fully attainable: no body can ever be fully 'addicted', only ever in a process of addiction. Addiction as a verb: a *doing* word. Not a descriptive noun. Categories such as 'drug user' and 'addict' can instead be understood as particular ways in which drug-using bodies have become organized and stratified in the social world. These stratifications are not only imposed by institutions (such as those of law, medicine, public health, education, the media, and so on), but are also taken up by bodies themselves. Stratifications are comforting: they enable the chaos of the world to be reduced to discrete categories of meaning and structure. They are also important, for they enable us to interact with the social world; to form relations with others and to have a political 'voice'. Yet it is essential that stratifications also be understood as limiting: they reduce the range of connections a body can make with the world around it; diminishing its potential for difference and for becoming-other.

Although bodies tend to be drawn to these reassuring, yet limiting, modes of organization, they also often repel them – seeking out assemblages which might enable them to destratify and thereby experience their bodies and the world anew. Bodies need these moments of destratification in order for life itself – as a continual production of difference – to continue. Drug use can be understood as one of the more extreme ways in which bodies attempt to destratify their everyday modes of being in order to connect to the world – and perceive the world – in new ways.[8] These drug-induced becomings are not without their dangers: they can lead to monstrous restratifications – the formation of habit or physical dependency; the contraction of a virus or bacterial infection; the production of a criminal or addict identity – which, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, are likely to be 'all the more rigid for being

marginal'.[9] There is also another danger: the danger of going too far or too fast and shattering the body's strata completely,[10] such that the body is no longer capable of having desire flow through it, nor of reforming connections with the social world. Examples include psychosis, suicide or overdose death. It is important, therefore, to retain at least some links with the social world – with organization and subjectivity – for without such links a body becomes incapable of forming new assemblages; of differing from itself and creating new lines of flight.

Rethinking urban space

> Even the most striated city gives rise to smooth spaces: to live in the city as a nomad, or as a cave dweller.
>
> Deleuze and Guattari[11]

In much the same way that the body can be said to be stratified or destratifying, space can be understood to exist in varying degrees of striation and smoothing. Striated spaces are those which are clearly delineated and arranged. Melbourne's CBD is, in many respects, a 'striated space par excellence'.[12] Its streets and lanes are laid out in an orderly, grid-like pattern; its buildings are predominantly rectilinear, tall and grey; its footpaths, curbs and crossings are delineated by signs, traffic lights and barriers; its trams move through the city on set trajectories; and almost every inch is under formal surveillance via a network of closed circuit cameras, police patrols, private security guards and local government 'compliance officers'. In contrast to a city such as Amsterdam – a 'city entirely without roots, a rhizome-city with its stem-canals',[13] where an irregular formation of circular paths, heterogeneous buildings, curves, colors, textures and sounds produce a smooth space of potentiality – Melbourne is indeed an exemplar of striated space. Yet as the quote above suggests, even the most striated of cities give rise to smooth space. Jay-walking, shoplifting, littering, homelessness, begging, skateboarding, graffiti-writing, sex-work and drug use: all constitute sites of chaos and rupture which deterritorialize Melbourne's urban environment; forging smooth spaces which elude control.

In Amsterdam, where drug use has been largely decriminalized, minoritarian subcultures of drug use, art, sex-work and other chaotic lines of flight tend to take place on the streets themselves. In Melbourne, drug use assemblages instead tend to traverse the cracks of the city (see Figure 10.1) – its laneways and alcoves, its toilets and stairwells – producing pockets and lines of smooth space amidst the striated. Buying,



Figure 10.1 Gap between buildings where injecting often takes place (Image courtesy of the author)

selling and injecting of heroin,[14] occur in smooth spatial trajectories that begin within the pedestrian camouflage of busy shopping strips and continue to a range of public and semi-public (publicly accessible, yet privately owned) spaces. Injecting often takes place in alcoves, lanes, parks, toilets and carparks; many of which retain visible signs of repeated use (discarded needles, syringes, swabs, spoons, and body fluids). These urban interstices have become very popular in recent years – not in spite of their chaotic, murky, minoritarian flows, but because of them; because of the potential for destratification they open up. As such, they

are increasingly being coveted by galleries, cafes and bars, and marketed as exciting places to visit.[15]

There exists, therefore, a constant tension in the city between the celebration of chaotic smooth sites of rupture, and the maintenance of order necessary for social amenity.[16] The increasing striation and gentrification of Melbourne's back laneways, alcoves and carparks, is not entirely bad: the removal of rubbish and grime, improvements in lighting, and the installation of syringe disposal bins (see Figure 10.2) all have important, gendered implications for the healthy use of city space.

Figure 10.2 Syringe disposal bin in Celestial Avenue (Image courtesy of the author)

Yet when striations become too extreme or too rigid, they can have negative affects on what it is that bodies – including injecting bodies – can do. When 'saturation' policing operations are under way, for example, or when drug sniffer-dogs patrol city space, those who are injecting drugs are more likely to rush their injecting, and are less likely to travel to get sterile injecting equipment, or to carry used syringes to disposal bins.[17] The issue is, as many advocates of harm minimization have argued, how

to find a balance between encouraging and enabling creative lines of flight (which always carry with them some risk) while preventing those which are destructive.

Assemblages of injecting in Melbourne's CBD involve the production and negotiation of multiple, simultaneous dangers. These include the risks of: restratification (through police intervention, social stigma, violence, blood-borne virus contraction, bacterial infection and vein damage); unsuccessful destratification (bad drugs, having drugs or equipment stolen); and destratification that takes place too fast or goes too far (overdose). The ways in which drug-using bodies are able to negotiate these dangers depends on the particular components that form part of the drug-using assemblage. Studies have already shown, for example, that both spatial context and gender have important, interconnected relationships to risk. Women who inject drugs in urban space have been shown to be more likely than men to inject with other people, and to share equipment with them;[18] more likely to favor remaining hidden during injecting than men;[19] and more careful than men in taking measures (such as quickly discarding syringes) to avoid being caught by police with their equipment.[20]

Gender is a bodily stratification which affects not only how we identify ourselves, but also the ways in which we move through space and interact with others. Women's use of urban space has long been regulated, and Melbourne's city streets continue to be shaped by historical attitudes toward women's appearance and respectability.[21] At the same time, women's use of alcohol and drugs – particularly heroin – has always received particularly strong condemnation.[22] Women who inject drugs in public city space are therefore already traversing at least two minoritarian fields of becoming. This does not render them simply 'doubly deviant',[23] but rather exponentially minoritarian – to at least the power of 2 (n^2). These women do not simply negotiate risk from within space, nor do they negotiate risks in relation to space. Rather, their bodies – and bodily potentials – are intimately entwined with the production of city space itself. To better address the risks for those who inject drugs in public spaces, we therefore need to look more closely at the intimate ways in which bodies and spaces interact.

Body-space folds

For Deleuze, following Leibniz, the relationship between bodies and spaces is one of folding.[24] The world around us folds into our bodies; shaping not only our movements, postures, emotions and subjectivity,

but also the very matter of which we are composed. We are folded by our genes, the food we consume and the air we breathe; by sound, texture, light and taste; by our relationships with others, and our interaction with the spaces around us. At the same time, bodies continually fold out into the world: shaping – and transforming – the spaces and places around them.

Folds are stratifications and striations: they limit the ways in which a body or space can be perceived and the kinds of relations it can form.[25] However, there are at least six ways in which the concept of folds is more useful than those of stratification and striation. First, it takes us beyond the level of the social; drawing attention to the ways in which material forces (as well as linguistic and discursive interactions) shape bodily and spatial constitution. Second, it draws attention to the malleability of organizational structures: the potential for bodies and spaces to unfold – or refold – their material configurations. Third, it highlights the symbiotic nature of stratifications and striations, which are never simply imposed from an outside, but involve a two-way process: a coming-together of bodies and spaces. Fourth, it enables the body (or space) to be understood as a multiplicity: an entity that is not simply 'one' (singular), nor a collection of many 'ones' (as in grains of sand), but rather a unified or continuous 'many' (as in pleats of material in a dress).[26] Fifth, it enables a conception of the world as a continuous line or plane of matter, which differentiates itself – actualizing each body or space – by folding; by forming 'an infinite series of curvatures or inflections'.[27] And sixth, it draws attention to the intensive potentiality which is embedded (or enfolded) within any body or space: a propensity – or virtual intensity – generated by the folding in of matter which, given the right conditions, has the capacity to unfold.

I suggest, therefore, reconceptualizing the space of the city as folded: composed of fluctuating intensities, smoothings and striations – each of which are connected, but without order or hierarchy. Urban space is in some parts smooth, in some parts striated: and is always moving; always folding and unfolding. A folded space is an intensive space. It is composed not only of extensive dimensions, such as distance and volume, but also intensive qualities such as temperature, color, sound, texture, smell, and an ever-present virtual potentiality which presses upon it. Intensive qualities are, by their very nature, opposed to striation and coding. They exist in the relations between: between sense and conscious recognition (of a smell, of a hot day); between a body and a space. They can be understood as virtual potentials (for smell, for heat) which become actualized in the moment of encounter.[28] They can also

be understood as levels, which only make sense in relation to a general milieu of levels: 'Our bodies perceive and move in a field. In stylizing, their positions and initiatives pick up the style of the field, catch on to its levels and follow its directives.'[29]

As we move through urban space, our bodies traverse different levels and spatial intensities which open up fields of bodily variation. We do not move through the city as unified, stable, rational and autonomous beings, rather, we move in conjunction with the spaces we encounter. Movements through levels of intensity affect our bodies in both corporeal and incorporeal ways; they affect our bodily capacities. At the same time, our movements through urban space, and the flows of desire that arise form our encounters and assemblages, can be understood to become embedded in the city: in its streets and lanes, footpaths and walls. These folds inhere in space, constituting, as Dewsbury suggests, 'unmeasured, invisible, energies'[30] which affect the ways in which bodies move through, and relate to each other within, city space.

This intensive, 'folded city' does not herald a loss of the 'real', where all matter becomes a kind of virtual reality: nothing more than images, simulations, and social constructions. Quite the contrary: conceptualizing the city as a dynamic, folded space, means acknowledging the ways in which it is materially connected to bodies; affecting them in very real, corporeal ways. The 'folded city' is also not one which involves a reproduction or representation of physical 'folds': as in the creation of buildings and houses that appear as though their walls have been bent over or 'folded'. Thinking the city as a folded space involves a logic of working with space, rather than an aesthetic style to reproduce.[31] It is about appreciating that folds that are already embedded in a space and the kinds of folds that a particular spatial form makes possible.

Case example: Junkie folds in Melbourne's CBD

One of the most interesting and prominent relationships between bodies and spaces spoken about by women who regularly inject drugs in Melbourne's CBD,[32] is that which is mediated by the term 'junkie'. The word 'junkie' is a derogatory identity category which has long been associated with drug use, particularly heroin injecting. It is a category that encompasses all the clichéd dirtiness, disease, deviancy, crime, dangerousness, laziness, and absence of will that are so commonly associated with injecting drug use. For women injectors – who have long been viewed as *especially* deviant, dirty and defiled – the term has particular

significance.[33] The women I spoke with, for example, talked about their frustration at being seen as *'just a hopeless junkie'*.[34] As one woman lamented: *'they believe that people bring it on themselves, and there's a stereotype of being this junkie loser'*.[35]

'Junkie' can be understood as a social stratum: one which has the capacity to produce particularly negative – or limited – stratifications. It is a stratum which is not only imposed upon those who inject drugs (by the public and the media), but which is also taken up and used by injectors themselves: either when claiming a political voice or cultural identity; or when distinguishing other, less responsible injectors from themselves. One woman for example, referred to herself as a user, because she cleans up after herself, whereas *'junkies are the ones that just have a whack [inject] and then throw it [the used syringe] on the ground'*.[36] She also used the term junkie to distinguish herself from those who are violent and who steal other people's drugs and belongings; practices which affect how others who inject drugs in the city are understood: *'a lot of people doing rips [thefts] and robbing everyone, and it's giving us a bad name, that's why everyone thinks we're just junkies'*.[37] Junkie-stratifications impact upon bodies and bodily potential, limiting what a body can do. They reduce, for example, a body's capacity for connecting with others: *'[people think] they're junkies, they've got AIDS, or they've got Hep C, and we can't touch them'*.[38]

The affective capacity of the term 'junkie' cannot, however, be fully understood through concepts of identity, stigma and stratification. In order to understand its affects, we must look at the ways in which it operates spatially; the ways in which it folds into space, and the implications of these folds for women who inject in urban space. The risk of being stratified as a junkie – or rather, developing 'junkie folds' – affects where women choose to inject. One woman noted that she did not, for example, like to inject in highly visible or public spaces, such as public toilets in shopping centres or fast-food outlets, because *'it involves Joe-public too much, and I don't like to think that people look at me and think I'm a junkie'*.[39] Furthermore, for many of the women I spoke with, the visibility of a space mattered a lot less than its sensory aesthetics. One woman described her aversion to a laneway in terms of dirtiness and its embodiment of all the junkie clichés:

> it was really horrible... dirty, smelly, exposed... I try and avoid the worst associations, you know, clichés of heroin users... shooting up in alleyways, and all that sort of stuff... it smelt of restaurant leftovers and urine, which is a lovely combination, just that rotting vegetable

> smell... it was cobblestones, discarded wrappers, upside-down milk crates, a lot of dirt on the ground, puddles forming in the cobblestones, yeah, it was very clichéd, a bad cliché.[40]

There is undoubtedly an element of desire associated with a clichéd 'junkie' assemblage such as this: an assemblage of cobblestones and milk crates; dirt and rubbish. It is an assemblage which envelopes a great deal of potentiality and one which – for some – is likely to enable desire to circulate and to flow. Yet it is also likely – over time – to striate the body, folding in relations of dirt and disease. One particularly well-known injecting site, a set of steps at the end of a laneway called Baptist Place, provides a good example of this danger.

Often referred to simply as 'Baptist', the site comprises a set of concrete steps (where injecting usually takes place); a syringe disposal bin mounted on the wall beside the steps; and a regular, open garbage bin (see Figure 10.3). Also near the steps is the rear entrance of the Baptist Church, where a free homeless lunch service is provided every weekday. As such, the lane provides a kind of refuge for many minoritarian bodies in the city who are looking for food, support, and shelter. It also provides an increased level of supervision – or at least an increased sense of supervision – which can be useful should overdose occur.[41] However, the space is usually filthy, and many women avoid injecting there for this reason. The steps are generally littered with rubbish, discarded needles and other injecting equipment; the area reeks of urine and faeces; and the lane has a reputation for violence as well as for being a drug use 'hot-spot'. It constitutes, in other words, a 'junkie' assemblage:

> as soon as you get in there you can smell shit and piss, and there's fits everywhere... junkies that haven't got fits, especially late at night, they go through the bins, and they empty the bin out and put it everywhere... Yuk!... I hate going there, because I use – but I don't class myself as a junkie.[42]

Instead of destratifying the space, repeated assemblages of drug use begin to sediment and striate it: producing it as a 'junkie' place. The space can be understood as enfolding the bodies of those who inject there – folding in all the rubbish, the dirt, the violence, and the body fluids of other injecting bodies. As though the concrete itself has enfolded a disease: *'it's disgusting actually... [I] feel like if I sit down I'm going to catch some deadly disease that's just manifested from the concrete, like the concrete's created its own disease from too many people chucking stuff*

Figure 10.3 Baptist Place (Image courtesy of the author)

on the ground'.[43] At the same time, the diseased concrete folds out into the drug using assemblage. It folds into the air, the nose, the stomach; into the drugs being mixed up; and into the body:

> Baptist Lane is getting really disgusting... I've been around that corner where somebody's actually [had a] shit up the top of the stairs, and just left newspaper over the top of it, and I've been mixing up [the drugs] and then realized, 'what the hell is that stench!?'... and it's made me feel just so ill... there's nothing that attracts flies quicker than blood or pee... oh, it can be really, really disgusting, really disgusting, and I'm disgusted with myself at times for being there.[44]

At Baptist, the dirt and stench of the space fold into the body to produce a 'disgusting' body. To produce a 'dirty' body: *'it always smells like piss, it's just a horrible smell, it's not a clean place, not at all, and that's why I hate going there, it just makes me feel dirty'*.[45] To produce a clichéd, dirty, grotty 'junkie': *'it feels like, like you see in the movies... just like the way people create an image of users, you know, just down an alleyway, really dirty, really grotty, and you kind of get that feeling about yourself when you're down there'*.[46] The space's potentiality – its capacity to actualize 'dirty', 'junkie' folds – could be sensed by the women injecting there. As one said: *'I know it's ridiculous, but just because the surroundings were dirty, the air was dirty [gestures to her arm... her skin... her body...], it felt somehow... I didn't like it'*.[47]

Dirty spaces fold dirt into the body: corporeally and incorporeally. These folds affect what a body can do. They reduce its power to affect and to be affected; its capacity to form future relations with others. This has important implications for overdose response. As one woman noted: *'usually if someone drops on the street people will walk straight past them [and say] "oh, they're junkies"'*.[48] Another made a similar observation:

> I just came out onto the street on the other side of the road and saw all these people standing around and these two people laying on the ground... and I said 'what's going on?' and they said 'oh, it's just junkies', and I said 'well Jesus, isn't anyone going to help them?' and they went 'oh no, AIDS, AIDS!'... and the boy was blue.[49]

When women inject drugs in Melbourne's CBD, they form assemblages which reconstitute both them and the spaces around them. Their bodies fold out into city space and enfold the spaces they encounter. The type of space that women inject in has important implications for their material constitution. Assemblages that produce 'junkie' bodies affect not only social identity, but the material production of bodies. Junkie folds reduce a body's power; limiting what it is that a body can do. They reduce its ability to form new relations, new connections; its ability to continue becoming-other. Such foldings have significant implications – not only for overdose responses, but for matters of sociability and social ethics more broadly.

Conclusions

> How far can we unfold the line without falling into a breathless void, into death...?
>
> Deleuze[50]

The city is an assemblage of spaces – sometimes smooth, sometimes striated – which bodies do not simply move through, but fold and enfold. This intimate relationship between bodies and urban spaces is important to consider when developing harm minimization responses to street-based drug use. Simple educational health promotion strategies which tend to be based on the assumption that correct knowledge of risks will lead to attitudinal and behavioral changes can no longer be relied upon. Educational strategies which fail to conceive of the injecting moment as an assemblage – an assemblage that incorporates not only the body, the drug, and the injecting equipment, but also flows of desire and spatial foldings – must be problematized.

Thinking the city as folded will enable a more intimate exploration of the ways in which spatial interventions might reduce the harm associated with injecting drug use. The introduction in Melbourne of a site specifically for safer injecting – similar to the supervised injecting facilities already in operation in cities such as Sydney, Vancouver, Amsterdam, Zurich, Hamburg, and Barcelona – would be a productive way to transform current injecting assemblages. Such sites constitute a useful striating of space, however great care should be taken to ensure that such spaces do not become too rigidly striated. A facility, for example, which is too medicalized – too cold, hard and bleak – will likely result in women setting up their desiring and injecting assemblages elsewhere. A facility which becomes a 'junkie' space – which sediments this identity through its violence, dirt, or through the media's categorization of it as a place for 'diseased' 'addicts' or 'junkies' – would also prove problematic. To be successful, a supervised injecting site will need to make room for some smooth spaces within the striated. A space, for example, which is not too rigidly defined; which is ambiguously co-located with other services (such as a health clinic, library, café, or art space); and which offers a level of camouflage by being continuous and contiguous with other urban, consumer spaces, will be more likely to leave room for women to go about unfolding and refolding their bodies.

Striating urban spaces is necessary for sociability. It is also necessary in order to prevent chaos – to prevent lines of flight turning into lines of destruction or death. However, it is important to be aware of the ways in which stratifications can stifle connections between bodies; blocking flows of desire and creating unhealthy body–space relations. The complex interdependency between bodies and spaces needs to be better understood and acknowledged not only for the sake of improving harm minimization strategies, but so that we can begin to move beyond the reduction of harm and toward an ethics of positive production;

that is, toward the active creation of healthy socio-spatial relations. A liveable, productive city is one which fosters smooth spaces and supple folds. One which enhances the capacity for people to surprise themselves; to launch creative lines of flight, and to unfold and refold their bodies in new ways.

Notes

1. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?* (French: 1991) Trans. G. Burchell and H. Tomlinson (London: Verso, 1994), p. 169, emphasis added.
2. A study of 103 cities worldwide has found, for example, that cities which have introduced Needle and Syringe Programs have experienced an average annual reduction in HIV prevalence of 19 per cent, while those which have not introduced NSPs have experienced an 8 per cent increase annually. And in Australia, where Needle and Syringe Programs have been operating since the 1980s, HIV prevalence (1 per cent amongst those who inject drugs, and 0.07 per cent of the entire population) is considerably lower than most countries, including, for example, in the US, where NSPs remain illegal in many states. See Dolan, K., MacDonald, M., Silins, E. & Topp, L. *Needle and Syringe Programs: A Review of the Evidence* (Canberra: Australian Government Department of Health & Ageing, 2005), pp. 12–15.
3. See Dolan, K., MacDonald, M., Silins, E. & Topp, L. *Needle and Syringe Programs*, op. cit.; and van Beek, I., Kimber, J., Dakin, A. & Gilmour, S. 'The Sydney Medically Supervised Injecting Centre: Reducing Harm Associated with Heroin Overdose', *Critical Public Health*, 14(4)(2004), pp. 391–406.
4. I would like to thank John Fitzgerald for inspiring my initial encounters with Deleuze and for coming up with the idea of using the fold to think through issues of drug use in public space. I would also like to thank the women in Melbourne who took part in the interviews for this research and Youth Projects' Foot Patrol NSP for their assistance with recruitment. Thanks also to Felicity Colman and Anna Hickey-Moody for their comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.
5. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (French: 1980) Trans. B. Massumi (London: Athlone, 1987), p. 4. I have replaced the term 'book' in the original excerpt for the term 'drug using body'.
6. Ibid., p. 257, emphasis added.
7. For a more detailed exploration of the implications of Deleuze and Guattari's work for understanding the drug using body, and an examination of the ways in which Deleuze and Guattari configure drug use as a 'limit-point', see Malins, P. 'Machinic Assemblages: Deleuze, Guattari and an Ethico-Aesthetics of Drug Use', *Janus Head*, 7(1)(2004), pp. 84–104.
8. See Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., particularly Chapter 6: '28 November 1947: How Do You Make Yourself a Body without Organs?', pp. 149–166.
9. Ibid., p. 285.
10. Ibid., p. 161.

11. Ibid., p. 500.
12. Ibid., p. 481.
13. Ibid., p. 15. See also Martin Jay's discussion of the haptic, textured, ungridded nature of Amsterdam's urban spaces: Jay, M. *Force Fields: Between Intellectual History and Cultural Critique* (New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 126.
14. Although amphetamines are also a commonly injected drug in Melbourne, heroin remains the drug most commonly injected in public spaces (one reason for this is that the strong physical withdrawal often associated with regular heroin use tends to encourage consumption as quickly as possible after purchasing).
15. For details on the growing numbers of cafes and bars down laneways in Melbourne, see Melbourne's tourism website: http://www1.visitvictoria.com/displayObject.cfm/ObjectID.000C534E-3881-1F3C-AAA180C476A90000/vvt.vhtml. In one laneway where I used to collect discarded syringes for the NSP, there is now an open-air bar called 'Section 8' which serves alcohol from a converted shipping container.
16. People tend to be simultaneously drawn to, and repelled from, bodies and spaces of deterritorialization, because of their potential to call into question the validity of the unified, autonomous body. For an exploration of these tensions, and the ways in which a 'fear of sense' (a fear of the destratifying potential of sensation) tends to govern public responses to urban drug use in Melbourne, see Fitzgerald, J. & Threadgold, T. 'Fear of sense in the Street Heroin Market', *International Journal of Drug Policy*, 15(2004) pp. 407–417.
17. Maher, L. & Dixon, D. 'Policing and Public Health: Law Enforcement and Harm Minimization in a Street-level Drug Market', *British Journal of Criminology*, 39(4)(1999), pp. 488–512.
18. Connors, M. 'Risk Perception, Risk Taking and Risk Management among Intravenous Drug Users: Implications for AIDS Prevention', *Social Science and Medicine*, 34(6)(1992), pp. 591–601.
19. Weeks, M., Singer, M., Himmelgreen, D., Richmond, P., Grier, M., & Radda, K. 'Drug Use Patterns of Substance Abusing Women: Gender Differences in an AIDS Prevention Program', *Drugs & Society*, 3(1/2)(1998), pp. 35–61.
20. Maher, L. & Dixon, D. 'Policing and Public Health', op. cit.
21. Brown-May, A. *Melbourne Street Life* (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 1998).
22. See, for example, Denton, B. *Dealing: Women in the Drug Economy* (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2001); Boyd, S. *Mothers And Illicit Drugs: Transcending The Myths* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999); Leigh, B. 'A Thing So Fallen, And So Vile: Images of Drinking and Sexuality in Women', *Contemporary Drug Problems*, 22(1995), pp. 415–434; and Ettorre, E. *Women And Substance Use* (London: Macmillan, 1992).
23. Broom, D. 'On Asking The Right Questions: Making Sense of Gender and Drugs', in Broom, D. (Ed.) *Double Bind: Women Affected by Alcohol and Other Drugs* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1994), pp. 197–206.
24. Deleuze, G. *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (French: 1988) Trans. T. Conley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).
25. Deleuze writes: 'to unfold is to increase, to grow; whereas to fold is to diminish, to reduce', Deleuze, G. *The Fold*, op. cit., pp. 8–9.

26. Deleuze writes: 'This is what Leibniz explains in an extraordinary piece of writing: a flexible or elastic body still has cohering parts that form a fold, such that they are not separated into parts of parts but are rather divided to infinity in smaller and smaller folds that always retain a certain cohesion', Deleuze, G. *The Fold,* op. cit., p. 6. Deleuze also refers to a piece of writing by Pacidus Philalethi (C 614–615) which states: 'The division of the continuous must not be taken as of sand dividing into grains, but as that of a sheet of paper or of a tunic in folds, in such a way that an infinite number of folds can be produced, some smaller than others, but without the body ever dissolving into points or minima', Deleuze, G. *The Fold*, op. cit., p. 6. And As Lynn explains: 'a folded mixture is neither homogeneous, like whipped cream, nor fragmented, like chopped nuts, but smooth and heterogeneous': Lynn, G. 'Architectural Curvilinearity: The Folded, the Pliant and the Supple', *Architectural Design*, 102(1993), pp. 8–15.
27. Deleuze, G. *The Fold,* op. cit., p. 24.
28. Massumi, B. *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), see especially pp. 24–33.
29. Lingis, A. *The Imperative* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), p. 36.
30. Dewsbury, J-D. 'Witnessing Space: "Knowledge Without Contemplation" ', *Environment and Planning,* 35(2003), pp. 19–22.
31. See Speaks, M. 'Folding Toward a New Architecture', Editor's foreword to Cache, B. *Earth Moves: The Furnishing of Territories* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1995), pp. xiii–xix; and Lynn, G. 'Architectural Curvilinearity', op. cit.
32. In 2004, as part of my PhD research, I interviewed ten women who regularly inject in Melbourne's CBD. The women were invited to participate by the Foot Patrol NSP outreach service and were paid $20 for their time. Interviews took place in the CBD (usually in a café) and were semi-structured around a range of themes relating to their experiences of city space. Interviews were audio-recorded went for approximately one hour each.
33. See, for example, Hassin, J. 'Living a Responsible Life: The Impact of AIDS on the Social Identity of Intravenous Drug Users', *Social Science and Medicine,* 39(3)(1994), pp. 391–400; and Ettorre, E. *Women And Substance Use*, op. cit., p. 78; Rosenbaum, M. *Women on Heroin* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1981).
34. Interview participant #07.
35. Interview participant #10.
36. Interview participant #05.
37. Interview participant #05.
38. Interview participant #05.
39. Interview participant #08.
40. Interview participant #01.
41. See Malins, P., Fitzgerald, J. & Threadgold, T. 'Spatial "Folds": The Entwining of Bodies, Risks and City Spaces for Women Injecting Drug Users in Melbourne's Central Business District', *Gender, Place and Culture*, 13(5)(2006), pp. 509–527.
42. Interview participant #05.
43. Interview participant #07.

44. Interview participant #08.
45. Interview participant #02.
46. Interview participant #07.
47. Interview participant #01.
48. Interview participant #05.
49. Interview participant #09.
50. Deleuze, G. *Negotiations* (French: 1990) Trans. M. Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 113.

11

Holey Space and the Smooth and Striated Body of the Refugee

Hélène Frichot

A contest is taking place in the socio-cultural geography and imaginary of the Australian Community, one that circulates about the figure of the refugee, or, more specifically, the 'asylum seeker'. The setting for this battle (or non-battle, depending upon which agonistic tactics are deemed to predominate) incorporates the leaky vessel, the displaced and denationalized body, the smooth space of the sea, and 'our' striated antipodean shores. In Chapter 14, '1440: The Smooth and the Striated' of *A Thousand Plateaus*, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari extrapolate upon two concepts concerning space: the 'smooth' and the 'striated'. In addition to these concepts, they mention a further (and thus far under-theorized) concept, which they name 'holey space'. It is necessary, however, to return to a previous chapter of *A Thousand Plateaus*, Chapter 12, '1227: Treatise on Nomadology: The War Machine',[1] to discover the connective and conjugal role which holey space plays (respectively) between smooth and striated space. What interests Deleuze and Guattari in operations of striation and smoothing 'are precisely the passages or combinations: how the forces at work within space continually striate it, and how in the course of this striation it develops other forces and emits new smooth spaces'.[2] Crucial to these combinations is the way holey space *connects* to nomadic smooth space, and *conjugates* with sedentary striated space, as though joining two sides of a surface of sense. A composition is thus laid out which incorporates the sedentary slowness of striated space, the nomadic speeds of smooth space, and the ambulatory, connective tissue of holey space.

Of the several models Deleuze and Guattari develop in their conceptual investigation of space, the maritime model tells us the most about difficult journeys undertaken. Not only is the sea given as a smooth space *par excellence*, alongside the desert and the steppes, but,

simultaneously, the space most easily subjugated to striation. Importantly, it is in the midst of the Pacific maritime milieu, as well as in the Australian desert, that a site of contest between smooth and striated space is taking place. A contest cannot be figured as a straightforward and symmetrical opposition, but an asymmetrical to and fro in which power relations become more or less coagulated and bare life comes to be manipulated and managed, or else find its line of escape. In the midst of this contest holey space can be seen to take up a particular role, though it risks being captured by striated space, or else carried away with smooth space. In this context, what lines of escape might holey space offer the refugee, who is corporeally stricken by both the smooth and striated spaces of the Australian nation-state and its maritime surrounds?

In this chapter, I will argue that the connective tissue of holey space promises a way of welcoming, and not evading, what Deleuze in his late essay, *Immanence: A Life...*, calls, quite simply, 'a life'. In addition to the question of a life, it will be important to consider what Giorgio Agamben, after Michel Foucault, and following Walter Benjamin, has denominated 'bare life'; life which becomes increasingly managed by forces of biopower.[3] Addressing the Australian context in particular, I will examine how the body of the refugee becomes caught up in such mechanisms of power. That is to say, I will examine the ways in which the pursuit of 'a life', determined by singularities, events and virtualities, comes to be constrained not only by striated spaces, but also by the State's co-option of smooth spaces. I will suggest that the creation of new holey spaces might offer the refugee body a more subterranean and hidden means of escape and resistance.

The desert and the sea

In December, 1992, the Australian High Court found that mandatory detention of asylum seekers was lawful as a means of migration control.[4] A wilful denominational slippage – the assertion that refugees can only be named as such once their status is proven – allowed the Australian government to suspend the rights otherwise granted to a refugee by the UNHCR. Until a refugee's status is proven (a process that often takes years) they are known merely as 'asylum seekers' who must necessarily, in accordance with the law, be detained. Subsequent to the above ruling, a network of refugee camps – or, to use the prevalent political rhetoric, Immigration Reception and Processing Centres (IRPC) and Immigration Detention Centres (IDC) – began to silently striate the Australian socio-cultural geography. I say 'silently' because, as Suvendrini Perera

points out, by some strategic sleight of hand, the Australian government managed to ensure that these detention camps only gained public visibility some 8 years after they were instituted.[5] This network of camps effectively instigate what Agamben identifies as the 'no-man's land between public law and political fact'.[6] They also constitute what Agamben refers to as the paradox of a permanent 'state of willed exception';[7] a place that resides outside the law, all the while being maintained by the strictures of law. Through the vocabulary of Deleuze and Guattari, we can understand the camps in terms of a desire to make the Australian landscape and its associated bodies more *striated*. This striation is regulated by the State apparatus and its juridical rules, but in ways that are generally insidious and camouflaged.

In Australia, the two dominant settings for this ongoing striation are the *sea* and the *desert*: spaces which are otherwise given as archetypically smooth. The sea here is that unruly space which the Australian government tells us must be managed with strict border control. 'Unruly' bodies which emerge from the smooth spaces of the sea, are bodies which must also be managed; detained in camps which have been custom built to accommodate 'unauthorized boat arrivals'.[8] The smooth spaces of the sea also become striated through the excision of islands (such as Christmas Island and Ashmore reef) from the Australian migration zone; making the process of seeking refuge more complex for those who arrive on these islands or who find themselves plucked from the sea and placed there by the Australian government.[9] In addition, Nauru and Manus islands, otherwise independent territories, and otherwise outside Australia's migration zone, have been designated by the Australian government to be 'declared countries', where asylum seekers can be sent by the Australian government to be assessed. Thus a veritable archipelago of minor island camps conjoin to support the expansive mainland camps in Australia.

And then there is the desert; the red heart of a fantastic Australian imaginary. This has become the remote locale where onshore refugee camps have been installed, out of sight and out of mind, and where, over a number of troubled years, most of the inhabitants of the island camps have found themselves subsequently imprisoned.[10] Captured in the excluded interior of the camp itself, the asylum seeker is further segregated, and compartmentalized according to sex, ethnicity, nationality and date of arrival.[11] New detainees are segregated in such a way that they cannot benefit from the experience garnered by those who have come before. The 'passwords' that might enable a more rapid escape from the camp – passwords that include being able to ask for relevant

immigration forms from DIMIA officials – are kept well guarded.[12] Baxter Immigration and Processing Centre, custom designed for the 'provision of higher levels of both security and amenity',[13] is located five hours north of Adelaide in the desert. It is surrounded by two tiers of 'energized fence', and contains a relentless arrangement of introspective buildings. While the official government website only describes the spatial arrangement of the camp in terms of its 'quality' infrastructure and services,[14] a refugee activist website, 'Baxter watch', provides witness accounts and testimony that describe the qualitative affect of the series of striated and disciplinary spaces that organize Baxter.[15] These witness accounts detail the modes in which the camp's compounds, corridors, thresholds, and so forth, are affectively inhabited. For instance, to travel from one designated segment of the camp to another, a detainee requires special permission. To meet with a detainee from another section of the building the detainee must arrange the meeting in advance and must then meet in the 'non-place', or sterile zone, of the visitor's centre. According to one testimony, no two security doors can be opened in the camp simultaneously. From within each compound the sky above is the only register of an outside world, as it is only the blind, windowless 'backs' of the compound buildings which are turned toward the surrounding desert.

The Australian nation-state thus operates as (what Deleuze and Guattari call) an 'apparatus of capture', which relies on an 'outside' (the desert, the sea) in order to define, delimit, and extend its territories in a striated manner. What's more, the nation-state creates a further 'outside', embedded in its very interior, by suspending the application of the penal code in the instance of the refugee camps. It has achieved this suspension because it has allowed the camps to be privately run by multinational companies[16] which regulate the camps according to their own rules in loose compliance with a government schedule,[17] and without the accountability and transparency normally required of state institutions. Thus the asylum seeker arrives from the outside, and must first be either rejected or assimilated into the sedentary State apparatus. If assimilated, the asylum seeker becomes the exemplary signifier of bare life – contained at the same time as being excluded – in order that the nation-state can better define its political arena.

The sea and the desert are thus the unruly smooth spaces which have fallen under surveillance and control. From the smooth space of the sea, to the smooth space of the desert, the body of the asylum seeker comes to be almost fully striated in the camp environment. And yet, despite being thoroughly striated, they are also emplaced such that all conditions of

belonging have been dismantled. Thus their claim to 'belonging as such' with no identifiable attributes, is the silent call that all the while haunts the State.

The space of the body

In Australia, the body of the asylum seeker is arranged in varying relationships to space, such that the body and space can be said to move in and out of zones of indiscernibility. Though traditional understandings of space describe it as a void, a container, an inert extensive medium in which bodies, whether animate or inanimate, are subsequently allowed to move, space should as well be conceived as zones of odour, shifts in degrees of temperature, as being proprioceptively responsive, that is to say, space is as much a qualitative as a quantitative condition; as much *spatium* as *extension*; as much smooth as striated. Though space can be measured, its quantifiable attributes do not entirely account for its multifarious and intensive affects. The body exfoliates in fits and starts like a developing embryo, a leg bud here, an arm bud there, for the body owns up to a complex relationship with space. The body is itself a space, composed in turn of so many caverns and voids, one engulfing and enfolding the other. Approaching the scale of the most minute molecules, it is possible to affirm that the body and space are composed of the same stuff. As Deleuze affirms in *The Fold*:

> matter thus offers an infinitely porous, spongy, or cavernous texture without emptiness, caverns endlessly contained in other caverns: no matter how small, each body contains a world pieced with irregular passages, surrounded and penetrated by an increasingly vaporous fluid, the totality of the universe resembling 'a pond of matter in which there exist different flows and waves'.[18]

The body is both fluid and hard, that is, elastic. The body too is pitted by holes, and can be seen to organize itself in fractal array in relation to space. In the socio-cultural and political milieu the body is constrained to greater or lesser degrees; it is more or less smoothed out or striated. It participates in trajectories of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, as the power relations into which it enters are more or less fluid or coagulated. The body becomes indiscernible from its trajectory through space and time.

When relations of power enact a repressive gesture on the space of the body it becomes increasingly striated, its movements and modes

of expression restricted. The body, after Deleuze's reading of Spinoza, enters into what can be called a bad composition, as distinct from a good composition, that is, it begins to decompose. Debilitating depression, suicide, self harm: these are the symptoms erupting from the midst of Australia's desert camps and off-shore detention facilities. Many of these symptoms could also be considered acts of resistance and protest. The least stratified body, according to Deleuze and Guattari, or the body most open to deterritorialization and lines of flight is the 'body without organs' (BwO), a term appropriated from Antonin Artaud. Deleuze and Guattari pointedly call the BwO *a* body, in much the same way that near the end of his life Deleuze will consider the question of *a* life. A body, a life, one not constrained by the definite article, but open intensively to a plane of immanence and composed of what Agamben calls 'whatever singularities', which claim no bond of belonging. This is not to say that the BwO cannot be caught up in bad decompositions, and devastating reterritorializations. To invent a body, to experiment with a body, the BwO and absolute deterritorialization, or pure immanence, offer us a limit condition, a field of potentially infinite movement. Deleuze insists, 'a life is the immanence of immanence, absolute immanence: it is complete power and complete bliss'.[19] Agamben refers to Deleuze's concept of absolute immanence as pertaining to a state of beatitude: to be blessed or in a state of bliss, such that one simply lets being be, rejecting all identity and every condition of belonging. An infinite speed travelled at the slow pace of resting oneself and simply letting things be. Each of our generic, mundane, or everyday organized bodies can participate in this absolute, limit condition body. A body, a life. Reading Leibniz, Deleuze explains, 'what I clearly express is what happens to my body',[20] and what's more, 'it is because we have a clear zone that we must have a body charged with travelling through it or exploring it, from birth to death'.[21] The body and soul correspond, and vibrate, one through the other, in a wondrous parallelism. While my generic body participates in the BwO, which I am forever attempting to attain, I will never quite achieve this state absolutely. We can never achieve absolute deterritorialization, nor absolute immanence (nor would we necessarily want to). Nonetheless, it is upon these fields that everything is played out.[22] Aspiring to the BwO, to absolute deterritorialization, or pure immanence, can offer us the promise of an ethical program for experimentation and the recipe for a possible life. I now turn to holey space and to the possibilities it might offer for such experimentation – with deterritorialization; with the BwO – through and within an otherwise stratified territory.

Holey space

Deleuze and Guattari tell us that striated space always operates in a complex relationship with smooth space. They write: 'smooth space is constantly being translated, transversed into a striated space; striated space is constantly being reversed, returned to a smooth space'.[23] The two registers of space only exist in mixture, which would appear to promise a way out for the asylum seeker after all. Deleuze and Guattari also draw attention to the importance of other forms of space, including holey space. They write: 'there are still other kinds of space that should be taken into account, for example, holey space and the way it communicates with the smooth and the striated in different ways'.[24] To extend the concept of holey space, they call on the geometrical operation of Benoit Mandelbrot's fractals: patterns that proliferate fractionally through relations of similarity across a scalar spectrum from the minute to the gigantic (consider the repeated patterns of snowflakes, or coastlines, apprehended at a series of different scales). As in smooth space, it's not so much a matter of joining the dots, as travelling the zigzag trajectory through one place, then another, and another. Likewise, geometrically, holey space is not properly volumetric, nor surface-like, nor linear, but always on the way to becoming one state or another. It can thus be called 'metamorphological'. As such, holey space registers the demand for a creative practice of 'hollowing out' regions of escape. Holey space is not as absolute as smooth space, and offers instead the possibility of *temporary* respite: a 'tent', 'holiday home' ('gîte'), or 'shelter'.[25] The personae of holey space include artisans, miners, and metallurgists who transpierce mountains and turn the earth into Swiss cheese. They are itinerants who move at an ambulatory pace following a flow of matter, or what Deleuze and Guattari call a 'machinic phylum'.[26] Holey space is composed of passages forged through smooth nomadic space and striated sedentary space without stopping at either one, as such, this mode of tunnelling promises surprising channels of communication between otherwise distantly located terrains. For instance, 'we must imagine less separate segments than a chain of mobile workshops constituting, from hole to hole, a line of variation, a gallery';[27] that is, a heterogeneous continuity of spaces.

An architecture of sorts begins to suggest itself that is similar to the topography Deleuze and Guattari discover in Franz Kafka's work. This is a topography in which 'two diametrically opposed points bizarrely reveal themselves to be in contact... two blocks on a continuous and unlimited line, with their doors far from each other, are revealed to have

contiguous back doors that make the blocks themselves contiguous'.[28] Finally these material journeys are as intensive as they are extensive, but they are always invented and, as such, constitute vital acts of creation despite the associated hardship. The flight of the refugee, the passages they must forge across world space, through one nation-state after another and across the watery domain of the sea, can be said to constitute such an act of creation of holey space.

Another exposition of what can be identified as holey space is undertaken by Brian Massumi's in *A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Here, the concept of holey space becomes that of 'derelict space'. Massumi explains his rendition of holey space, as: 'holes in habit, what cracks in the existing order appear to be from a molar [or striated] perspective. The site of a breach in the World As We Know It... the derelict space is a zone of indeterminacy that bodies-in-becoming may make their own'.[29] Massumi's holey space, or what he names derelict spaces, are autonomous zones that punctuate dominant political milieus. These zones, ranging from the ghetto to the delinquent's daydream, offer places of retreat and escape. Importantly, they are immanent to this world at the same time as being directed toward a future (Massumi calls his derelict spaces 'shreds of futurity').[30] Derelict spaces are powered by the forces of the virtual, which is crucial to every actualization. The challenge for the asylum seeker is how to pass on the inside as part of the striated, molar organization, at the same time as maintaining a derelict or holey space upon which the dominant order is not able to enforce its repressions absolutely.

Giorgio Agamben, who writes explicitly on the figure of the refugee, also describes a formation that might likewise be named holey space. His concerns are directly related to the structure of nation-states and the relationship of these to bare life, exemplified for him in the figure of the refugee. The challenge for the nation-state, Agamben argues, is to 'find the courage to call into question the very principle of the inscription of nativity and the holy trinity of state/nation/territory'.[31] He suggests a possible route: that of considering an arrangement of 'extraterritoriality', or better, he says, 'aterritoriality'. This aterritoriality is a space of refuge or exodus for all which is not based on a logic of 'belonging' according to the 'rights' of the citizen. It is a matter of inventing an alternative to the homogenous, national territory; an alternative that is topologically arranged so that it is pitted with holes of difference, a holey space, 'where exterior and interior are indeterminate', and where the spaces of States have become 'perforated and topologically transformed'.[32]

Such is Agamben's rendition of holey space, which accompanies his study of the figure of the refugee as a figure which breaks up the relationship between man and citizen, bare human life and political life. Bare life, or *zoe*, is distinct from the political life, or *bios*, of the citizen who claims allegiance to a nation-state. Bare life would appear to fall between the gaps of the State apparatus, but following Agamben's argument, with modernity, the insertion of bare life into the political realm has facilitated 'concrete ways in which power penetrates subjects' very bodies and forms of life'.[33] The promise of holey space offers a way out, a qualitative increase of power for the body in question in direct relation to local as distinct from global networks.[34] One should remain wary here, for it is already possible to see how zones of aterritoriality, such as those liminal zones in airports where the jurisdiction of the nation-state becomes momentarily ambiguous, even suspended, can be taken up as repressive mechanisms where bodies in transit can be managed by ever more stringent security checks.

In all of the above renditions of holey space, modes of resistance to dominant political apparatuses are suggested. Holey space facilitates the pace of a groping experimentation, stopping and starting again across a plane of immanence, in connection with local material conditions. As Deleuze and Guattari suggest, holey space follows flows of matter. Further 'holey spaces' can be found where Deleuze and Guattari develop their concept of the plane of immanence. 'Every plane', they tell us, 'is not only interleaved but holed, letting through the fogs that surround it, and in which the philosopher who laid it out is in danger of being the first to lose himself'.[35] The 'hole' is the place where shelter is sought, but also the pit-hole where one's bearings are lost, and within which the risk of capture and striation begins all over again. Holey space is not the unrestrained condition of smooth space, which demands movements of absolute deterritorialization, and pure immanence. Deleuze and Guattari explain that across smooth space 'life reconstitutes its stakes, confronts new obstacles, invents new paces, switches adversaries',[36] but only because it is complicated by striated space and pitted with holes. The limit case of potentiality would be pure and uninterrupted smooth space. But like absolute deterritorialization and pure immanence, such a transcendental necessity must always be immediately tied to an empirics. Nonetheless, the power of the absolute in Deleuze and Guattari's work is crucial, for it is this force that enables the construction of 'a real that is yet to come, a new type of reality', and a people to go with it; a coming community.[37] In this way,

the connective relationship between smooth and holey space can be understood to enable the composition of a people to come.

Conclusion

In the Australian geo-political context, a pressing contemporary problem circulates around the fact that the government has legislated to lawfully contain and detain those they have named 'asylum seekers'. This constitutes an exemplary and pressing contemporary problem. It is at the threshold of a life that an ongoing contest takes place between smooth and striated space. What holey space would seem to facilitate is possible shelter from this battle, a provisional place of escape and refuge, for the time being. More than this, holey space is suggestive of a creative movement, a forging of passages through space such that the body and its relationship to space can become transformed. In addition to real refuge, it might also be possible to begin to imagine an ethics – that is, what Deleuze describes as 'a typology of immanent modes of existence'[38] – as distinct from the transcendent values of morality. An everyday and immanent practice, not regulated by fixed rules, nor by codes of belonging (as distinct from belonging as such), but by qualitative differences such that we can begin to identify what is good and what is bad for us as well as others, or what conjoins us with, or separates us from a life.

Notes

1. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (French: 1980) Trans. B. Massumi (London: Athlone, 1987), pp. 474–500.
2. Ibid., p. 500.
3. Biopower is a term coined by French philosopher Michel Foucault in his 1979 lecture at the Collège de France, 'La naissance de la biopolitique' [The Birth of Biopolitics]. Biopolitics describes a shift in governmental practice that Foucault argues sought to rationalise problems associated with human populations, such as sanitation and birth rate. Foucault, M. 'The Birth of Biopolitics', in Foucault, M. *Ethics: The Essential Works of Foucault*, Trans. R. Hurley and others (London: Penguin, 1994), pp. 73–79.
4. Manne, R. & Corlett, D. 'Sending Them Home', *Quarterly Essay*, 13(2004) pp. 1–95, see p. 4.
5. Perera, S. 'What is a Camp?', *Borderlands e-journal*, 11(1)(2002), p. 8, accessed 25 November 2004 from: http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol11no1_2002/perera_camp.html.
6. Agamben, G. *State of Exception*, Trans. K. Attell (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 1.

7. Agamben, G. 'The Camp as the *Nomos* of the Modern', in Agamben, G. *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Trans. D. Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 166–180.
8. 'Baxter IRPC is an essential element in the Government's long term strategy for immigration detention facilities in respect of unauthorized boat arrivals. The facility allows a reduction on the reliance on older, less suitable facilities and enhance the focus to purpose designed facilities, to enable the provision of higher levels of both security and amenity'. Accessed 28 November 2004 from: www.immi.gov.au/detention/facilities_baxter.htm.
9. See Coombs, M. 'Excisions from the Migration Zone: Policy and Practice', in *Parliamentary Library, Department of Parliamentary Services, Research Note*, no. 42 (1 March 2004). Accessed 25 November 2004 from: http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rn/2003-04/04rn42.pdf.
10. The former Woomera Immigration Detention Centre, now 'moth-balled', the current, custom-built Baxter Immigration Detention Centre, both in South Australia, and the Curtin Immigration Reception and Processing Centre (CIRPC), in Western Australia, can be counted amongst the desert camps.
11. 'They say there are nine compounds, four in use and five empty. Two are for single men, one for families and one apparently for people of a particular religious group from Iran... You have to apply in writing for permission to visit other people and to visit the DIMIA office' (Report of life in Baxter from an eyewitness). Accessed 28 November 2004 from: http://www.baxterwatch.net.
12. 'You may be aware of screening out. This is considered a form of quarantine in the medical sense, where those who are untainted by knowledge are kept apart from those who know what legal rights are available to them'. Everitt, J. (lawyer and representative of asylum seekers), lecture presented to Refugee Action Committee Forum relaying information concerning her visits to Woomera IPRC, 10/4/2002. Accessed 19 July 2004 from: www.refugeeaction.org/inside/everitt.htm.
13. See www.immi.gov.au/detention/facilities_baxter.htm.
14. See http://www.immi.gov.au/managing-australias-borders/detention/facilities_baxter.htm.
15. See http://www.baxterwatch.net Google's last cache or snapshot of the site was taken 14 February 2006 06:05:37 GMT. The site appears to be no longer in existence. See, alternatively, http://www.refugeeaction.org.
16. In 2003, the Australian camps, formally managed by the privately owned ACM (Australasian Correctional Management), a subsidiary of the Wackenhut Corporation, based in Florida, USA, were taken over by Group 4 Falck Global Solutions Pty Ltd.
17. Provided by the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA).
18. Deleuze, G. *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (French: 1988) Trans. T. Conley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 5.
19. Deleuze, G. *Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life* (French: 1995/1965/1972) Trans. A. Boymen (New York: Zone Books, 2001), p. 27.
20. Deleuze, G. *The Fold*, op. cit., p. 99.
21. Ibid., p. 86.
22. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 151.
23. Ibid., p. 474.

24. Ibid., p. 500.
25. Ibid., p. 413.
26. Ibid., pp. 409 and 413.
27. Ibid., p. 415.
28. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature* (French: 1975) Trans. D. Polan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), p. 73.
29. Massumi, B. *A User's Guide to Capitalism & Schizophrenia* (Massachusetts: MIT, 1992), pp. 104–105.
30. Ibid., p. 105.
31. See Agamben, G. 'We Refugees', *Symposium,* 49(2)(1995) pp. 114–119.
32. Ibid.
33. Agamben, G. 'The Camp as the *Nomos* of the Modern', op. cit., p. 5.
34. See also Paul Patton's explanation of the different ways in which a body might increase its power, according to the quantitative model of the State apparatus, or the qualitative model of the nomadic war machine: Patton, P. *Deleuze and the Political* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 111.
35. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?* (French: 1991) Trans. G. Burchell and H. Tomlinson (London: Verso, 1994), p. 51.
36. Ibid., p. 500.
37. Ibid., p. 142.
38. Deleuze, G. *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* (French: 1970) Trans. R. Hurley (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1988), p. 23.

12

Microsociology and the Ritual Event

Kenneth Dean and Thomas Lamarre

The 'revival' of ritual activities in China after the Cultural Revolution seems to entail a paradox: that which is typically placed under the sign of tradition in opposition to the modern has now become prominent under modernization and in conjunction with global capital.[1] This paradox is the effect of a crude historical ordering (premodern, modern, postmodern or late modern) that collapses in the context of these ritual activities. To understand the co-existence and potential co-operation of ritual and capital in contemporary southeast China, we work through Deleuze's discovery of a microsociology at the heart of Tarde's monad-based sociology. Microsociology calls attention to the effectuation of multiple worlds (monads) in the ritual event.

Theorizing ritual

Several hundred villages in Putian county of Fujian Province lie on an alluvial plain that gathers into an estuary. Over the centuries, irrigation networks have made cooperation and competition between villages possible, as riziculture and other agrarian practices held in common generated a degree of regional coherence, which is doubled by a kind of socio-cultural coherence. As various dynasties of the Middle Kingdom expanded and centralized, ritual hierarchies and other courtly practices were imposed upon localities, with so many layers of mediation that even today, in the context of ritual practices and festivals, it would be impossible to say what is local or regional and what is imperial or national.

In light of the diverse institutional frameworks that organize this region (irrigation networks, political parties and government, temple organizations), ritual practices might appear as a kind of subjective glue

holding things together. This is, in fact, a common approach to ritual – or, more specifically, a common Durkheimian or Cartesian approach – which situates a village festival or ritual event in terms of an overarching or underlying social order. This was also, in effect, the imperial dynastic opinion of ritual: ritual was to mediate and soothe out the tensions between competing practices and institutional registers, while re-hierarchizing them aesthetically. Ritual here, at an extreme, becomes nothing in itself. Instead it is *of* everything else. And in a structuralist framework, it is on the verge of becoming a sort of ubiquitous originary absence.[2]

If we submit on the contrary that ritual *is* something, it is not only because we are struck by the tremendous collective energies unleashed in ritual events. (What is this commitment to spontaneity? Is it merely a valve to let off potentially revolutionary energies?) If we insist that ritual *is* something, it is also because we see the pitfalls of a structuralist approach in which there is an originary indetermination that can only be displaced.

Deleuze's concept of microsociology seems to us particularly promising in the study of ritual activities in southeast China. This is first because those ritual activities have typically been construed in exceedingly Durkheimian terms – as a site of imposition of social facts, of the reproduction of the social, as a site of elimination of difference – from which the articulation of local differences or autonomies always appears tenuous at best. By the very terms of this model, local difference is fated to capitulate to the imperial center, with its quasi-Cartesian Confucian order. In other fields, there exist other accounts of ritual activities that stress the spontaneous emergence of practices as well as a thoroughgoing renegotiation of the social order, but the general sociological bias to the study of Northeast Asia is geared largely to the reinscription of immutable national or proto-national identities. This bias is due to a legacy of modernization theory in the formation of area studies; a legacy which is entrenched and unexamined.

Because microsociology thinks the social from the angle of the event, it foregoes the dubious logic of modernization theory, in which the duality of *individual* and *society* is transposed onto that of *modernity* and *tradition*, and in which the modern individual is understood to struggle against the constraints of traditional society in an attempt to Westernize and modernize (an attempt that is preordained to fail no matter how far modernization advances). While the refusal to question modernization theory appears most virulent in the context of area studies, it is not unusual for philosophers – even those thinkers schooled in the

very philosophies of difference that issued a challenge to modernization – to replicate it as soon as they step out of the Western enclave. And so we think it crucial to insist on the ways in which a Deleuzian microsociology parts company with the assumptions of modernization theory. Microsociology also holds out promise because it allows us to think ritual activities in terms of the 'differently different' – or, to reprise Deleuze's citation of Tarde: that difference 'which opposes nothing and which serves no purpose'.[3] Such a non-oppositional and non-utilitarian thinking of difference in ritual activities suggests a general economy based primarily not on modes of production but on expenditure. As such, we encounter basic questions about the relation between festival and capital.[4]

Microsociology

Deleuze's discussion of an historical crisis in psychology – that of overcoming the duality of image and movement – might well be applied to sociology and social theory. Traditionally in psychology, images were placed in consciousness, and movements in space. But how to pass from one order to the other? How, asks Deleuze, 'can movement be prevented from already being at least a virtual image, and the image from already being at least possible movement?'[5] Deleuze writes of two very different authors who strove to overcome the duality of image and movement, each with his war cry: 'all consciousness is consciousness *of* something (Husserl), or more strongly, all consciousness *is* something (Bergson)'.[6]

An analogous problem cropped up in social theory, that of a duality of regulation and innovation – of fixed positions and transformations, of institutions and creation – which has also been described in terms of a general tension or debate between Cartesianism and 'spontaneity'.[7] How to explain the fact that regulations and social institutions can produce innovations, or that innovation and creation can generate fixed positions? The dilemma rested on the status of the human individual in relation to society. Two thinkers appeared with radically different ideas about the relation between the individual and society: Durkheim and Tarde. Durkheim posited social facts as exterior to the individual – imposed on the individual through a sort of constraint – and, as a result, excluded psychology from sociology. Thus for Durkheim, the individual psyche is *nothing*, or, more specifically, the mind is always *of* a social action, to wit, of a Cartesian striving for social order. In contrast, for Tarde, 'every thing is a society, every phenomenon is a social fact',[8] even the mind. Psychology thus is central to sociology, and social action

emerges from the spontaneous imitation of beliefs and desires. The mind *is* a social action.

This is surely one point of departure for thinking a Deleuzian social theory: varieties of an 'action-mind' analogous to the concept of the movement-image which he develops in *Cinema 1*.[9] But one would have to take care to distinguish a socio-philosophy of the action-mind from a psychological study of the 'intermental' aspects of the individual, that is, the individual insofar as other individuals influence it. This is a common take on Tarde. Yet, as Deleuze remarks in an extended footnote, 'it is completely wrong to reduce Tarde's sociology to a psychologism or even an interpsychology... [w]hat Tarde inaugurates is a microsociology, which is not necessarily concerned with what happens between individuals but with what happens within a single individual'.[10] Crucial to a microsociology that would avoid psychologism is an understanding of the individual as a monad, much as announced in Tarde's *Monadologie et Sociologie*.[11]

Tarde draws his inspiration for the monad from Leibniz who invented it in response to an untenable duality in Descartes' physics: a resolute division of matter and soul, or objects and subjects. Descartes argued that the essence of matter is spatial extension, and that all of a body's properties are modes of spatial extension. Or, as William James puts it: 'Descartes for the first time defined thought as the absolutely unextended, and later philosophers have accepted the description as correct'.[12] Leibniz argued that matter must have some non-geometrical properties. It cannot consist of merely being extended, because there must be something to be extended or simultaneously and continuously repeated. Leibniz worked against the dualisms generated in the physical sciences. He could not accept analyses that divide reality in two different kinds of entities – matter and spirit/mind/soul, or matter and energy/force. The monad is his solution, for the monad (unlike the atom of classical physics) is not indivisible, nor does it introduce a division between matter and mind.

It remained to Tarde to take the monad into the emerging science of sociology as a way to move past its dead-end dualisms. To address sociological problems, Tarde significantly altered Leibniz's monads, arriving at a conceptualization of monads as intensive (non-physical, that is, mental), self-differentiating, open-ended unities. For Tarde, monads are involved in *coordinating* that which he understood as 'societies' or 'assemblages' – including those operating at all levels from the subatomic through the biological to larger social groups such as armies and monasteries. He attributed to monads activity, appetite, and desire, as

well as a sense of self-consistency (belief) and a particular perspective (point of view, perception). While some monads coordinate or even dominate other monads, Tarde sustained Leibniz's commitment to think the infinitesimal and thus avoided recourse to a duality of external social facts and internal psychological states.[13]

While Deleuze does not evoke the monad as such in his brief account of Tarde, he situates him in the tradition of Leibniz and speaks of infinitesimals. For Deleuze, there is no opposition between an individual human monad and a society or collective. Rather, an individual and society emerge together, and what looks like the psychic state of an individual turns out to be an integration/differentiation of small social variations. Deleuze provides a gloss on two examples from Tarde: 'hesitation understood as "infinitesimal social opposition", or invention as "infinitesimal social adaptation"'.[14] Deleuze reprises Tarde's criticism of Durkheim, noting that Durkheim assumes what must be explained, namely, 'the similarity of thousands of men'.[15] Whence their similarity? Tarde finds laws of imitation, invention, and opposition that are ontologically prior to social hierarchies and imposition of social facts. Deleuze stresses this ontological priority by insisting on a *micro*-sociology: if one reads the laws of imitation sociologically, at the same level as institutions, one completely misses out on molecular movement.[16] This is what it means to look at ritual practices *micro*-sociologically: one attends to the microsociological categories of imitation, adaptation, and opposition.

In sum, Deleuze's comments on Tarde, in conjunction with his work on Leibniz and the movement-image, suggest to us a microsociology that deals with the individual as a monad, looking at it in terms of infinitesimal social variation. Because the monad effectively goes beyond a duality of individual psyche and social action, we have suggested the term 'action-mind' for this microsociological player. As awkward as the term action-mind may be, it seems to us important to retain some sense of the psyche or mind, even in the most generalized sense (all social facts, all things, are potentially minds), not in order to sustain psychology or to centre philosophy on the subject, but in order to allow room for some account of the historical emergence of subjects and thus of power formations.[17] In the present theoretical sketch of the ritual event, we hope to make clear that the action-minds brought into play in ritual events in southeast China might tactically accrue subjective technologies.

Varieties of action-mind

What does it mean to see the ritual event in terms of performative monads, rather than in terms of the mediation of institutions? If we

consider what is deemed the crucial and central action of ritual activities and festivities in villages in southeast China – the summoning of the deity from the temple, usually to partake of the feast and thus to confirm the villages' productivity – we now have eyes and ears for the micro-monad or action-mind. We thus note first that the deity has a double or multiple personality. Deities often harbor contradictory personality traits, which allows them to share a trait or two with duplicitous deities in neighboring villages. The deity's mind thus acts in more than one place at the same time. What is more, deities are poised between earth and some other celestial realm. And the hesitation of the deity to come forth from the temple, all the efforts to cajole and usher it out, can be understood in terms of infinitesimal social opposition. The deity, its action-mind, integrates the small variations of opposition in the social order – across villages, within a village, between village and cosmos.

At this first level of Tarde's philosophy, Deleuze notes 'three fundamental categories which govern all phenomena: repetition, opposition, adaptation'.[18] It is worth citing Deleuze's account of it in full:

> Opposition... is only the figure by means of which a difference is distributed throughout repetition in order to limit it and to open up a new order or a new infinity: for example, when the parts of life are opposed in pairs, it renounces any indefinite growth or multiplication in order to form limited wholes. Nevertheless, life thereby attains an infinity of another kind, a different sort of repetition: that of generation.[19]

In other words, at this level, difference serves repetition, and the result is the limitation of the whole that diminishes multiplication and puts it in the service of generation: a limited kind of multiplication. This is, in effect, what the deity does. Despite the potential in its multiple personality for infinite connections within and among villages, the deity tends to settle into opposed pairs of traits (in the almost archetypal fashion beloved of Jung[20] – small yet big, earthly yet divine, benevolent yet malign). Thus it forms a limited whole that is almost, but not exactly, synonymous with its village. Its force of cosmological multiplication (a deity that potentially harbors all deities within it) turns into a force of generation for the village. This is a largely agrarian sense of generation or of 'semination' – the prolixity of grains, domestic beasts and male offspring. So it is that the limitation of multiplication to generation/semination confirms the deity's role in bestowing its blessing on the village's productivity. Of course, the deity must hesitate, if it is to

integrate social opposition into the collective of the ritual event, infinitesimally.

Deleuze is well aware that there is something conservative at this level of Tarde's philosophy, for it is that at which Tarde sees 'imitation as the repetition of an innovation'.[21] In the context of ritual, this means that the mass of participants are seen simply to imitate the innovations of some great innovator. Consequently, Deleuze calls attention to 'a deeper level' of Tarde's philosophy, at which 'it is repetition which serves difference'.[22] This is also the level at which Tarde turns away from 'impersonal givens or the Ideas of great men' in favor of 'the little ideas of little men'.[23] For Deleuze, this becomes a matter of 'little inventions and interferences between imitative currents'.[24]

This encourages us to turn from the deity to the experience of the ritual event. In a prototypical ritual event in a Putian village, as a prelude to summoning forth the deity in the temple, Taoist and Three-in-One ritual specialists form two groups in the courtyard before the temple. They set up portable altars in accordance with ritual prescriptions and begin to dance and gallop between and around the altars in cosmological configurations. The carefully prepared and overcoded space is designed to prevent a chaotic, undirected release of the force of the deity as it tentatively and hesitantly leaves its perch in the temple. The idea is to harness and guide that cosmological force.

Such a controlled relation to cosmological forces we will refer to as *sheng*,[25] for it evokes self-cultivation, sageliness, and hierarchical codes. In terms of the practices of ritual masters and specialists, *sheng* implies controlled processes of self-transformation – techniques of visualization, the recitation of 'secret' mantra, performance of mudras (hand gestures enacted so fluidly and rapidly as to blur distinctions between signs), and choreography – all of which lead to identification with a divinity in a stepwise, encoded fashion. At the same time, *sheng* works within hierarchical overcoding and carefully decodes signs in order to move upward in the hierarchical ladder. The creation of zones of indistinction allows the movement to attain a higher level of coding – until the point that one reaches the divinity itself. *Sheng* thus entails a process of sensory-motor experimentation not unlike what Tarde thinks of as invention, or what Deleuze refers to as: 'infinitesimal social adaptation'.[26]

The question of *sheng* is whether it attains the depth for which it aims. Like adaptation, *sheng* can be understood as 'the figure by means of which the repetitive currents meet and become integrated into superior repetitions'.[27] For *sheng* elaborately arranges out insides and outsides – hierarchical concentric circles – with the deity or deities at the pinnacle.

The image is one of infinite ascent, a mountain whose peak vanishes into the sky, like that of deities within the temple. The devices of *sheng* suggest an esoteric approach to religious experience insofar as they imply that: while in theory, anyone can undertake the intensive training needed to attain identification with the deity, in practice, few are capable of such austerities, and very few reach the highest point, the summit, or deity. At this level, *sheng* might appear to occlude a deeper experience of difference, precisely because, as the figure of adaptation, 'difference appears between two kinds of repetition, and each repetition presupposes a difference of the same degree as itself'.[28]

At the same time, insofar as *sheng* is a figure of sensory-motor experimentation that *integrates* the bodily adaptations of the practitioner, *sheng* implies not only adaptation but also invention, and invention is, in turn, *infinitesimal* social adaptation. Simply put, there is an effect of mise-en-abyme with *sheng* (an infinite sequence of repetitions of the image within the image): because the deity at the pinnacle is ultimately multiple, the practitioner cannot simply ascend to the peak; the adept must simultaneously move sideways, eccentrically, toward potentially infinite centers. *Sheng* thus generates a finite area with infinite surface; a cosmological fractal.[29] Nonetheless, because *sheng* makes the relation between finite and infinite appear manageable and controllable, it easily betrays its 'depth' (infinitesimal adaptation) in favor of a simple adaptive process. Surely this is why esoteric approaches often have such an easy relation with the powers at hand, and with state formations.

At the other extreme is what we call *ling*,[30] best exemplified in spirit possession, that is, possession by a deity or demon, which involves trance, loss of self, spontaneous and uncontrolled bodily movements, and speaking in the voices of gods. *Ling* appears to be all depth. Yet its depth comes not from a simple outside, nor is it an inner depth (interiority) in relation to *sheng*. Rather, it recalls the 'inside of the outside' evoked in Deleuze's discussion of Foucault.[31] The loss of self in trance, for instance, implicates an inside deeper than interiority; one that is also ecstatic (opening to outside), with limbs twitching and tongues speaking in response to the deities' passage. *Ling* might be thought of as a radical scrambling of all the material and sensory paraphernalia of esoteric practices. It is reminiscent of exoteric approaches to religious experience, in which: no particular training is needed since the deity already resides within you, but, as a consequence, there is no guarantee where or when (or even if) the deity will happen to you. Basically, *ling* says: 'Every step up the mountain looks the same, so how do you know what step you are at? Any step might be *the* step.' And indeed the trances of *ling* make the

first step and the pinnacle indistinguishable. Trances impart automatic identification with the gods, which arrives as automatism, as tics and twitches and babble.

The apparently automatic diffusion of states of ecstatic trance throughout a crowd at ritual events suggests that, in terms of social variation, *ling* is a matter of diffusion. Deleuze refers to 'diffusion as repetition of perturbation', which sits well with *ling*. At one level, *ling* can presuppose a repetition of a difference (a perturbation that arrives as twitch and babble) of the same degree as itself, resulting in an apparently preordained diffusion of the faith from person to person. At another level, *ling* is sensory-motor perturbation as infinitesimal social diffusion: radically non-hierarchized integration; a decidedly utopian and anarchic action-mind. While *ling* may appear closer to what Deleuze calls 'the deeper level' at which 'repetition serves difference', we should note, in our micro-monadological way, that *ling* could also be understood as a 'shallower' process of diffusion. At an extreme, *ling* could border on proselytism (something endemic to exoteric sects, it would seem). Generally, popular ritual activity in rural China does not concern itself with the transmission of articles of faith, but with kinds of ritual action as addressed to multifarious groupings of local deities, and so proselytism per se is not an issue. Nonetheless implicit in *ling* is a making-similar that may not confine itself to automatism.

In sum, if we adopt Deleuze's suggestions for the transformation of Tarde's monadology into a microsociology (rather than sociology), we are invited to think the ritual event in terms of monadic action-minds. Above, we sketched three varieties of action-mind: (1) hesitation and duplicity of the deity as infinitesimal social opposition; (2) sensory-motor experimentation as infinitesimal social adaptation, or *sheng*; and (3) perturbation in trance-like experiences as infinitesimal social diffusion, or *ling*. Surely there are many others.

What interests us about the ritual event is its evocation of many action-minds at once. Not only do the ritual specialists and spirit mediums in the course of the many days of a ritual event move between *sheng* and *ling* action-minds, but also, as the deity emerges from the temple and circulates through the village, different performative monads appear at different locations and at differing speeds. In addition to *sheng* and *ling*, a variety of performative nodes spring up around ritual objects, such as the incense burner or the palaquin, or even around the operas and puppet dramas that occur in conjunction with the ritual event. It is possible to perceive and experience the entire ritual event from one of these nodes. Some villagers are there for the opera, others

to ogle the crowd or to eat, while others arrive to entreat the deities. In other words, the ritual event comprises a variety of different monadic viewing positions (simultaneous but non-synchronous). Simply put, action-minds, as monads, are 'possible worlds', and the ritual event generates multiple possible worlds.

Here we confront the most perplexing and important question of the ritual event, which follows directly from Deleuze's encounter with Leibniz. Are these compossible or incompossible worlds? What is the relation between monadic worlds? Does the ritual event conjure up a transcendent or metaphysical point of view that guarantees the truth of all these possible worlds and their interrelations?

Incompossible worlds

Because different action-minds and performative nodes of the ritual event perceive some parts of the event more distinctly and other parts more obscurely, they resonate with Leibniz's monadic worlds: each has its truth, and as such, one faces the problem of the relation between different truths. As Lazzarato notes, Tarde complicates this problem considerably, for Tarde sees monads as open. Lazzarato writes: 'monads interpenetrate each other reciprocally in place of being exterior to one another'.[32] With respect to perception, we again see the action-mind as infinitesimal variation, as a differential relation between various layers of thought (not only the conscious and the unconscious). This opens thought to what might be called a transcendental field of pre-individual singularities.[33] This is certainly true of the monadic action-minds of the Putian ritual: *sheng* and *ling* interpenetrate each other reciprocally, resulting in other differential relations. Nonetheless, as Deleuze remarks, the concept of temporality implied by multiple worlds (even if co-penetrating as in Tarde's model) presents a problem for the notion of truth, because, at every event, time bifurcates into different temporalities with incompossible truths.[34]

Confronted with this problem, Leibniz resorted to an overall view – that of God – which lets you know whether you are in one world or another. Similarly, in the ritual event, one might refer to the deities in order to say, 'I didn't see the ritual masters summon the deities, but I know this took place, and so my experience is relative to that overall truth'. So long as the deities provide some kind of overall view, the ritual event can imply a supreme or all-gathering witness or celestial realm. Such a view of the ritual event, however, repeats the aristocratic stance that so often mars Tarde's sociology: everything moves from the top

down, from the great innovator to the masses, from a god-like creator to the worlds. It also places difference at the service of repetition: the difference between action-minds becomes homogeneous, implying pre-established harmony among them. Deleuze's extrication of a microsociology at the heart of Tarde's sociology bids us to turn to a deeper level at which repetition: 'is what enables us to pass from one order of difference to another... [r]epetition, therefore, is not the process by which difference is augmented and diminished, but the process by which it "goes on differing" and "takes itself as its end" '.[35] It is a 'difference "which opposes nothing and which serves no purpose", which is "the final end of all things" '.[36] Or, in the relation to the ritual event: 'This is the apparent paradox of festivals: they repeat the unrepeatable'.[37]

The ritual event is always a matter of the 'differently different'.[38] At one level – as a whole or an *all* – the ritual event effectuates worlds. The ritual event is the repetition of a differential (polyphony), which lends itself to social reproduction when polyphony (its anarchy) appears in the guise of social variation. At a deeper level, however – as a differential, as polyphony – the ritual event is infinitesimal world effectuation.[39] As such, the ritual event offers a way to rethink its own importance in contemporary China. For in the ritual event we perceive the potential autonomy of the multiple worlds at once integrated and differentiated. These multiple worlds are not relative truths of an overarching Truth (God). They are instead like the parallel universes of science fiction. One might, for instance, conjure up a parallel universe in which the Cultural Revolution did not take place. This idea of parallel universes, however, sustains a notion of Truth (despite its temporal diversity) if it boils down to a matter of knowing which universe you are in: the one with the Cultural Revolution or the one without it. Ritual activities in southeast China occur in the universe in which the Cultural Revolution both happened and did not happen. Their revival in conjunction with globalization is only a paradox in appearance, in accordance with an ideology, a Truth, of socio-economic development that can no longer be sustained. Ritual activities ask us to rethink the temporality of capital.

The microsociological perspective sketched out here provides a good point of departure for rethinking the problem of ritual and capital, for it leads us to an understanding of the ritual event as an effectuation of worlds. It is at the effectuation of worlds that the problem of ritual intersects that of capital. Working with Tarde's sociology, Deleuze's philosophy and Negri's analysis of capital, Lazzarato calls attention to an effectuation of worlds at the heart of capitalism that is

ontologically prior to modes of production. He sees capitalism in this way precisely because he adopts a sort of micro-economic perspective: he addresses transformations in capital that reputedly have, at least in certain sectors, inverted the priority of macroeconomics and microeconomics. In addition, he thinks through Negri's theorization of labor power as a constituent force (an ontologically prior creativity) in contrast to labor. The result is a non-utilitarian theory of an effectuation of worlds (labor power) ontologically prior to modes of production (labor), which meshes nicely with a non-utilitarian philosophy of monads (world effectuation) ontologically prior to the subject.

It is here that we see the possibility in Deleuze of a social theory of capital unlike the one laid out in *A Thousand Plateaus*. This socio-political theory of capital would begin with a microsociology derived from monadology. And the ritual event would become *the* crucial event for such a theory, precisely because the infinitesimal world effectuation of the ritual event asks us to think differently from capital but not oppositionally. It bids us to consider the differently different between capital and ritual. For the ritual event is not simply an obstacle to the movement of capital, nor a contradiction within it. As Lazzarato puts it: 'How to understand concepts of labor, production, cooperation and communication when capitalism is not only a mode of production but *a production of worlds?*'[40] The promise of a microsociology of contemporary ritual activities in southeast China lies in the attention it calls to an infinitesimal world effectuation. This in turn opens not only into questions about technologies of the subject, but also to an articulation of microeconomic exchanges that are, by virtue of being ontologically prior to modes of production, open to socio-historical transformations other than via capital.

Notes

1. See Dean, K. & Lamarre, T. 'Ritual Matters', in Lamarre, T. & Nae-hui, K. (Eds) *Traces 3: Impacts of Modernities* (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press, 2003), pp. 257–294. See also: Dean, K. *Taoist Ritual and Popular Cults of Southeast China* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Dean, K. *Lord of the Three in One: The Spread of a Cult in Southeast China* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
2. This might lead to an incorrect way of thinking the virtual in Deleuze. In *The Site of the Social*, for instance, Theodore Schatzki construes Deleuze and Guattari's account of social assemblages and the problem of the virtual entirely in structuralist terms, positing the virtual as a pre-existent (yet unfortunately in his opinion not causal) structuration that is unfolded in actualization or substantialization. But, much in the way that Bakhtin argues that there are

no pre-existent linguistic structures, Deleuze makes clear that the virtual is not a pre-existent structure in seed form. Actualization of the virtual is akin to a performative utterance that makes and unmakes its rules and structures. Surely this is also why Deleuze wishes to align the monad with the nomad: let there be no mistaking the monad for an originary indetermination in the structuralist sense.

3. Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition* (French: 1968) Trans. P. Patton (London: Athlone, 1994), pp. 312–313, n. 3.
4. Here we not only sense a possible affinity between Bataille and Deleuze-Tarde but also a dialogue with such thinkers as Lefebvre and Bakhtin. While we will not have the opportunity in this chapter to explore these thinkers or their take on festival and capital in detail, we wish nonetheless to indicate some of the other possible inflections of microsociology.
5. Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., p. 56.
6. Deleuze, G. *Cinema 1: The Movement Image* (French: 1983) Trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), p. 56.
7. Clark, T. 'Introduction', in Clark, T. (Ed.) *Gabriel Tarde on Communication and Social Influence* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 8.
8. Tarde, G. *Monadologie et Sociologie*, Oeuvres de Gabriel Tarde, vol. 1 (Paris: Institut Synthélabo, 1999), p. 58.
9. Deleuze, G. *Cinema 1*, op. cit.
10. Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., pp. 312–313, n. 3.
11. Tarde, G. *Monadologie et Sociologie*, op. cit.
12. James, W. *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (Mineola: Dover Publications, 2003), p. 16.
13. For an account of the infinitesimal, see Smith, D. 'Deleuze on Leibniz: Difference, Continuity, and the Calculus', in Smith, D. (Ed.) *Current Continental Theory and Modern Philosophy* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2006), pp. 127–147.
14. Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., pp. 312–313, n. 3.
15. Ibid.
16. Microsociology also resonates with the Foucault whose microhistories situated subjective technologies and bodies as ontologically prior to modes of production in order to remap modernity.
17. Although we place greater emphasis on questions of subjectivity, we would not want to foreclose some affinities with Latour's 'actor network theory'. See Latour, B. *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
18. Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., pp. 312–313, n. 3.
19. Foucault, M. 'The Subject and Power', Afterword in Dreyfus, H. & Rabinow, P. (Eds) *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982).
20. Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., pp. 312–313, n. 3.
21. Ibid.
22. Jung, C. 'The Psychology of the Child Archetype', in Jung, K. *Essays on a Science of Mythology* (New York: Pantheon, 1949), pp. 70–100.
23. Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., pp. 312–313, n. 3.
24. Ibid.

25. Sheng, sometimes translated as sacred, holy, saint, or sage, is a term drawn from Chinese religious and philosophic discourses. The term often appears in the titles of gods worshipped in Putian temples. For further discussion of this concept, see Dean, K. & Lamarre, T. 'Ritual Matters', op. cit.
26. Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., pp. 312–313, n. 3.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. As in multiple deities of mandala: although hierarchized, they communicate eccentrically via color and tone.
30. Ling, sometimes translated as numinous, efficacious, spirit or sprite, is a term drawn from Chinese religious and philosophic discourses. The term often appears in the titles of gods worshipped in Putian temples. For further discussion of this concept, see Dean, K. & Lamarre, T. 'Ritual Matters', op. cit.
31. Deleuze, G. *Foucault* (French: 1986) Trans. S. Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 120.
32. Lazzarato, M. *Les revolutions du capitalisme* (Paris: Éditions les Empêcheurs de penser en rond, 2004), p. 34.
33. See again: Smith, D. 'Deleuze on Leibniz', op. cit., pp. 127–147.
34. Deleuze, G. *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (French: 1988) Trans. T. Conley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 62.
35. Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., pp. 312–313, n. 3.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., p. 1.
38. In the light of microsociology, the deity is what Deleuze calls 'crowned anarchy' (Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., pp. 41 and 224), or elsewhere, 'sociability whose transcendental object would be anarchy' (p. 167).
39. Space does not permit us in this context to discuss in full why we think it better to discuss this combination of crowned anarchy and polyphony in terms of metastable states. For a fuller account, see Dean, K. & Lamarre, T. 'Ritual Matters', op. cit.
40. Lazzarato, M. 'From Capital-Labour to Capital-Life', in *Ephemera*, 4(3)(2004), p. 187.

Part IV
Global Schizophrenia

13

Indigenous Peoples and a Deleuzian Theory of Practice

Simone Bignall

The process of reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples around the world remains an unfinished business. In contemporary Australian discourses of Reconciliation, 'indigeneity' has tended to become aligned with 'inequality' and 'disadvantage'. Furthermore, the act of reconciliation itself is posited as a causal ideal that progresses the Australian community towards postcolonial unified social harmony. These discourses, and the policies that are informed by them,[1] act to reinforce dominant representations of Indigenous Australians as 'lacking', 'disadvantaged', 'victims', or even 'disruptive' and 'divisive'; representations which supported the emergence of colonial power relations in the first place. They also support the ideal of a final social unity, which necessarily posits an end to history and ultimately eliminates the need for critique.

Such discourses are based on a dialectical model of social transformation – a model which finds an early expression in Hegel's ontology and philosophy of history and extends through Marxist social theory. This model is based on particular conceptions of difference and history. Difference is represented negatively, as the opposing class in a binary relation which is negative by virtue of its lack in relation to a standard. Difference thus becomes thought of as a state of being which is measurable by degrees of inequality or disadvantage, and the 'solution' necessarily becomes the elimination of inequality or disadvantage by the reduction of degrees of difference. Difference is treated as a problem and proposed solutions aim to reduce difference by creating unity as a basis for equality. History, in the dialectic model, is seen as representing the gradual unfolding of a rational organization of society; with social agency consisting in the collective effort to describe and realize this rational end. On this view, transformative action can be evaluated as

progressive when it moves society towards an ideal state of perfect and rational consensus, reflected in social organization. The ideal functions as a transcendent, final cause of social action, which draws history inexorably towards completion, and society towards agreement and unity. Transformation thus proceeds by the progressive elimination of difference, with the simultaneous expansion of an encompassing unity. In Australia, Reconciliation is a causal ideal that draws the nation towards postcolonial social harmony.

Despite its imperial attitude towards difference and history, this dialectical philosophical tradition forms the basis of much postcolonial[2] theory. Policies and practices of transformative action informed by this body of theory have often been constrained by its assumptions about difference and identity, critique, negation and causation. In this chapter I argue that this model is a misguided basis for postcolonial theory (and practice), which on the contrary, ought to celebrate and affirm difference at every level. I will suggest that postcolonial theory needs an alternative or a supplementary, *positive* notion of difference as a basis for thinking about critical agency. In this context, the significance of Deleuze's philosophy lies in his insistence that there are (at least) two notions of difference – *differentiation* and *differenciation* – which dialectical philosophy falsely reduces to a single concept.[3] Deleuze's *different/ciation* affirms an alternative, non-dialectical process of development and transformation, and is based upon an absolutely positive notion of difference. In this chapter I explore the ways in which this philosophy of transformation can usefully inform practical critiques of colonialism and the construction of postcolonial societies. In particular, I examine the notion of agency carried within this tradition of philosophy, and the ways in which it describes a form of reflexive subjectivity that can be receptive to the kinds of possibilities and ethical responsibilities faced by agents in sustaining multicultural, postcolonial societies.

Negation

The capacity to problematize an existing social structure (colonialism) is perhaps the first step in a process of collective social analysis and directed transformation. This critical capacity relies upon a concept of difference which raises the possibility of 'thinking otherwise'. The existence of potential alternatives to established ways of being unsettles assumptions about received truth, calls into question the habitual 'rightness' of social practices, and disrupts the apparent 'given-ness' of existing social worlds. An adequate philosophy of active social transformation thus requires an

element of negating or critical agency (aimed at the existing, problematic structure) and an element of positive or constructive agency (aimed at producing a preferred structure, which does not yet exist). Difference thereby lies at the heart of critique. However, the way difference is itself conceptualized shapes the way a problem is defined and so also sets parameters for the sorts of critical actions that may be taken in response to the perceived problem.

In the dominant tradition of dialectical critical philosophy, difference is conceptualized as a relation of contradiction or opposition between two bodies or classes.[4] However, only one of these classes is thought to 'have' difference: one class is defined as different in relation to a first class, which thereby becomes the positive standard according to which the difference of the contesting class is measured. This measuring of difference results in perceived degrees of inequality or disadvantage calculated as deviance from the standard. Difference is a negative position; a 'not-', an inequality or a disadvantage, defined in relation to a primary and positive norm.

It is this negative character which gives difference its critical force in a dialectical process of transformation. As a 'negative', difference is an absence or lack that disturbs the claimed perfection, unity or completeness of a supposed representative standard of reality or social life. Diana Coole writes: 'To invoke negativity is thus to exhort political intervention while already performing a political act: it destabilizes illusions of perfection, presence and permanence by associating the positive with petrified and illegitimate structures of power'.[5] In addressing the negative, we confront 'that which is not', and implicitly *why* it is not, and perhaps also how it might become (positive/present). The negative is therefore characterized by its critical opposition to the positive, to the given, to the identity or standard form of being which has presence or factual dominance. Difference is 'the negative in general', and is a source of critical agency.[6] 'Negation' refers to the active moment of critique, to resistance and the transgression of 'that which is'. The privileging of negativity is therefore also a privileging of difference, and negation is an act that calls attention to difference.

At face value, this strategy of dialectical negation does not seem problematic for postcolonial theory and the politics of Reconciliation. However, the association of negativity and difference results in an ambiguous theory of practice. Difference is reified as the compelling or causal force of critical transformation, but simultaneously treated as the problematic absence, lack or disadvantage that must be eventually resolved or dissolved, as society reconciles its differences and forges unity

and equality.[7] The association of negativity and difference is particularly complicated by slippage in the signification of the terms. 'Difference' signifies not only 'transformative potential' but also 'inequality'.

In this schema, difference has a critical function, since it signifies where and how the social ideal of unity is failing. It describes a certain lack of coherence, which makes it the critical force of transformation: difference compels the process of history by negating the perfection of the present. However, the realization of social unity comes about when the contesting or negating difference is able to be assimilated within a greater unity. The dialectic of history thus progresses by eliminating and assimilating difference: it is characterized by a movement from conflict to harmony, multiplicity to unity, or difference to identity.

Different/ciation

Following an alternative philosophical tradition, including Duns Scotus, Spinoza and Bergson, Deleuze argues that the 'becoming of being' – the development and transformation of reality – in fact proceeds from unity to difference. All things emerge from a universal elementary ground, which divides and *differentiates* (as virtual potentialities) to produce diverse types of actual, *differenciated*, bodies: 'A single voice raises the clamour of being'.[8] This universal ground is characterized by Deleuze as a chaotic milieu consisting of elementary bodies in networks of contact with other bodies.[9] This ground is chaotic in the sense that it displays no discernible pattern of regular, coherent order. The relationships binding bodies are flimsy and transient, constantly in flux. However, with time, order emerges as these elementary parts settle into regular and enduring habits of relation to one another. The regular association of particles produces a more complex body, which in turn relates to other complex bodies to form even greater degrees of complex organization. This physics of relational bodies and their emergent complexity through association is the basis of Deleuze's ontology. Everything that exists can be thought of as a body, which is in contact with other bodies, and which is composed of elementary parts arranged in a regular order to produce an enduring assemblage.[10]

Deleuze considers this emergence of organization to be the process by which *virtual* reality becomes *actualized*.[11] The distinction he makes between virtual being and actual being is crucial, as it allows him to develop a method of critique based upon a purely positive concept of difference.[12] According to Deleuze, the universal, formless ground from which all things emerge is a *virtual* foundation. He describes

this virtual unity as a 'plane of immanence' or 'plane of composition', which is always-already present within actual things as the condition of their determination.[13] Being eventuates by a creative process of constructive emanation, proceeding from this 'plane of immanence' on which everything coexists in various states of actualization.[14] An adequate concept of being must therefore be thought of in terms of the process of its becoming, or of duration, which is 'universal, univocal and unique. It is a concrete universal'.[15] Deleuze thus thinks of the virtual in terms of 'a single time, a single duration, in which everything would participate'.[16] In short, duration expresses the univocity of being; as a *becoming* over time.

More precisely, the becoming of being is a process of actualization in which an originally undifferenciated and chaotic unity creatively *differenciates* to produce a variety of actual bodies.[17] Actualization is differenciation: the 'carving up' of a virtual unity into various actual forms, diversely characterized by the particular nature of the relations governing their internal parts. Actual being expresses a particular point or 'event' in the process of differentiation or actualization. Being becomes actual at the moment in which a durable relation, or 'consistency', has been established between the elementary parts that constitute a body.[18] In this way, the becoming of being is a 'bloc' that occurs between 'parts', in the interstitial space of the relationship that binds elementary bodies into a more complex organization.[19] Actual being is then a point of fixture or arrest, when mobile and flexible relations of force between parts acting upon each other become consolidated into definite and rigid relations that define the form of the emergent body. Actual being is thus an imposition of *form* over relations of *force*.[20]

While being is properly conceptualized in relation to *virtual* duration, differentiation or becoming, Deleuze explains that we generally perceive things to be real only when they *actually* exist, that is, when they have already been identified or represented as such, or have already come to be.[21] Actual bodies are perceived as concrete things that exist in space or extension, while virtual entities exist in duration or time, as things developing, or as bodies or identities in the process of their becoming.[22] Thus, actual reality is an illusion about being which affirms the apparent 'given-ness' of existing bodies and obscures our better understanding that things have come to be as they are only through the productive process of actualization, which formalizes a contingent relationship between constituting parts. Deleuze's critical practice hinges upon struggling against this illusion of 'given-ness' and attending to the contingency inherent in the process of actualization itself. This encourages us

to think alternative ways in which the elements that constitute bodies could better relate to produce more cohesive complex organizations.[23]

Central to Deleuze's critical method is the notion that the actual and the virtual support two distinct concepts of difference.[24] In the realm of actually existing things, difference can only be understood as a comparative relation between identities relatively fixed into concrete types of actual being. For example, in Australia, the categories 'Indigenous' and 'non-Indigenous' denote two fairly rigid 'bodies' or identities, which differ from each other by degrees of advantage/disadvantage, degrees of citizenship privilege and state protection, or in an older discourse, degrees of 'culture', 'civilization', or 'history'. Dialectical transformation operates via this form of difference: the difference between opposing categories of actually existing bodies measures degrees of deviance from a projected ideal unity. This difference compels the dialectical process of unification through the eventual elimination of conflict. Actual difference, or the difference between actual things, is therefore best described as a *difference in degree*, which is a source of inequality and conflict, and is the impetus for processes of equalization or dialectical unification.[25]

However, the process of actualization – the differenciation of a virtual, universal chaos into diverse forms of actual complex being – rests upon an alternative conceptualization of difference: as virtual, creative, primary and absolutely positive.[26] For Deleuze, pure difference is not tied to lack or negation, nor is it, as in dialectical philosophy, attributed to a thing *externally* by virtue of its relationship to a representative or standard body. For Deleuze, difference is *internal* to a body as it transforms over time. Deleuze's early essay on Bergson[27] and his principal doctoral thesis *Difference and Repetition* both explore this idea, and all of his subsequent work refers to the conceptual framework outlined in these early texts.[28] For Deleuze, actualization follows the differences traced by bodies themselves, as they transform and develop over time. While actual bodies differ from *each other*, virtual bodies constantly differ from *themselves* in the process of their becoming. Virtual difference thereby describes the difference internal to a body, difference-in-itself, which represents a true *difference in kind* as a body changes qualitatively from one kind of assemblage to another when its constitutive elements shift and combine in alternative ways. Dialectical unification involves the realization of a potential and prospective unity through the elimination of conflicting differences between actual bodies, Whereas differenciation involves the creation and proliferation of difference, as the virtual unity that is the chaotic ground of all existence divides up, and

diverse types of actual bodies form and transform in the process of their becoming actual.[29] While actual difference is always defined as a negative term in relation to a given standard or a projected ideal unity, virtual difference or differenciation is wholly productive and positive, at every moment affirming *both itself and actual being* in the constructive process of its becoming.[30]

This primary and positive concept of difference as differen*c*iation also gives rise to a complementary concept of differen*t*iation when actual existence is imaginatively placed back into the context of the virtual from which it develops. While differen*c*iation is the dividing up of a virtual unity as various discrete actual bodies emerge and take shape, differen*t*iation is the decomposition of these actual bodies back into the virtual and elementary conditions of their formation.[31] This allows a critical, retrospective tracing of the process of emergence of actual bodies, which form as complex entities through the regular and habitual association of their constituting elements. Since the initial meeting of these constituting elements is contingent upon chance and circumstance (when elements meet in an originally chaotic context), an alternative emergence is always possible if the constituting elements are related in other ways, or if the assemblage becomes composed by other elements. Differen*t*iation counters the apparent 'given-ness' of actual reality, insofar as the transformation of the existing configuration of the actual according to alternative lines of development remains a permanent possibility. Differen*t*iation is thus Deleuze's critical concept of difference, which facilitates a capacity for 'thinking otherwise'.

According to Deleuze, the practices of social construction and critique combine in the complex process which he names 'different/ciation'.[32] This involves agents associating elements and forming relationships to produce a complex reality, while simultaneously remaining mindful that this established reality might always be recombined in alternative ways. Agents are responsible for actualizing reality, and also for returning this reality to a virtual, decomposed state, in which it becomes possible to reconfigure that which has previously come to pass. This endless weaving between the virtual and the actual is Deleuze's description of the formation and transformation of being. Like dialectical processes, this trans/formative practice is compelled by a notion of difference. However, in this case the process is not compelled by difference as 'the negative in general' which causes negation, but by a wholly positive notion of virtual difference, which persists inside actualized entities as the virtual movement of their creation. Deleuze writes: 'one has only to replace the actual terms in the movement that produces them to bring

them back to the virtuality actualized in them, in order to see that differentiation is never a negation but a creation, and that difference is never negative but essentially positive and creative'.[33] Deleuze's concept of different/ciation is the basis of an alternative, non-dialectical philosophy of constructive process and transformation. Because it is grounded in a positive concept of difference, this philosophy is very useful for practitioners seeking to enable postcolonial futures. The following section explores two practical implications of different/ciation in the context of the process of Reconciliation in Australia. The first of these concerns the 'problematization of the actual'; the second considers the scope for unity in transformative practice informed by Deleuze's philosophy of different/ciation.

Reconciliation

Deleuze's concept of different/ciation translates into critical practice as the problematization of the actual or the given.[34] The constructive aim of different/ciation is then to make possible an alternative process of actualization, in which systemic inequity or select privilege would no longer be produced. Different/ciation encourages the becoming of the actual, a shift in the way actual bodies currently relate, that they might transform to produce an alternative, more cohesive complex organization.[35] In Australia's case, Reconciliation is the process that would actualize an alternative to the continuing colonization of Indigenous Australians on their own territories. The task is to disrupt this problematic colonial actuality, and to reconstruct an alternative, postcolonial present.

Of course, this task includes the problematization of actual difference – established relations of inequality between actual bodies, such as exists between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. However, the crux of the problem is not difference *per se*, but the way systemic inequality has come to be established and maintained through Australia's historical process of actualization. On this view, the underlying political problem is not the 'difference' of Indigenous society and its relation of disadvantage, deficiency or opposition to mainstream ('White') society. The problem is precisely that 'race' relations were shaped in the context of colonial conquest which inflected the initial attitude of orientation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous bodies, and that the present has subsequently been actualized through this imperial mode of sociability. It is the established nature of the relation *between* these two identities that constitutes the actual in Australia, and therefore it is this

relation, its origins and the way it has come about, that should be the focus of transformative action.

The problem of the actual thereby also implies an associated problem of constructive agency and political dominance. The process of Australian national development formalized inequitable relationships between bodies, and the identities of Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians alike have been produced and maintained by a particular, dominant constructive agency that continues to manipulate the construction of the actual to its own advantage. In making the actual the focus of the problem, we are able to criticize the way the present has taken form via an agency which consolidates certain relations of advantage and disadvantage between bodies. By placing 'advantage' in the virtual context of the process from which it developed, we can ask the genealogical questions: by *what* process of actualization and *what* mode of agency did the advantage come about?[36]

Fairly obviously, the systemic advantage currently enjoyed by 'White' Australia came about through colonization. Less obviously, the actualization of advantage came about through a *particular* form of social agency, which established this advantage only by the avowal of its own authority, the suppression or denigration of the agency and authority of the Indigenous Other, and by denying both bodies alternative ways of being, acting and relating. This colonizing agency of 'White' advantage thereby simultaneously constituted both itself and the disadvantage of those other cultures and their modes of constructive agency, through this act of suppression. This is not to say that Indigenous agency is a negligible feature of Australian history, nor that the production of 'White' advantage did not meet with resistance. In fact, there have been many traditions of successful Indigenous resistance to colonial domination.[37] However this resistance mostly worked through an equivalent mode of agency, which was successful insofar as Indigenous peoples were able to claim authority for their position by suppressing dissenting Indigenous voices or alternative ways of being-Indigenous. For example, bodies like the Australian Aboriginal Provisional Government and ATSIC have represented Indigenous authority at the national level. However, amongst Indigenous peoples there is much dispute about the adequacy and authenticity of this kind of representation.[38]

I suggest that the underlying difficulty arises from the requirement that authority/authenticity be a ground for agency at all, since this simply replicates and perpetuates the structure of agency that was responsible for imperialism and the construction of colonial society in the first place. Furthermore, on the whole, 'White' Australia was able to

contain and repress Indigenous resistance, and even now preserves its social advantage through the same type of agency of social construction that works to perpetuate imperial modes of sociability. While this colonizing mode of agency towards others has been dominant in Australian history, it is not the only mode of social action available to constructive agents. Indeed, Reconciliation requires all Australians to develop an alternative mode of agency and type of sociability appropriate to our becoming-postcolonial. In Deleuzian terms, an alternative actualization of a *postcolonial* present must come about via an alternative, *postcolonial* attitude and agency, which can orient an appropriate association between the elements comprising Australian society, and enable the subsequent emergence of a desired complex social body, which is not characterized by systemic structures of advantage. Although beyond the scope of this chapter, the description and promotion of this alternative mode of agency remains a pressing task for postcolonial activists.

As well as facilitating a critique of advantage, the problematization of the actual enables an alternative conceptualization of unity, which may usefully inform collective practices of resistance to colonialism and of postcolonization. In dialectical critique and transformative theory, unity is organized at the level of the solution. It is presented as an ideal, final harmony, which then causes the gradual elimination of dialectical conflict and difference in order that the ideal might be eventually realized. Furthermore, dialectical politics establishes a strategic and transitory unity at every step along the way to this final harmony, as each resisting class identifies as a political subject with representative authority. For example, Reconciliation has usually proceeded by identifying an Indigenous subjectivity that voices the concerns and aspirations of Aboriginal Australians.[39] This subject has authority to the extent that it can claim to universally represent Indigenous peoples. In this way, unity is constructed at the level of the solution, which is perceived to be the empowerment of this Indigenous agency, to better enable its authoritative presence in national life. However, this unity is precarious, since the assertion of a universally representative Indigenous identity is only possible when various ways of being Indigenous are excluded.[40] Further, the Indigenous subject aims to destabilize the dominant representation of *national* unity, resulting in a politics that pits Indigenous society against 'Australian' society, resulting in a politics of conflict that allows Indigenous peoples to be presented in national discourse as 'divisive' and 'disruptive' – and thus always-already outside the sphere of national unity.

By problematizing the actual, Deleuze suggests unity is best thought at the level of the problem, rather than at the level of the solution: 'only the Idea or problem is universal. It is not the solution which lends its generality to the problem, but the problem which lends its universality to the solution'.[41] On this view, Australians are united as a nation in relation to a problematic actuality: the continuing colonization of Indigenous peoples upon their own territories. On this basis, Australians could also be united in their various struggles to think this problematic actuality as it might otherwise be, and to imagine and enact the ethical and political relations with one another that would enable various structures of Australian postcoloniality. While Australians might act together to confront the problem of the legacy of colonization, if they are to respect one another's differences by acknowledging that there are multiple approaches to this problem, the solutions developed will be diverse and will not necessarily be commensurate with each other. The outcome should not be the formation of a seamless national unity, but a society that continues to be characterized by actual differences in the relations formed. The challenge is to *intentionally* organize this difference in ways that are ethical – postcolonial, rather than colonial. As already suggested, whether this will be successful depends upon what conceptualization of an intentionally postcolonial agency Australia creates.

Conclusion

Deleuze's theory of different/ciation embraces two strategic aspects of genealogy. The first is retrospective and critical and asks: what force has made the present what it is? The second is future-active and constructive and asks: if the actual present is to become an alternative present of a particular type (e.g., postcolonial), what forces of actualization are needed to bring it into being? This alternative philosophy of productive process and transformative difference translates into practice as a series of strategic reversals away from the kind of politics that currently defines action for Reconciliation in Australia. These reversals include a shift from a politics that criticizes lack or disadvantage, to a politics that criticizes the genealogy of presence or advantage; from unity organized at the level of the solution in the form of ideal identity, to unity organized at the level of the problem, now conceived as the actual present; and finally, to a critical practice that is immanent to the process of transformation itself, and which aims to create difference, rather than to negate it.

Australia's transition to postcolonial society requires an appropriate philosophy of transformative action, which will neither reinstate nor reinforce the types of power relations that are a legacy of its colonial history. Indeed, Reconciliation should introduce a discontinuity or a difference into this history, allowing Australians to 'turn away' from habitually colonial assumptions and practices of relation, along with a corresponding opportunity to reconstruct modes of social existence upon an alternative and ethical, *postcolonial* basis.[42] Underlying this theory of practice is the view that social organization results from a spontaneous, creative and open-ended process of actualization, in which social forms emerge and transform as an effect of the shifting relations of power that bodies enter into. This view compels a renewed focus on agency and the ethics of relations between bodies. Above all, Deleuze insists that each self has a primary responsibility to cultivate and practice an attitude of relation to others that enables the emergence of ethical social forms.

Notes

1. See, for example, the First Report of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation: *Walking Together*, Australian Government Press, Canberra, 1994, which presents Reconciliation as 'the satisfactory resolution of the disadvantaged situation' faced by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in Australia (xiv). The then chairperson, Patrick Dodson, claimed that this 'disadvantage can be traced directly to dispossession', which took place 'without rights, without consultation, without negotiation, without compensation, and little in the way of equal human interaction' (pp. 4–5). The legacy of historical dispossession is now seen in the 'disadvantage and inequality of Aboriginal people in all areas of life where comparison is possible between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people' (p. 5) and is clearly reflected in Indigenous people's 'poor health, substandard housing, poor education outcomes and low levels of employment' (p. 8). See also Howard, J. 'Practical Reconciliation', in Grattan, M. (Ed.) *Reconciliation: Essays on Australian Reconciliation* (Melbourne: Black Inc. Books, 2000), pp. 88–96.
2. While an adequate definition of 'postcolonial' remains beyond the scope of this chapter, my use of this term intends to convey a quality of social life and mode of relation that is yet to come, rather than a period of time following colonization, already reached. See Loomba, A. *Colonialism/Postcolonialism* (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 1–20.
3. Deleuze, G. *Bergsonism* (French: 1966) Trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam (New York: Zone, 1991), pp. 31–35. See also: Hardt, M. *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy* (Los Angeles: University of Central London Press, 1993), pp. 1–26.
4. Dialectical thought has its origins in Hegel's philosophy and is the basis of Marx's historical materialism. Alexandre Kojeve's seminar on Hegel in the

1930s was hugely influential in reviving contemporary interest in Hegel, and much subsequent Western social philosophy (including Marxism, psychoanalysis and various critical theories like feminism and postcolonialism) draws from his analysis of Hegel.

5. Coole, D. *Negativity and Politics* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 11.
6. Hegel, G. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Trans. A. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 37.
7. Difference is understood to be simultaneously the '*defect* of both [subject and object], though it is their soul, or that which moves them': Hegel, G. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, op. cit., p. 37.
8. Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition* (French: 1968) Trans. P. Patton (London: Athlone, 1994), p. 35.
9. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?* (French: 1991) Trans. G. Burchell and H. Tomlinson (London: Verso, 1994), pp. 42 and 50–51; Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (French: 1980) Trans. B. Massumi (London: Athlone, 1987), pp. 39–75.
10. A 'body' in Deleuze's sense need not be a material body. Concepts and discourses can likewise be thought of as 'assemblages' of elements combined into an enduring and coherent order. See particularly Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., pp. 327–328 and 331–334; and Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., pp. 15–23 and 122.
11. While this idea is discussed at various points throughout Deleuze's work, his discussion of Bergson in particular refers to the distinction between virtual being and actual being.
12. Hardt, M. *Gilles Deleuze*, op. cit., pp. 1–26.
13. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., pp. 265–272. See also Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit., pp. 42, 50–51 and 118–122.
14. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 255: 'a pure plane of immanence, univocality, composition, upon which everything is given, upon which unformed elements and materials dance that are distinguished from one another only by their speed and that enter into this or that individuated assemblage depending on their connection, their relations of movement. A fixed plane of life upon which everything stirs, slows down or accelerates'.
15. Boundas, C. 'Deleuze-Bergson: An Ontology of the Virtual', in Patton, P. (Ed.) *Deleuze: A Critical Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 97.
16. Deleuze, G. *Bergsonism*, op. cit., p. 78.
17. I have followed Paul Patton's translation of terms in Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., pp. 207–221: 'We call the determination of the virtual content of an Idea differentiation; we call the actualization of that virtuality into species and distinguished parts differenciation' (p. 207). An alternative is given by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam in their translation of Deleuze, G. *Bergsonism*, op. cit.
18. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., pp. 327–337.
19. Ibid., pp. 291–293.
20. Deleuze, G. *Bergsonism*, op. cit., p. 104. The explanation of structure in terms of force relations shows the influence of Nietzsche on Deleuze's thought. See Deleuze, G. *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (French: 1962) Trans.

H. Tomlinson (London: Athlone, 1983), pp. 39–71. Deleuze also explains Foucault's thought, with its similar Nietzschean influences, in like terms. See Deleuze, G. *Foucault* (French: 1986) Trans. S. Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), pp. 70–93.

21. Deleuze, G. *Bergsonism*, op. cit., pp. 25–27 and 104–105.
22. Ibid., p. 38.
23. Further discussion of the nature of the ethical evaluation implied by 'better' assemblages is beyond the scope of this chapter, however it is important to note that this is the point where Deleuze turns to Spinoza in order to develop an ethics of assemblage based upon Spinoza's notions of 'desire', 'joy' and 'conatus'. See Deleuze, G. *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* (French: 1970) Trans. R. Hurley (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1988). See also: Hardt, M. *Gilles Deleuze,* op. cit., pp. 56–112. For a discussion of Deleuze, Spinoza, ethics and joy, see Gatens, M. & Lloyd, G. *Collective Imaginings: Spinoza, Past and Present* (London: Routledge, 1999).
24. Deleuze, G. *Bergsonism*, op. cit., pp. 34 and 38.
25. Ibid., pp. 34–38 and 101.
26. Ibid., pp. 97–101.
27. 'La conception de la différence chez Bergson', *Les études bergsoniennes*, vol. IV, pp. 77–112.
28. Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., p. xv.
29. Deleuze, G. *Bergsonism*, op. cit., pp. 97–101.
30. Ibid., p. 97.
31. Ibid., p. 95. Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., p. 207.
32. Ibid., p. 279.
33. Ibid., p. 207. Deleuze, G. *Bergsonism*, op. cit., p. 103.
34. In practical terms, working to transform a given reality through the method of different/ciation requires an agent to problematize the actual by asking questions like: How has this actual reality emerged to be the form it is today? How is it possible to construct an alternative relationship between the elements that compose this body? How is it possible to select different elements altogether? How to reject certain unwanted elements from this body? How to enable a shift so that some elements become dominant in relation to others? How to orient a body in relation to other bodies, in order to enable a desirable complex social existence?
35. Again, Deleuze's turn to Spinoza enables him to develop an ethics of constructivism, however discussion of the ethical evaluation required by the idea of actualizing alternative and better organizations is beyond the scope of this chapter.
36. On genealogy as method see Foucault, M. 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', in: Rabinow, P. (Ed.) *The Foucault Reader* (New York: Penguin, 1984). This critique of 'advantage' is similar to Derrida's critique of 'presence' and post-structuralist critiques of representation in general. For a feminist critique of advantage, see Eveline, J. 'The Politics of Advantage', *Australian Feminist Studies*, 19(1994) pp. 129–154. See also Bacchi, C. *The Politics of Affirmative Action: Category Politics and the Case for Women* (London: Sage, 1996), pp. 79–100.
37. See, for example, Goodall, H. *Invasion to Embassy* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin/Black Books, 1996).

38. Oxenham, C. *et al. A Dialogue on Indigenous Identity: Warts 'n' All* (Curtin Indigenous Research Centre: Gunada Press, 1999), see Chapter 2: 'Politics of Identity', pp. 51–91.
39. See, for example, Molnar, H. 'Indigenous Media Development in Australia: A product of Struggle and Opposition', *Cultural Studies*, 9(1)(1995), pp. 169–190; Gilbert, S. 'A Postcolonial Experience of Aboriginal Identity', *Cultural Studies*, 9(1)(1995), pp. 145–149. See also Jordan, D. 'The Social Construction of Identity: The Aboriginal Problem', *The Australian Journal of Education*, 28(1984), pp. 274–290.
40. Oxenham, C. *et al. A Dialogue on Indigenous Identity*, op. cit., pp. 51–91.
41. Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., p. 162. See also: Deleuze, G. *Bergsonism*, op. cit., p. 93.
42. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 96: 'History... designates the set of conditions... from which one turns away in order to become... in order to create something new'. Foucault has a similar view of history as a process of 'exit'. See his essays 'What is Enlightenment?'; 'Kant on Enlightenment and Revolution'; and 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', all in Rabinow, P. (Ed.) *The Foucault Reader*, op. cit., pp. 76–100; and Foucault, M. *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Trans. A. Sheridan (London: Tavistock, 1972), pp. 3–17.

14

Deleuze and the Tale of Two Intifadas

Todd May

The first intifada

The first Palestinian intifada started on 9 December 1987, a day after an Israeli truck killed (perhaps by accident, perhaps not) four Palestinian workers on the Gaza Strip. After 20 years of occupation, the first mass uprising – the shaking off (in Arabic, *intifada*) – had begun. There had been resistance before, sporadic, often courageous. But there had been nothing like this.

Demonstrations against the occupation occurred in nearly every town, every day. Rocks were thrown at Israeli soldiers as they drove their tanks and military vehicles through Palestinian towns. Groups of young males, warned by townspeople on the watch, awaited Israeli incursions and then signaled their refusal of the occupation with their stones before vanishing into the streets and homes of villagers who hid them. Banned Palestinian flags were flown from telephone poles and spray-painted on walls. Strikes were called by a group calling itself the United National Leadership – a group that did not emerge from the traditional PLO leadership – and people followed those strikes.

And there was more. Women formed cooperatives to set up Palestinian agricultural projects. They developed alternative daycare centers that taught children their own history, a history that had been distorted by Israeli propaganda. Students met in secret with their professors as the Israeli military closed the universities. Backyard gardens were planted to feed people during the long curfews Israel imposed.

The first intifada was a resistance without a center, a resistance in which various threads pulled together and reinforced one another without dictates from above (except for the occasional directive from the

UNL). It was a Deleuzian rhizome: 'the rhizome connects any point to any other point and its traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same nature... It is composed not of units but of dimensions, or rather directions in motion... The rhizome operates by variation, expansion, conquest, capture, offshoots.'[1]

Nobody predicted it. Nobody could have predicted it. But there it was, where no one, least of all most Palestinians, thought it would be. How do we understand what happened?

This chapter suggests that Deleuze's ontological perspective can help us understand the first Palestinian intifada. His concepts, far from simply articulating a realm divorced from our social and political world, can be brought to bear in the specific issue of Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation. Moreover, extending Deleuze's perspective can help us understand the differences between the first and second Palestinian intifadas. Finally, in looking at these intifadas, there is a lesson for Deleuze's own thought, a lesson that centers on the question of violent and nonviolent resistance.

Deleuze, chemistry, and the first intifada

Deleuze's writings have always been sympathetic to the situation of the Palestinians. In 1983, he refers to Israeli treatment of Palestinians as a 'genocide',[2] and during the first intifada he reminds us that 'the Zionists have constructed the State of Israel on the recent past of their torture, the unforgettable European horror – but also on the suffering of this other people, with the stones of this other people'.[3] In this, Deleuze is in stark contrast with some of his contemporaries. Emmanuel Levinas, for instance, proves willing to betray his entire philosophical framework when, in an interview, he responds to a question about the Palestinians being the other for the Israelis by saying, 'My definition of the other is completely different... if your neighbor attacks another neighbor or treats him unjustly, what can you do? Then alterity takes on another character... There are people who are wrong.'[4]

In his writings on the Palestinians, however, Deleuze focuses on their plight rather than on their resistance. Given Palestinian history before 1987, this is understandable. Deleuze recognizes the resilience of the Palestinian people. From the miserable failures of their history, he notes that, 'their resistance has become nourished'.[5] He does not tell us, however, what this nourishment consists of. In order to understand the 1987 intifada, then, we must turn from Deleuze's political analyses to his philosophical work.

In the later collaboration between Deleuze and Guattari, the writings of Ilya Prigogine become increasingly important. Prigogine, whose book *La nouvelle alliance* (co-authored with Isabelle Stengers and partially translated as *Order Out of Chaos*) argues for a self-ordering of chemical components into patterns and relationships that cannot be read off from the previous state of chemical disarray. 'The artificial', they write, 'may be deterministic and reversible. The natural contains essential elements of randomness and irreversibility. This leads to a new view of matter in which matter is no longer the passive substance described in the mechanistic world view but is associated with spontaneous activity'.[6]

Prigogine and Stengers offer the example of the chemical clock. In conditions that move away from equilibrium (e.g., conditions of intense heat or other type of energy) a process they describe with the following image might occur:

> Suppose we have two molecules, 'red' and 'blue'. Because of the chaotic motion of the molecules, we would expect that at a given moment we would have more red molecules, say, in the left part of a vessel. Then a bit later more blue molecules would appear, and so on. The vessel would appear to us as 'violet', with occasional irregular flashes or red or blue. However, this is *not* what happens with a chemical clock; here the system is all blue, then it abruptly changes its color to red, then again to blue. Because all these changes occur at *regular* time intervals, we have a coherent process.[7]

This is not the type of result one would expect. It is not the introduction of some sort of ordering mechanism that makes the chemical clock appear. Nothing is brought in from the outside. It is an inherent capability of the chemicals themselves for self-organization that gives rise to this phenomenon. It is as though there were virtual potentialities for communication or coordination contained in the chemicals themselves, or at least in their groupings, that are actualized under conditions that move away from equilibrium.

There are two aspects of this example that might point toward a way of understanding the intifada. First, chemicals can display behavior for which there seems to be no particular causal explanation, no recognizable causal chain. Second, small changes in the environment can have a decisive impact on the nature of a chemical change. There is a lesson both Deleuze and Prigogine draw from the chemical clock and from other phenomena like it: we should think of the chemical field not as

one of identities in causal interaction, but of differences that can be actualized in a variety of ways.

Consider the Palestinian experience under the occupation before the first intifada. Palestinian land, the basis of its agricultural society, was often expropriated for Israeli settlers. This turned farmers into day laborers for Israel, a humiliating experience for many. Instead of tilling the land that had been in their families for generations, Palestinians now traveled into the country of their oppressors to perform menial tasks for a population whose racism against them was unrelenting. Meanwhile, wives were left at home, often for days at a time, caring for the household alone; and children were taught – when they are taught at all – in schools closely monitored by the Israeli military for any signs of nationalism.

And these were the lucky ones, those who did not live in the refugee camps created by Israel's dispersion of nearly three-quarters of a million people in 1947 and 1948. In the refugee camps, conditions were much worse. There was no land to be stolen. There were few jobs to be had. There was little aside from the memories of land of Palestine before the formation of the Israeli state.

So what was the experience? There was fear and anger, sadness and regret, each bleeding and passing over into one another. These were compounded by the paltry character of most of the early resistance to the occupation. There was a Deleuzian virtual, a becoming of difference that had not actualized itself into resistance but that could, under certain conditions – we could call them conditions far from equilibrium – spontaneously take on the character of resistance. 'Revolution', Deleuze tells us, 'is the social power of difference... Practical struggle never proceeds by way of the negative but by way of difference and its power of affirmation'.[8]

What there was *not* was some kind of general resolve that was merely awaiting the opportunity to express itself. Such a mistaken view is one that comes from looking backward from what has happened to before its happening, and then positing a hidden identity – a particular possibility – that existed *preformed* before being subject to a particular cause or causal chain that carried it over into reality. The virtual, for Deleuze as for Prigogine, is not a set of identities awaiting actualization. It is a fluid realm *out* of which various actualities might arise, but *in* which there are no particular potential realities – no 'possibles' – from among which the world in its unfolding will choose. 'Difference and repetition in the virtual ground the movement of actualization, of differenciation

as creation. They are thereby substituted for the identity and the resemblance of the possible.'[9]

The Palestinians did not know what would happen in December, 1987. And after it began, they did not know what it would amount to. There was much to grieve and much to resist, but that it would take these particular forms in this particular coordination was a result not of prefigured structure of Palestinian experience, but of a virtual that was capable of many actualizations.

The second intifada

The second intifada, the one that has taken place since September, 2000, has had a very different texture and character. Its causes are much the same. Since signing the Oslo Accords in 1993, Israel had nearly doubled the number of settlers in the occupied territories. It had enforced closures on Palestinian towns and villages on the average of one day out of every four. It expropriated large tracts of land from Palestinian farmers, constructed bypass roads to isolate Palestinian towns and villages, mowed down many of their orchards, and, as always, humiliated the Palestinian people on their land at every opportunity.

But the Palestinian context had changed. There was a government, the Palestinian Authority, in place. There was a police force that had weapons. Many of the leaders of the first intifada had either been co-opted or, alternatively, marginalized (being seen as a threat to the Palestinian authority). As the Palestinian Authority revealed its corruption, and as Islamic fundamentalism swept through the Arab world, Hamas gained adherents and became a central force in Palestinian politics. Suicide bombings, which began in Lebanon, became a political option for Palestinian resistance. Moreover, Israeli closures and appropriation of land had left the Palestinian population more impoverished and more desperate than it had been in 1987.

These changes altered the character of Palestinian resistance. Fewer people participated in demonstrations, and those demonstrations became more violent. The resistance began to belong to those who had guns and bombs, and to those who were the official spokespeople for the Palestinian population. Gone were the gardens, the collectives, the displays of culture. In their stead there were mostly corpses: some Israeli, most Palestinian.

Deleuzian ontology recognizes this possibility as well. Actualization offers no guarantees, either good or bad. Nietzsche's eternal return, Deleuze teaches us, is the return of difference, not identity. Just as the

occupation does not go on forever, tracing an unvarying trajectory across the lives of Palestinians, so the intifada is not written in stone. The virtual does not give way before the actualization that emerges from it; it remains within the actual, undercutting its permanence even as its gives birth to it. It is desire itself, Deleuze and Guattari tell us in *Anti-Oedipus*, that desires its own repression. So, too, the intifada, which came to fruition in the unity of its nonviolent resistance, returns as a struggle that threatens itself even as it progresses.

Deleuze, the intifadas, and nonviolence

So far, we have read the two intifadas from a Deleuzian perspective. Rhizomes, the virtual and the actual, the return of difference: these are the terms in which we have understood Palestinian resistance. There is more we could say, for instance about the overcoding performed by the Palestinian Authority as a State apparatus. But there is another question worth asking. Can we turn things around and see them from the other end? If Deleuze has much to teach us about Palestinian resistance, are there any lessons Deleuze might draw from it? Are there ways we might extend Deleuze's thought by understanding what happened in 1987 and what happened in 2000?

Among the many differences between the two intifadas, one stands out as promising for an extension of Deleuze's thought. The first intifada was primarily a nonviolent one, while the second has been much more violent. There are, of course, many who will say that the throwing of stones against Israeli soldiers is a violent act. This may be so. However, measured against the overwhelming military power brought to bear against the Palestinians, the violence of a stone seems to pale in significance. The essential character of the first intifada was nonviolent, and the stones, while perhaps playing at the edges of that nonviolence, did not in any important way betray it.

Nonviolence, I want to claim, is deeply aligned with Deleuzian politics. This may be surprising, since Deleuze's talk of politics often seems tinged with a violent edge. It is the 'war machine' that resists the apparatus of the state; Genghis Khan is often invoked as an example. Consider this quotation:

> The warrior is in the position of betraying everything, including the function of the military, or of understanding nothing. It happens that historians, both bourgeois and Soviet, will follow this negative tradition and explain how Genghis Khan understood nothing: he

> 'didn't understand' the phenomenon of the city. An easy thing to say. The problem is that the exteriority of the war machine in relation to the State is everywhere apparent but remains difficult to conceptualize.[10]

However, although Deleuze, to my knowledge, does not speak of nonviolence as a political tactic, the political orientation he commends to us is bound to nonviolence in a way that can be seen through the contrast between the two intifadas.

Before we look at this bond, I want to issue three disclaimers. First, I am not saying that Deleuze's politics is committed to nonviolence in all situations. The alignment of Deleuze's politics with nonviolence is not a claim of principle. There may well be situations in which a Deleuzian politics would counsel violence. That would be the exceptional case, however, not the usual one.

The second disclaimer is about nonviolence itself. There are many who would argue that nonviolence is a superior political tool of resistance to violence, particularly in the face of a powerful oppressor. Their argument rests on the greater likelihood of nonviolence to succeed in attaining specific political goals. I am among those who agree with this argument. However, this is not my claim about Deleuze. In fact, the concepts of success and failure as they apply to specific political goals external to the character of the resistance itself seems to me to be foreign to Deleuze's thought. For Deleuze, the important political possibilities lie as much if not more in the character of the resistance rather than the external goals it achieves or fails to achieve.

The third disclaimer is about nonviolence itself. Many people confuse nonviolence with the idea of 'passive resistance'. Nonviolence as a form of resistance is not passive. It is anything but. A campaign of nonviolence requires the creation of imaginative and different political tactics that go beneath, around, and sometimes through the violence that is directed against them. To engage in a campaign of nonviolence is to take upon oneself the task of confronting a militarily superior power with refusal and struggle in ways that will throw the power back upon itself, often confusing it and making it doubt itself, and ultimately, in one way or another, defeating it.

If nonviolence is intimately tied to the character of Deleuze's political thought, it is because of its relation to the process of resistance rather than to its outcome. Let us look again at the two intifadas. The first one was rhizomatic. It came from no recognizable center. It was not directed from the outside, although early on Israel was convinced that

it arose from the PLO leadership in Tunis. In fact, in early 1988 Israel went so far as to assassinate the PLO official with the closest contact to the occupied territories, Khalil Al-Wazir, in front of his family. The first intifada had spontaneous elements that sprang up and intersected with other elements. It was, in the only important sense of this word, a *popular* uprising. People did not witness it. They participated in it, in a variety of ways and at a variety of levels, many of which could not have been predicted beforehand.

The second intifada provides a sharp contrast. It is arboreal rather than rhizomatic. Much of the Palestinian population has played the role of audience rather than participant. (Although, I should note, recently there have been outbreaks of nonviolent resistance, particularly against the Wall, and they have been popular and participatory.) For the most part, those who are considered the protagonists of the second intifada are those with guns, grenades, mortars, and belts of explosives. The distinction between those who are directing the intifada, those who are participating in it, and those who are the passive beneficiaries is much more stark than it was during the first intifada.

What, exactly, does this have to do with violence? Violence promotes arboreal politics in two directions, first with regard to one's fellow oppressed and then with regard to the oppressors. In the first case, weapons often change the relations among those who are struggling. This happens for a couple of reasons. Historically, struggle has been seen as a matter of war, and war has been seen as a matter of violence. Foucault and others have tried to break the grip of the second assumption – that war is solely a matter of violence – but nevertheless it retains a strong hold on us. If struggle implies war and war implies violence, then the key participants in the struggle are those who are capable of violence. Others become, at best, auxiliaries. With this distinction between the fighters and others comes the arboreal schema. There are those who fight, and those who support those who fight. It is a fixed way of looking at things, where everybody has a particular role to play in a pre-conceived form of struggle. There is not much room left for rhizomatic offshoots when struggle happens like this.

The second reason violence promotes arboreal relations among the oppressed is that when one has weapons one can force one's viewpoint upon those without weapons. It is a sad truth that often in the struggle against oppression it is those with access to the resources of violence who make the agenda, simply because they cannot be opposed. The alternative is not only a Habermasian resort to reasons, although that

is often a good option. Another alternative is the creativity of various and unpredictable forms of struggle. This is much less likely to happen if there are those with weapons impressing their authority upon others.

Violence also leads to an arboreal relation between the oppressed and their oppressors. This might seem an unlikely possibility, since the difference between the rhizomatic and the arboreal pertains to the process of an unfolding rather than to the relations between oppressor and oppressed. Recall, however, one of the ways Deleuze and Guattari distinguish the arboreal from the rhizomatic: 'In contrast to centered (even polycentric) systems with hierarchical modes of communication and preestablished paths, the rhizome is an acentered, nonhierarchical, nonsignifying system without a General and without an organizing memory or central automaton....'[11] What could be more centered, more hierarchical, and more pre-established than relations of violence between oppressed and oppressor? The second intifada shows this clearly. In many ways, it has degenerated into a ritual of violence: the Israelis provoke it through their policies of assassination, dispossession, and humiliation, certain Palestinians respond with violence, and Israel uses the latter as an excuse to provoke some more. It's all so predictable.

Nonviolent struggle does not necessarily avoid the arboreal, just as violent struggle does not entail it. However, as the first intifada shows, it more nearly kin to the rhizomatic than violence is. When the predictable and hierarchical relations that have characterized violent struggle are laid aside, the field becomes open to possibilities that might otherwise be foreclosed. Moreover – and this contributes to widening the field of possibilities – the field is also open to more participants. The distinction between those who struggle and those who support can become effaced, leading to the valuing and creation of struggle across a variety of registers.

This creativity of struggle refers us not only to the Deleuzian concepts of the rhizomatic and the arboreal, but also, and relatedly, to his concepts of the virtual and the actual. Violent struggle takes place almost solely within the parameters of the actual. Because it is so often ritualized, because it happens along pre-established pathways, because it is usually hierarchical, because it is generally centered (or at best polycentric), it does not touch upon the virtual. Difference eludes it; or, perhaps more accurately, it refuses difference. Violent struggle is, often if not necessarily, historically if not logically, an exercise that takes place wholly within the actual.

Nonviolent struggle, by contrast, can be an experiment in difference. By flattening the field of struggle so that everyone can participate, and

by refusing to privilege a single form of resistance and subordinating all other forms to it, nonviolence opens the door to the virtual. It allows for experimentation in forms of struggle whose outcome is uncertain and whose methods are often discovered as one goes along. Here's something Deleuze and Guattari say about struggle:

> This is how it should be done: Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there try out continuums of intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of land at all times.[12]

How much more does that sound like the first intifada than the second? How much more does it sound like an experiment in the virtual, which nonviolence offers us, than the ritual of violent resistance?

One of the lessons Deleuze teaches us (although he is not the only one), is that the process of struggle is as important as the outcome. Indeed, the process of struggle often is the outcome. Violent struggle, because it seeks an end beyond itself, neglects itself as process. This is perhaps why so many revolutions turn sour after the oppressor has been defeated: the oppressors may be gone, but the process of violence remains. Nonviolent struggle, because it can be as concerned with process as with outcome, opens the possibility for new and uncertain forms of resistance, and with it comes an embrace of the virtual and a creation of rhizomatic systems. This, I believe, is one of the lessons of thinking through specific struggles with the aid of Deleuzian concepts. In attempting to understand the two intifadas, both as specific struggles and in relation to each other, Deleuze offers a framework that allows us to see aspects of our history and our present to which we might otherwise have been blind. In turn, a study of the two intifadas offers us a concept, that of nonviolent struggle, that can itself enrich Deleuze's political thought and be transformed by it.

Such enrichment and transformation, although I have only gestured at it here, is at once a political and a philosophical task. It is a task that effaces the distinction between theory and practice; one that asks us not only to think differently but to act differently. It is a task that is, in a single gesture, one of thought and of life. And is that not the type of task that Deleuze has always set before us?

Notes

1. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (French: 1980) Trans. B. Massumi (London: Athlone, 1987), p. 21.
2. Deleuze, G. 'Grandeur de Yasser Arafat', in Deleuze, G. *Deux Régimes de Fous: Textes et entretiens 1975–1995* (Les Éditions de Minuit, 2003), p. 222 (no English translation to date – this chapter does not appear in the English version of *Two Regimes of Madness*).
3. Deleuze, G. 'Les Pierres', in Deleuze, G. *Deux Régimes de Fous*, op. cit., p. 311. Republished in English as 'Stones', in Deleuze, G. *Two Regimes of Madness* (French: 1975–1995) Trans. A. Hodges and M. Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2006), pp. 333–334.
4. Levinas, E. *The Levinas Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), p. 294.
5. Deleuze, G. 'Grandeur de Yasser Arafat', op. cit., p. 224.
6. Prigogine, I. & Stengers, I.*Order Out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue with Nature* (Boulder & London: New Science Library, 1984), p. 9.
7. Prigogine, I. & Stengers, I.*Order Out of Chaos*, op. cit., pp. 147–148.
8. Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition* (French: 1968) Trans. P. Patton (London: Athlone, 1994), p. 208.
9. Ibid., p. 212.
10. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 354.
11. Ibid., p. 21.
12. Ibid., p. 161.

15

The Autonomy of Migration: The Animals of Undocumented Mobility

Dimitris Papadopoulos and Vassilis Tsianos

Imperceptibility

The concept of becoming seeks to articulate a political practice in which social actors escape their normalized representations and reconstitute themselves in the course of participating in, and changing, the conditions of their material existence. Becoming is not only a force *against* something (against, primarily, the ubiquitous model of individualism and the sovereign regimes of population control), but is also a force which enables desire. Every becoming is a transformation of one multiplicity into another; every becoming radicalizes desire and creates new individuations and new affections. Becoming is a drift. But these continuous becomings – these ceaseless processes of diversification and transformation – do not fabricate an infinite series of differences. Deleuze is not a difference engineer: differences, individuations, modalities are only a starting point; they are the building materials of the world. Interestingly enough, the end of all becomings is not the proliferation of diversity and difference, but its disappearance. Becoming imperceptible is the immanent end of all becomings, it is a process of becoming everybody/everything; of eliminating the use of names to articulate and affirm that which exceeds the moment. Becoming indiscernible, impersonal, imperceptible is Deleuze and Guattari's universal political project because in order to become imperceptible one must dismantle in oneself everything that prevents one from slipping between things and growing in the midst of things.[1]

This chapter[2] will trace the political implications of the notion of imperceptibility in relation to migration, and its role in the emergence

of new modes of cooperation and action. Starting from a discussion of the notion of nomadism, we will argue that the practices of contemporary transnational migration force us to revise Deleuze and Guattari's split between nomadism and migration. Nomadism's dictum – 'you never arrive somewhere' – constitutes the matrix of today's migrational movements. The following section attempts to delineate various modes of nomadic becoming which govern migrants' embodied experiences: becoming animal, becoming women, becoming amphibious, becoming imperceptible. Finally, in the last section, we discuss how these volatile transformations escape the pervasive politics of representation, rights and visibility. This exodus confronts today's configurations of political sovereignty with an imperceptible force which renders the 'walls around the world' irreversibly porous. This is the autonomy of migration.

Documents

The arrival of Sir Alfred Mehran has been registered in many European police departments of immigration affairs, yet his figure remains an enigma. Mehran's biography seems to be emblematic of the figure of the nomad. His desire was to come to Britain on a refugee passport with his original name, Mehran Karimi Nasseri. In 1988 he flew from Brussels via Paris to London. In London he was refused entry into the country and sent back to Paris. But France also denied him entry and Brussels would not accept him back. Since then he has lived in the transit area of Terminal 1 in the Charles de Gaulle airport in Paris. When he finally got a UNHCR passport and was able to travel again and to leave the transit space, he declined to acknowledge and sign the necessary documents, arguing that the person 'Mehran Karimi Nasseri' did not exist any more. This person existed in 1988; today he is Sir Alfred Mehran.

This course of events is a perfect example of nomadic life. Nomadic motion is not about movement but is about the appropriation and remaking of space. What characterizes the nomad is not his/her passage through enclosures, borders, obstacles, doors, barriers. The nomad does not have a target, does not pass through a territory, leaves nothing behind, goes nowhere. The nomad embodies the desire to link two points together, and therefore s/he always occupies the space between these two points. The enigma of Sir Alfred Mehran's arrival does not result from his multiple displacements and final capture in Paris, rather it refers to the fact that this very moment of arrival lasts 17 years. Arrival has a *longue durée*, it covers almost the whole life of the nomad. One is

always there and always leaving, always leaving and always manifesting in the materiality of the place where one is.

You never arrive *somewhere*. Sir Alfred Mehran's spectacular story breaks with a classic conception of migration as a unidirectional, purposeful and intentional process. In this version of migration – typical of Fordist societies – the migrant is the signifier of a particular conceptualization of mobility: the individualized subject laboriously calculating the cost-benefit ratio of his/her trip and then starting an itinerary with fixed points of departure and arrival. But migration is not an individual strategy, nor does it designate the option 'exit.' Rather it characterizes the continuous shifts and radical re-articulations of individual trajectories. Migration is not the evacuation of a place and the occupation of a different one, it is the making and remaking of one's own life on the scenery of the world. World-making. You cannot measure migration in changes of position or location, but only in the increase in its inclusiveness and the amplitude of its intensities. Even if migration starts sometimes as a form of dislocation (forced by poverty, patriarchal exploitation, war, famine), its target is not *relocation* but the active transformation of social space. By being embedded in broader networks of intensive social change, migration challenges and reconstitutes the sovereign population control which functions solely through the identification and control of individual subjects' movements. Sir Alfred Mehran represents, in the most radical way, a non-representable migrant: the person who starts the journey is not the same at the end; the space which one inhabits is not the one intended; your documents do not refer to who you are or who you were, but to who you become in the journey. Travel becomes the law; becoming becomes the code.

Animals

The coyote is more than a *canis latrans* in the borderline of USA and Mexico. It also designates all the commercial 'guides' who are able to cross the national borders and organize illegal migrational movements and undocumented mobility. British sailors call the elusive helpers of stowaway passengers 'sharks'; in the Greek-Albanian borders their name is *'korakia'* (ravens). In Chinese they are called *'shetou'* (snakehead); a person who is as cunning as a snake and knows how to use his/her agile head to find a way through difficult situations. *'Shetou'* was also the name of the Chinese network blamed in public discussion for the Dover tragedy, which involved the death of 58 illegal migrants in a container lorry at Dover, UK, in the beginning of this millennium.

Official anti-trafficking discourse is bound to a sovereign conception of border politic: it individualizes border crossings and presents migrants as victims of the smuggler mafia. In the dominant public imaginary, migration is an illegally organized scandal with only two players: lawbreaking migrants and criminal smugglers. But the criminalization of border crossing, and the reduction of the complex and polymorphic networks which sustain migrational movements to a single or double actor piece, hides how the alleged sovereign humanitarian doctrine – 'save the people' – is nothing but the a violent fixation on the politics of 'save the national borders' and on the protection of the national corpus from unchecked intrusion. (We'll come to the importance of this preoccupation with borders for the constitution of national sovereignty later.) Migration is not a unilinear process of individual choice; it is not an effect of the push and pull mechanics of supply and demand for human capital. Migration adapts differently to each particular context; it changes its faces, links unexpected social actors together, absorbs and reshapes the sovereign dynamics targeting its control. Migration is arbitrary in its flows, de-individualized, and constitutive of new transnational spaces which exceed and neutralize sovereign politics. Migration is like big waves: migrants never appear precisely where they are expected; their arrival can never be predicted exactly, but they always come; and they have a magnitude to reorder the whole given geography of a seashore, the sandbanks, the seabed, the maritime animals and plants, the rocks, the beach.

In Turkey, trafficking with illegal migrants – '*koyun ticareti*' (sheep trade) – is more than an affair of corrupt policemen and has little in common with the phantom of a globally active 'smuggler' mafia. The coastal 'sheep trade' is a whole regime of mobility; a whole informal network in which hundreds of different actors participate – each one with different stakes – to make borders permeable. Migration makes material and psychosocial spaces porous – a Benjaminian porosity – where public and private intermingle, deviance and norm are renegotiated, zones of exploitation and justice are rearranged, formal and informal situations are reassembled. Rendering states' apparatuses and borders porous is the tactic migrants deploy to oppose the control of desire. Becoming animal is not simply a metaphor for transactions in the current regime of mobility, nor is it just a new academic theoretical trend; it is the cipher for the corporeal substratum of transnational migration in times of a global regime of forced illegality.

Consider for example the importance of becoming for the migrants' border crossing of the Straits of Gibraltar. In 1991, Spain imposed a visa

requirement for migrants from the Maghreb region. Since then, migrants from Morocco, Mali, Senegal, Mauritania (etc.) gather in Tangier waiting for an appropriate moment to cross the Mediterranean. They are called *'Herraguas'* (the burners); people prepared to burn their documents when they reach the Spanish Schengen border in order to avoid being returned to their country of origin. In the film *Tanger, le rêve des brûleurs* (Morocco/France 2002), Leila Kilani follows the paths of Rhimo, Denis, and others, and documents the de-individualized dreams and practices of these burners. But the strategy of de-identification is not primarily a question of shifting identitarian ascriptions; it is a material and an embodied way of being. The strategy of de-identification is a voluntary 'de-humanization' in the sense that it breaks the relation between your name and your body. A body without a name is a non-human human being; an animal which runs. It is non-human because it deliberately abandons the humanist regime of rights. The UNHCR convention for asylum seekers protects the rights of refugees on arrival, but not when they are on the road. And as we already know, the arrival has a *longue durée*: it does not concern the moment of arrival but the whole trip; perhaps a whole life. This is how migration solves the enigma of arrival. As the burners say: if you want to cross the Spanish borders, it is not sufficient to burn your papers, you have to become an animal yourself. Becoming is essential to mobility. The trope of becoming animal is only one of the options migrants employ in order to claim their freedom of movement. Becoming woman, becoming child, becoming elder, becoming soil, becoming fluid, along with becoming animal; these movements are the migrants' answer to the control of their desire.

Consider for example the 'eternal' becomings of one Interviewee – a Chinese man on his way to France who we met in a camp in Northern Greece during fieldwork for a project on transnational migration routes. This man was forced to stay in Romania for some time, married and got a residence permit there, applied for an EU visa, was rejected, reapplied and got a 3 month work permit which brought him to Paris, after overstaying his visa for more than 12 months was caught and deported back to Romania (something which means that you are not eligible to apply for an EU visa for a period of 10 years), in Romania he changed identity and gender, married again as a woman now, applied again for an EU visa, traveled to Paris, changed identity again and married in France, where finally he got a residence permit. Sometime later this person sent us an email to say that he or she – because the grammatical conventions of this sentence oblige us to choose a pronoun – had arrived in Canada.

Becoming is the inherent impetus of migration. Migrants do not connect to each other by representing and communicating their 'true' individual identities, nor by translating for others what they posses or what they 'are'. Migrants do not need translation to communicate; migration does not need mediation. Migrants connect to each other through becomings; through their own gradual and careful, sometimes painful, transformation of their existing bodily constitution, they realize their desire by changing their bodies, voices, accents, patois, hair, color, height, gender, age, biographies. Deleuze and Guattari write:

> Starting from the forms one has, the subject one is, the organs one has, or the functions one fulfils, becoming is to extract particles between which one establishes the relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness that are closest to what one is becoming and through which one becomes. This is the sense in which becoming is the process of desire.[3]

The migrant's becoming creates the indeterminate materiality on which new connections, sociabilities, lines of flight, informal networks, and transit spaces thrive. Becoming is the way to link the enigma of arrival and the enigma of origin into a process of dis-identification. We mean dis-identification literally here, as the way to become more than one. Migrants' material becomings do not end in new states of being, rather they constitute being as the point of departure on which new becomings can emerge. Being is similar to the transit spaces where migrants rest for a while, reconnect to their communities, call their relatives and friends, earn more money to pay the smugglers, collect powers, prepare their new becomings. Being is nothing more than becoming's intermediate stages. If being is a passport number, the migrant's becomings are countless. The multiplication of beings. Two, three; many passports! Dis-identification = being everyone. Because you must be everyone in order to be everywhere. Becoming imperceptible: Deleuze and Guattari call this the cosmic formula of multiplicity. The imperceptibility of migration does not mean that migration itself is imperceptible. On the contrary, the more migrational flows become powerful and effective by materializing the practices of becoming, the more they turn out to be the most privileged targets for registration, regulation and restriction by sovereign power. Becoming imperceptible is an immanent act of resistance because it makes it impossible to identify migration as a process which consists of fixed collective subjects. Becoming imperceptible is the most precise and effective tool migrants

employ to oppose the individualizing, quantifying and representational pressures of the settled, constituted geopolitical power.

The cunning of migration

What kind of political subject does imperceptibility create? How is migration woven into the emergence of a post-representational era of politics? The politics of difference of the eighties and nineties intervenes in the given conditions of representation; renegotiating and rearticulating them under the imperative that resistance is possible. Cultural studies, postcolonialism, postfeminism, queer studies, and radical democratic approaches have all revealed that the given systems of representation generate the effacement of certain differences (the migrant, the queer, the subaltern, the excluded) and have thus introduced a new subversive strategy of *visibility*. But these times are over. The crisis of multiculturalism, the difficulties of aligning queer politics with other radical social movements, the gradual occupation of postfeminist positions by communitarian neo-essentialisms, and the obsession of radical democratic approaches with the question of formal rights: all these mark a phase of stagnation of subversive politics and suggest the absorption of such politics into a vortex of liberal thinking.

This is the end of the politics of representation. And as such, the end of the strategy of visibility. Instead of visibility, we say: imperceptibility. Instead of being perceptible, discernible and identifiable, current migration puts on the agenda a new form of politics and a new formation of active political subjects whose aim is not to find a different way to become or to be a political subject, but to refuse to become a subject at all. Sir Alfred Mehran refused to use his original name when, in 1999, he was offered a UNHCR passport which – through the assimilationist logic of liberal-national administration – rendered him identifiable. Many of the migrants in the border camps do not wait for a decision regarding their asylum status, but instead escape the camps and dive into the informal networks of clandestine labor in the metropolises. The migrants waiting in the North shores of Africa to cross the Mediterranean in floating coffins choose to burn their documents and enter a life which *de facto* puts them outside of any politics of visibility. Visibility, meanwhile, in the context of illegal migration, belongs to the inventory of technologies for policing migrational flows.

Migrants become stronger when they become visible by obtaining rights, but the demands of migrants and the dynamics of migration cannot be exhausted in the quest for visibility and rights. This is because

both function as differentiation markers that establish a clear and visible link between the person and its origins; between the body and an identity. And this is precisely not what migrants want when they are clandestine on the road. What they want is to become everybody by refusing to become integrated and assimilated in the logic of border administration; what they want is to become imperceptible. Migration is the moment where you prefer to say: I prefer not to be. And this is not something which characterizes contemporary migration alone. It is only because of the dominance of communitarian, humanist, and identity oriented conceptual systems in social sciences (and associated public discourses) that we are prevented from seeing migration as one of the biggest laboratories for the subversion of liberal politics. Even the emblematic Ellis Island should not be considered the melting pot out of which the new American citizen was born, but rather the space where endless stories of virtual identities were invented in order to make one eligible to cross the 'golden door' into America. The whole vision of an America 'welcoming everyone from abroad' – an America which is 'open to difference' – is based on an infinite series of inventions and lies. Valuable lies, nice lies, vital lies. America's history and the cunning of migration. Migration is the sister of transience; it produces mixed forms, menwomen, new species. The cunning of migration breeds animals. How to register them in the clean and pedantic archives of the administration? How to respond to a sheep or a raven when it has the courage to encounter the gaze of the bureaucrat in a police department of immigration affairs and demand asylum? How to register all these liminal animals? How to record all these paperless subjects? How to codify all these continuous becomings? Impossible.

Of course migration's weapon of imperceptibility does not always succeed. It is a route without guarantees. It involves pain, suffering, hunger, desperation, torture; even the death of thousands of people in the sunken ships into the oceans of earth. But in this text we are deliberately not presenting migration once again as a humanitarian scandal, nor as a deviation from the evolutionist human rights doctrine of Western modernity. Is it a coincidence that the widespread images of migration in the media and public discourses – which depict it as a series of monstrous tragedies – supply *equally* the ubiquitous humanitarian discourses as well as the xenophobic and racist politics of forced repatriation? This text attempts to change the perspective and to approach migration as a constitutive moment of the current social transformation; a moment which is primarily sustained by cooperation, solidarity, the use of broad networks and

resources, shared knowledge, collective anticipation. This understanding of migration puts the issue of citizenship directly on the agenda of post-national polity (consider three different demands of migrational movements related to an enlargement of traditional conceptualizations of citizenship: cultural citizenship, flexible citizenship and universal citizenship).

The demise of the strategy of visibility marks a turning point in the way we understand politics. How does migration open possibilities for rethinking the end of contemporary forms of sovereignty? The politics of representation and its subversive re-articulations belong to the inventory of the historical realization of democratic social organization. Its core principle is national sovereignty, the ideal correspondence and congruence of people and territory. National sovereignty attempts to establish this correspondence in two subsequent moments: first, it separates and classifies the people of a territory into groups and social strata through the signification procedures of representation; second, it assigns rights of participation to each of these represented groups. National sovereignty is based on the national social compromise between different groups and strata for a potential egalitarian distribution of rights. Migration is part of this process, even if it has been treated differently in different countries. In most European countries, for example, migration was assimilated in the form of *Gastarbeit* (temporary employment), which performs an inclusion of the right to work at the national level without the extensive granting of equal political rights. In countries which actively encouraged immigration, migrants were incorporated in the national social compromise by accepting them as an integral part of the national project in general. In this case, migrants were granted not only full work rights but also political rights. But despite the seemingly egalitarian treatment of migration in this second case, migrants came across the racist dispositifs prevalent in these societies. Equal rights did not mean the possession of equal symbolic capital in the politics of representation. The fact that cultural studies and post-colonialism (which are, as we said earlier, concerned with the critique of the representational deficit) arose primarily in these countries, and came later to continental Europe, is the result of this particular historical experience, namely: the coexistence between equal rights and racist treatment; between formal equality and de facto ethnic segmentation. Despite all these variations in the treatment of migration, the main focus was always the assignment of rights and representational visibility to migrants.

The demand for unrestricted rights and extensive representation – the so called 'double R axiom' – is an outcome of the pressure migration exerts on national sovereignty to restructure the functional relationship between people and territory. The constitutive outside of national sovereignty is not another extraterritorial national sovereignty but the border as the material manifestation of their relation. The double R principle does not only organize the national-territorial corpus, it primarily designates the relation to outer states and their people. Thus, the double R axiom simultaneously defines the matrix of positive rights and representation within the national territory and the non-existence of rights and symbolic presence beyond its borders. When we think of the double R axiom, we have to always consider that it also refers to its exact opposite: the absence of rights and representation. This is why the state of exception in modern political theory is regarded as the crucial moment of modern national sovereignty. Because always inherently given in national sovereignty is its negation. It can always deny its own foundations and withdraw from its function as the creditor of the double R axiom. The state of exception is the moment where the borders are erected within the national territory; tearing up any apparent society of equals. Despite the conceptualization of the nation as an egalitarian unity of the people, national sovereignty is organized around an inner border which traverses the whole society from its very beginning: the hierarchical organization of gender relations and the organization of the national imaginary along masculinized and homophobic ideology. National sovereignty is institutionalized gender oppression. There is no nation which guarantees equal rights and equal symbolic power to men and women, to heterosexuals and queer people. So, from the very first moment of its existence, the power of national sovereignty is that it can always erect borders in its own corpus; it can perform surgical operation on its own body, on the society of the people. While national sovereignty is the all-inclusive and all-digesting belly of *Leviathan*, the state of exception which results from the state's erection of borders within its own society, is the moment when Leviathan empties its belly; throwing out of its body that which is destabilizing it. Modern national sovereignty is thus, simultaneously, both the organizing agency which grants rights and secures access to symbolic power, as well as its antithesis: a power which systematically nullifies rights and restricts representation.

We have traced how, under the pressure of migration, borders reveal the changing faces and developments of sovereignty. Now we want to illuminate this same issue from another perspective: that of the moving

masses. How do borders, as integral parts of national sovereignty, sustain specific forms of control of migrational movements? Historically, the systematic control of the mobility of workforces was a reaction to the escape of the masses from enslavement and indenture to the guild. The establishment of wage labor was an attempt to translate the freedom of the vagabond masses into a productive, utilizable, and exploitable workforce. The freedom to choose and to change your employer is not a fake or ideological liberty, as classical working class Marxism suggests, but an historical compromise designed to integrate the newly released, disorganized and wandering workforce into a new regime of productivity. In fact, from the outset, wage labor is more an ordering principle (ordering the surplus of the worker's freedom) than a mere mechanism of oppression. Only later, and gradually with the emergence and global expansion of capitalist production, does waged labor again become an oppressive constraint on workers' potential freedoms. Fordist waged labor transforms the worker's liberty and mobility into a fixed and stable workforce market. Fordism transformed the promising force of the freedom of mobility into competitively organized upward social mobility. Disciplinary institutions prepare men to enter the Fordist organized labor market, and bind women into the socially effaced and symbolically devalued realm of reproduction. The incorporation of the split between productive and reproductive fields in the Fordist regime stabilized the hierarchical patriarchal order of gender relations pertinent to national sovereignty.

Neoliberalism and the biopolitical turn brought the collapse of national sovereignty and the Fordist regime. On the one hand, global capital practices its own exodus from national regulation. On the other hand, the current border-crossing mobility of work intensifies the existing pressure on national borders. Neoliberalism introduced the virtual order of global markets and irrevocably undermined the national sovereign state's monopoly of power. In parallel, biopolitics infused a deregulated and fluid governance of the population in the heart of the established Fordist regime of immobility. Together, neoliberalism and biopolitics pushed national sovereignty to its end. The dual dynamics of transnationalism and migration accelerated the previously mentioned internal ambivalence of national sovereignty. By increasingly erecting borders in the heart of its own society, national sovereignty is more and more tempted to execute its right for exception in its own body: the proliferation of camps, Guantanamo; gated communities; banlieues; the prison-industrial complex; favelas. But all this only represents the naked body of the new emerging sovereign. We enter a phase

were neoliberalism and biopolitics have accomplished their task to decentralize national sovereignty, and enter a period where they are starting to annul themselves. There is a new grand transformation of the present taking place, one which leaves behind the post-war national sovereignty, and the neoliberalism and biopolitics of the eighties and nineties, and brings us to a postnational and postliberal formation of sovereignty.

In the emerging postliberal conditions, labor becomes mobile and migrants become animals enunciating their subjective lines of flight out of the current rigid and exploitative regimes of accumulation. While biopolitics has contributed to reactivating freedom of movement against the Fordist national regime of control, it has also slowly but steadily started to consolidate an oppressive global system which controls the released migrational flows and suppresses the autonomy of migration. In this chapter we have read Deleuze and Guattari's nomadic philosophy as a starting point for overcoming the limitations of the biopolitical understanding of migration. Deleuze and Guattari provide unsettling concepts for challenging the holy duality of contemporary migration theory (e.g., the economistic thinking of new mobility studies vs. the humanitarianism of communitarian thinking and refugee studies alike). The concept of becoming can help to overcome the liberal discourse of the new migrant – as a useful and adaptable workforce – as well as the logic of 'victimization' prevalent in NGO paternalistic interventionism. Within a theory of the autonomy of migration inspired by the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari, migration is the paradigmatic driving force of the new postliberal sovereignty. But it is simultaneously the worst nightmare of the emerging sovereign, whose new clothes are manufactured in the sweatshops of this earth. The moving packs of mobile workers traversing continents on floating coffins create uncountable new subjectivities which are unlabelled, untamed, unidentified. People act together and make worlds without giving any permanent name to their alliances and conditions of existence. Without ever intending it, this multiplicity of subjectivities is tantamount to a univocality. It is a moment where social control is exercised from below, where social change is subjectless, where the new elusive historical actors dwell in the world of imperceptibility and generate a persistent and insatiable surplus of sociality in motion. A new world in the heart of the old world: world 2. World 2 does not redeem this surplus of sociality by establishing a new totalizing and messianic version of a better democratic polis, but it constitutes the exodus out of the polis – the First Transnational?

Notes

1. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (French: 1980) Trans. B. Massumi (London: Athlone, 1987), see p. 279.
2. We would like to thank Niamh Stephenson for her insightful comments and her three-words-present, Jim Clifford for all these ideas in this text which originate in our inspiring discussions in Santa Cruz, Efthimia Panagiotidis for sharing with us her thoughts about our common fieldwork, and Brigitta Kuster for her suggestions about documentary films on migration. Some of the empirical and theoretical research presented here was funded by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and by the Federal Cultural Foundation of Germany (research project 'Transit Migration'). The ideas discussed in this text have benefited much from the debates in the theory and border activist network Frassanito.
3. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 272.

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Complex and Minor: Deleuze and the Alterglobalization Movement(s)

Graeme Chesters

> As we weave and unweave our bodies... from day to day, their molecules shuttled to and fro, so does the artist weave and unweave his image.
>
> James Joyce[1]

> It's not a question of worrying or hoping for the best, but of finding new weapons.
>
> Gilles Deleuze[2]

Introduction

This chapter[3] argues for a Deleuzian approach to the study of global social movements as a means of interpreting the strands of subjectivity, antagonism and reflexivity that animate and inspire those arguing that 'another world', or even 'other worlds', are possible.[4] I suggest that networks of individuals, groups, projects and events increasingly constitute an 'alter-' – rather than an 'anti-' – globalization movement. Such networks propose myriad social, technical and ecological responses to global problems and demonstrate, through practice, the lived reality of those possibilities.

From the Zapatista rebellion in Mexico, to People's Global Action[5] and the World Social Forum,[6] the emergence of dynamic and globally interacting movements focusing on peace and social justice has led to international institutions of finance and governance (WTO, IMF, G8, and so on) being re-framed as controversial and contested entities. This antagonism has been materially realized in protests from Seattle to Genoa[7] and Cancun to Gleneagles.

The alter-globalization movement(s) comprises forces constitutive of what the New York Times called 'the second superpower';[8] a 'new power in the streets' that is challenging both the economic orthodoxies of neo-liberalism and the 'inverted totalitarianism'[9] underpinned by a normative discourse of permanent war (on terror, drugs, and the poor). By using Deleuze and Guattari's concepts of the 'war machine', the 'rhizome' and the 'plateau', the distributed networks constituting the 'movement' can be theorized as an expression of the immanent possibilities of increasing social and global complexity.[10] This is in keeping with the complexity-inspired form of Deleuzian (schizo)analysis recently pioneered by Manuel Delanda[11] and John Protevi.[12]

When considering complexity from the perspective of the humanities and social sciences we can identify thinkers who have worked with concepts that are now being systematically theorized and nested within the complexity 'turn'.[13] The link that Joyce makes between art and molecular reproduction is one instance, and is reminiscent of Deleuze[14] and Guattari's[15] re-grounding of life *as* (and *in*) process through their use of *becoming* to destabilize the idea of 'being'. Becoming indicates a process of symbiosis; the connection of heterogeneous elements into new assemblages with emergent properties. One such assemblage is the 'war machine':[16] a concept that suggests a range of social actors (nomads, itinerants, artisans, warriors) who avoid assimilation within the disciplinary logic of the state and who frequently array against it as a result of their resistance to normative constraints. It is a concept that illustrates the antagonistic potential of forces that resist or escape processes of stratification, over-coding and control by the axiomatic of the state, and that resist (more recently) the inevitability of neoliberal globalization underpinned by a capitalist axiomatic.

My own work in this area[17] indicates that the alter-globalization movement(s) acts as an anticapitalist *attractor* within global civil society; reorienting groups and movements during spaces of encounter and deliberation wherein new assemblages akin to those of a 'war machine' are produced. This is a task of discovery and artistic intervention that locates and synthesizes forces immanent to global practices of resistance, refusal and escape. What emerges is a fractal movement in space, akin to the patterning of self-similarity in complex systems, where modes of symbolic contestation, discursive democracy and antagonistic conflict overflow borders iteratively and through various scales from the local to the global.[18]

For Deleuze, a 'war machine' might exhibit as much of its antagonistic quality in its capacity for cultural intervention, as it does from its

acts of political and economic contestation. In the instance of the alter-globalization movement(s), antagonism is culturally rendered in a siege of the signs of informationalized capital flows. In such a siege, axiomatically derived norms – including free markets, corporate power, brand identities, and so forth – are creatively disrupted and re-appropriated by a 'hacker class'[19] of activists.

The cultural politics of this movement(s)[20] valorizes both material interventions and discursive contestation through the 'resources' of subjectivity and symbol, with the result that activists often prefer poetic performance to political rhetoric and espouse carnival – rather than collectivism – as their modus operandi.[21] Indeed, the alter-globalization movement(s) has self-consciously adopted artistic modes of expression that defy reduction to simple issues of identity or grievance.[22] Instead it seeks spaces for what might be described as *ritornellos* of the subject, movement *refrains* and *'rhythms* of resistance',[23] all of which constitute a complex ontology of signification. As a movement, therefore, it remains inaccessible to social movement models of political exchange, which operate within the conceptual confines of the nation state and frame analyses around the construction of collective identity for political campaigning or lobbying purposes.[24]

Plateaux: Intensive planes of consistency

In protests against transnational financial and administrative institutions, the alter-globalization movement(s) has mounted confrontational collective action using consensus and directly democratic mechanisms. As a rhizomatic 'network of networks',[25] it has also constructed 'new' democratic spaces for deliberation on complex global problems and has framed these problems within the discourse of 'anti-capitalism'[26] and 'alter-globalization'. These participatory fora, including the conferences and gatherings of People's Global Action (PGA) and the World Social Forum (WSF),[27] are central to the emergence of global social movement networks as antagonistic actors within global civil society.

The first WSF, held in Porto Alegre, Brazil in 2001,[28] came about through the efforts of a number of organizations, including the Brazilian Justice and Peace Commission (CBJP), the Brazilian Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (ABONG), the Social Network for Justice and Human Rights, and the founders of ATTAC (France). Conceived as an alternative to the World Economic Forum, the 'informal' gathering of political and business leaders – now hosted yearly in Davos, Switzerland, and frequently attracting in excess of 150,000 people – has grown to

become *the* predominant (and uniquely non-representational) space of encounter and deliberation within global civil society.

In my work on framing processes within global social movements, I refer to these events – both the protests (Seattle, Genoa, and so on) and the gatherings (PGA, WSF) – as 'plateaux'.[29] This, I believe, is one of the most interesting, yet under-theorized (despite it being the title of Deleuze and Guattari's most celebrated work: *Mille Plateaux* – the second volume of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*) concepts to arise in Deleuze's work. The term *plateau* has geological, mathematical and figurative meanings, but Deleuze's use is derived from the work of the anthropologist and systems-theorist Gregory Bateson,[30] who used plateau to differentiate a preference within Balinese culture for the continuation of intensity over the transcendence of culmination or climax (an orientation that he noted was pervasive in many Balinesean social relations, including sexuality and aggression). Deleuze and Guattari developed this concept as an extension of their distinction between arborescent culture (linear, binary, hierarchized) and rhizomatic culture (multiplicitous, heterogeneous, non-linear): 'We call a "plateau" any multiplicity connected to other multiplicities by superficial underground stems in such a way as to form or extend a rhizome.'[31]

In my formulation, I use plateau(x) as a descriptor for the process of intensive networking in material and immaterial spaces that occurs around nodal points of contestation or deliberation, such as in protest events or social fora. This allows a focus upon processes of territorialization, including the manifestation of movements within physically and temporally bounded spaces, and the lines of flight between those territories. It also enables a focus on the reconfiguration of networks through processes of encounter, the proliferation of weak links, the exchange of knowledge, and the construction of affective relationships through face-work and co-presence. These processes of physical interaction that characterize global social movement – the protest actions, *encuentros* (encounters) and social fora – are further understood to be dynamically interconnected and co-extensive with a *digital commons*,[32] which underpins computer mediated interaction and communications, and which co-constructs the rhizome of the alter-globalization movement(s).

Movement plateaux (summit sieges and social forums) render visible the iterative character and fractal patterning of overlapping networks. They also make manifest processes of interaction and exchange between global locales, between the virtual and the real, and between new social actors and familiar forces of antagonism. Both geographically discrete and temporally bounded, they are 'events' that are simultaneously

extensive of space and time; stretched and warped through interaction on e-mail lists, dedicated chat rooms, web logs, text messages, and a variety of mobile technologies. As such, they are moments of temporary but intensive network stabilization, where the rhizomatic components of the movement(s) – groups, organizations, individuals, ideologies, cognitive frames and material resources – are simultaneously manifest and re-configured.

These plateaux provide a reflexive impetus for movements; an opportunity to recognize singularities and valorize connections. They allow for the exploration of difference (identities, politics, strategy, goals) through theoretical and practical innovation (such as cognitive and symbolic reframing[33]) or the construction of distinct spatialities within the one temporality (action zones, different protest repertoires). Plateaux therefore involve: the formulation and shaping of political projects at the local and global levels; further strategic and tactical reflection; skill sharing; the construction of alternative means of communication and information exchange; and the development of mechanisms for the expression of solidarity and mutual aid.

Plateaux are increasingly a means through which phase transitions occur in movement forms; they precipitate increases in flows of energy, which produce non-linear changes in the system (of relations) conducting that energy. Phase transitions of this type might involve dramatic metamorphoses – such as a discrete national campaign group becoming a transnational affinity network, or a 'workers party' becoming a 'movement-party' – or they may be far subtler, such as when a 'leader-less' culture is re-framed as one that is 'leader-full'.

Throughout, movement plateaux correspond to the definition advanced by Deleuze and Guattari of a 'continuous, self-vibrating region of intensities whose development avoids any orientation towards a culmination point or external end'.[34] This is evident in the World Social Forum movement, which, according to Michael Hardt, is '*the* representation of a new democratic cosmopolitanism, a new anticapitalist transnationalism, a new intellectual nomadism, a great movement of the multitude'.[35] This movement's sensitivity and commitment to *process* over *outcome* has enabled activists to 'bridge worlds' through the deliberate construction of spaces wherein weak links between diverse movements can be made. The importance of 'social bridges' for the elaboration of communication and access to resources, is a point made strongly in Granovetter's seminal work on the strength of weak ties[36] (and later made by those elaborating theories of small world networks derived from complexity theory[37]).

Granovetter's counter-intuitive argument is that it is weak ties between people – not strong friendships – that are most important when it comes to things such as launching a new project, finding a job, and accessing news. This is because weak ties are crucial for being able to communicate beyond one's immediate social (or activist) worlds. Close friends and fellow activists almost inevitably move in the same circles and, as such, are most likely to be exposed to the same information. Weak ties have to be activated to open new channels of information and maximize potential for agency. These ties might include e-mail contacts, and people met during meetings, protests and gatherings. There is also a need to be able to connect with activist hubs. Individuals and groups thus become active within many networks ('spiders at the center of many webs'[38]), networking spaces (such as forums and information exchanges) and social centers, and they do so without undue interference from structures and hierarchies.

The World Social Forum process is a perfect example of a movement plateau(x), for it constitutes explicit recognition of the value of, and desire for, a space of enunciation, interaction and iteration that is coextensive with the actions of movement networks and organizations, without trying to represent those actions, or, in turn, be represented by them. The social forum movement also resists being conceived of as temporally or geographically bounded. Instead, its Charter of Principles recognizes that: 'The World Social Forum at Porto Alegre was an event localized in time and place. From now on, in the certainty proclaimed at Porto Alegre that "another world is possible," it becomes a permanent process of seeking and building alternatives, which cannot be reduced to the events supporting it'.[39]

The social forum process remains remarkably resilient and resistant to co-option despite the efforts of comparatively powerful actors, including Leftist political parties,[40] to control this process. This is due primarily to the complex character of the system of relations comprising social forums. The variable and contested structures of the forum movement are emergent properties of processes of interaction in real and virtual domains. They are both adaptive to, and contingent upon, the differing contexts of their manifestation. This capacity to change structure in response to external environments is a quality that signifies a high degree of self-organization. Through the distillation of complex and abstract argumentation, combined with social force and political pressure, the forum movement becomes particularly adept at perturbating established political and economic discourses.

Plateaux are thus comprised of a combination of elements. These include large numbers of interacting individuals, groups, and movements which constitute an open system that continually adapts to its environment. This leads to increased reflexivity, facilitated by feedback loops and non-linear processes of interaction and iteration, that in turn lead to even greater complexity. Plateaux are therefore combinatory expressions of complexity effects, realized through assemblages of material and immaterial elements. They are shaped by the material infrastructure of mobility and communication systems that are a prerequisite of a 'network sociality'.[41] Through their emphasis upon co-presence, face-work, meetings, and encounters, they point to how these material/immaterial assemblages realize the potential of small world networks. What emerges is a network of networks, shaped by an eclectic mix of base communities (indigenous, cultural, affective) and minoritarian subjectivities. These *virtuosi*[42] include net-workers of various kinds – 'artivists', 'hackers', 'Indy-mediatistas' and 'academivists' – whose capacity to resist co-option by party discipline and ideological strictures has grown as a result of increasing complexity.

Parallelogram of forces

Plateaux facilitate the multiplication of forces (social, cultural and economic) through artisanal production in subjective, material and symbolic domains. The resultant vectors express both *force* and *flight*, thereby exposing the 'rule' of neo-liberalism to challenges that cannot be met by the application of equal and opposite forces within the fashion of a hegemonic struggle. This 'asymmetric' terrain of struggle is frequently addressed by political elites through the application of 'simple' solutions, including violent intervention by the state (such as the pre-emptive attacks against protesters in Genoa during the protests against the G8[43] or populist attempts at assimilation through global governance structures).[44]

Through plateaux, global movements are able to hold in dynamic tension the expressive and transformative potential of a number of ideological and discursive traditions. *Not* as an integrated collective identity but as a *parallelogram of forces*[45] that enables the realization and multiplication of force relations through an affirmation of the *virtual singularities*[46] present within global civil society. Hybridity, diversity and difference combine here in forms of antagonistic collective action, rendering identity and cultural politics material (in a proximate sense)

and highly visible (in terms of the wider culture of discontent evident in the public sphere).

The social sciences have a remarkably poor record in terms of understanding the dynamics of, let alone predicting, significant social change. Scholarship within both social movement and historical studies, demonstrates that significant shifts in 'habits of mind' often originate in the liminal spaces of social margins. The problem has been, and remains, that of identifying the marginal vectors with transformatory potential within the prevailing set of material circumstances and conflicts. In terms of the themes engaged with here, there is no consensus over these conditions, but some key elements are arguably clear. Amongst these, the significance of networks and the primacy of mobilities, encounters and knowledge practices in a global age stand out as key examples.[47]

Accounts of these processes typically share an analytical focus upon the rise of computer-based communications, the transition to knowledge economies and the significance of 'sign values'.[48] For example, Hardt and Negri argue for the increasing importance of 'immaterial labor' in producing services, 'cultural product, knowledge or communication'.[49] Their analysis emphasizes that such 'affective labor' is a *collective* production of 'social networks, [and] forms of community'.[50] This resonates with the concept of the plateau, which suggests that actors are concerned with the production of a cultural politics (rather than a political culture) and, through it, the creation of 'new types of resistance' (such as those envisaged by Hardt and Negri). As cultural forms have been appropriated to create value for products and brands,[51] cultural politics have been rendering visible and declaring a global set of stakes – most notably: that 'what is at stake is life itself'.[52] We could therefore say, in a Deleuzian sense, that the alter-globalization movement(s) has rediscovered the project of political life to be immanent to the style in which one lives.[53]

The primacy of network approaches to social movements[54] and complex societies,[55] reflects a widespread concern with the 'space of flows' created by economic and cultural globalization, including flows of capital, people, materials and symbols that are constitutive of global dynamics. However, network analyses sometimes reproduce a cartographic form of engagement within social science and the humanities that seeks to map networks, measure densities, and so on. Networks are frequently depicted *as if* they are bounded conduits connecting discrete actors with specific grievances and with aims that intersect within equally bounded 'nodes'. The use of the term 'plateaux' however, is an attempt to preserve the integrity and centrality of rhizomatic forms,

in order to get beyond conceptions of protest events or social fora as one of many 'nodes' in an 'indefinitely expansive network'.[56] Instead, it counterpoises processes of self-ordering material processes and phase transitions (from 'flow' to gas to solid) arising from within a machinic phylum.[57]

The rhizome does not just stand for non-hierarchical forms but also reflects the multi-layered diffuse and interactional nature of the processes through which rhizomes constitute and shape 'forceful bodies'; the 'particular force arrangements of chemical, biological and social bodies'.[58] When understood radically, this distinction allows us to move beyond the reductive aspects of network analyses, which are prone to emphasize connectivity *over* the capacities for material self-ordering arising from such connectivity and the force arrangements that emerge from these processes. This is consistent with the argument advanced by Deleuze and Guattari and articulated by Protevi,[59] who suggests that 'questions of human freedom are only explicable when we address emergence above and below the level of the subject'.[60] These are theoretical postulates consistent with Bateson's emphasis upon systemic aspects of communication. The increasing potential for 'free acts', noted by complexity theorists,[61] requires attention to the experiential degrees of freedom through which individuals subjectively experience, recognize, modulate and replicate libratory repertoires of self. This might include anything from exercising constraint upon the autonomic nervous system, through to perturbating social, cultural or institutional constraints inhibiting emergence. In this way, the extensive creation of a rhizomatic movement through plateaux is an experiment in the pre-subjective, subjective and collective invocation of singularities cooperating to express difference.

Conclusion: An 'ethics' of invention, intensity and connection

To conclude, we might consider a number of pressing questions that emerge from the Deleuzian conceptualization of global movement as a parallelogram of forces constituted through plateaux. These include the model of social change (if any) that such a concept suggests, how we might understand the role of agency and organization in complex systems, and what values we might derive from our understanding to guide future action and interventions.

This requires us to look closely at the differing vectors of the alter-globalization movement(s) and their resultant force-combinations (the

emergent properties that are frequently manifest in protest events and through symbolic challenges that extend beyond specific space-times). Added to these are the lines of flight represented by experiments in the creation of radical subjectivities, autonomous spaces and forms of cultural production best described by the Deleuzian concept of 'becoming-minor'.[62]

The argument I wish to advance is that Deleuze and Guattari's work enables consideration of the properties of material self-ordering within complex systems whilst retaining a pragmatic emphasis upon intervention, upon agency as immanent structuring, and upon ethics as a means of experimentation within a 'body-politic'. As Bogue[63] has shown, this is particularly clear in Deleuze's delineation of the relationship between the self, knowledge practices and power deployed in his exposition of Foucault's work.

Deleuze systemizes Foucault's thought by 'establishing the relationship between the archaeological strata of knowledge, the genealogical domain of power and the ethical folds of the self'.[64] Deleuze's project here, it seems, is to locate the ethical self as a locus of resistance to the systematicity of knowledge-power processes; a locus of resistance which operates in ways which enable the interstices in those systems to be exploited and the reproduction of control to be traversed or subverted. Moreover, Deleuze's project is to situate those ethics in a broader process of becoming-minor, and it is this trajectory that most resonates with the contemporary resistances expressed by the alter-globalization movement(s).

In Foucault's genealogies of disciplinary control[65] – his 'histories of the present' – he describes a system of power that becomes ever more complete through the extension of disciplinary institutions and discursive, linguistic and symbolic formations that regulate and order life. Deleuze takes this further in his 'Postscript on Societies of Control',[66] arguing that the pervasive character of technology and disciplinary logic allows for the dispersal of control mechanisms throughout society, so that we are now subject to continuous monitoring through the modulation and extension of formerly spatially bounded institutional logics. The socio-spatial discipline provided by schools, factories, hospitals and prisons, is replaced by technologically mediated and 'virtual' enclosures. These include: 'life-long' learning, corporatization, risk assessment, 'performance' management and the universalized panopticon of the 'invisible' and immaterial prisons constructed by CCTV, electronic tagging and house arrest. These forms of control find local and global expressions and have developed in parallel to the extension of systems of

governance to the global level, the integration of financial systems and the liberalization of capital flows, to form what Guattari calls 'integrated world capitalism',[67] and what Hardt and Negri describe as 'Empire'.[68]

Deleuze suggests that in Foucault's ethical studies we can see the possibility of opposition to this system of control, through 'the self as a locus of resistance, a point at which thought itself can become a political force'.[69] In this sense, resistance is located in the rejection of what Bateson termed the 'habits of mind' associated with the 'common sense' constructed through the dispersed logics of control, leading to the formulation through encounter of an ethics of invention, intensity and connection, rather than a moral politics.

Deleuze suggests that the entropic tendency of force, towards dispersion and disorganization, can be accelerated through minoritarian becomings, leading to the deterritorialization of key elements of the social and political field. This is not then, a personal ethics, but a knowledge practice based upon what Massumi calls 'symbiosis tending':[70] the bringing together of diverse elements in a way which allows them to escape what Deleuze refers to as the plane of organization. This is the transcendent plane; the normative standard under which judgment is made possible and through which things are ordered by the 'logic' of representation.

The 'schizophrenic' tendency of capitalism, identified by Deleuze and Guattari, ensures ever-greater differentiation and the subsequent elevation of difference as the generative dynamic behind informationalized production; new styles, objects, modes of exchange, etc. This creates both opportunities and pitfalls for further experimentation. In this context, plateaux allow lines of flight – constructed locally in the spatial-temporal dynamics of protests and sub-cultural experiments – to be multiplied globally. This results in force-combinations that act both politically (against specific sites and manifestations of the neo-liberal axiomatic) and culturally (through the ethics and practices of a 'coming-together'[71] which valorizes affectivity, deliberation and consensus). These postulates find expression through the street party as a protest repertoire,[72] and through the carnival as cultural analytic,[73] and extend to the symbolic multipliers of participatory practices invoked by the Porto Alegre[74] affect and the Zapatista 'Caracoles'. These experiments transcend the local and are diffused globally. As both force and flight, they are increasingly the exodus of those who 'flee but whilst fleeing seize a weapon'.[75] The promise of the alter-globalization movement(s), therefore, is its desire to find new weapons; be they thoughts, words or actions.

Notes

1. Joyce, J. *Ulysses* (New York: Random House, 1986), p. 159.
2. Deleuze, G. *Negotiations* (French: 1990) Trans. M. Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 178.
3. The ideas developed in this chapter grew out of a long collaboration with Ian Welsh and many encounters with the people and processes constituting the alter-globalization movement(s). I also want to acknowledge my father, who understood the war machine and its implications, a long time before me.
4. 'Another World is Possible' is the slogan of the World Social Forum – see Fisher, W.F. & Ponniah, T. (Eds) *Another World Is Possible: Popular Alternatives to Globalization at the World Social Forum* (London: Zed Books, 2003). However this has recently been pluralized to reflect the emphasis upon difference and singularity within movement spaces and discourse – see Sen, J., Saini, M. & Kumar, M. *Other Worlds Are Possible* (New Delhi: Viveka, 2005).
5. See www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/ accessed 7 February 2006.
6. See www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/index.php accessed 25 March 2006.
7. See Notes From Nowhere (Eds) *We Are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise of Global Anticapitalism* (London: Verso, 2003).
8. Taylor, P. 'A New Power in the Streets', *New York Times*, 17 February 2003.
9. Sheldon Wolin coined this term. See Wolin, S. 'Inverted Totalitarianism', *The Nation*, 1 May 2003.
10. See Chesters, G. & Welsh, I. *Complexity and Social Movements: Multitudes at the Edge of Chaos* (London: Routledge, 2006). See also: Urry, J. *Global Complexity* (Cambridge: Polity, 2003).
11. Delanda, M. *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy* (London: Continuum, 2002).
12. Protevi, J. *Political Physics* (London: Athlone Press, 2001).
13. Urry, J. *Global Complexity,* op. cit.
14. In this I follow Bogue. See Bogue, R. *Deleuze's Wake: Tributes and Tributaries* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2004), p. 1.
15. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (French: 1980) Trans. B. Massumi (London: Athlone, 1987).
16. Ibid.
17. See, for example, Chesters, G. 'Global Civil Society and Global Complexity', *Voluntas*, 15(4)(2004), pp. 323–342; and Chesters, G. & Welsh, I. *Complexity and Social Movements*, op. cit.
18. The local is conceived here as the immediate context of one's everyday life, which is defined by repetition of dwelling or movement through a delimited set of spaces, whilst the global is conceived of as encompassing a planetary aspect or effect. Invariably each interpolates and is co-constructive of the other.
19. Wark, M. *Hacker Manifesto* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).
20. Osterweil, M. 'A Cultural-Political Approach to Reinventing the Political', *International Social Science Journal*, 56(182)(2004), pp. 495–506.
21. Notes From Nowhere (Eds) *We Are Everywhere*, op. cit.
22. This is also described in McDonald, K. *Global Movements: Action and Culture* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006).

23. Rhythms of Resistance is the name of a international collective of musicians and dancers that play during anti-capitalist protests – see www.rhythmsofresistance.co.uk, accessed 1 August 2006. The outcome of such rhythmic interventions is to introduce an affective and ambiguous dimension to the space of protest, which marks the becoming-Carnivalesque of that space. The use of musical terms – 'ritornellos', 'refrains' etc. as a means of illustrating the complex and dynamical interplay between action, agency, affect and sensation which is prominent in Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition* (French: 1968) Trans. P. Patton (London: Athlone, 1994); and Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit. See also: Buchanan, I. & Swiboda, M. *Deleuze and Music* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004).
24. Similar criticisms are made in McDonald, K. 'From Solidarity to Fluidarity: Social movements beyond "collective identity" – the case of globalization conflicts', *Social Movement Studies,* 1(2)(2002), pp. 109–128.
25. Melucci, A. *Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
26. Tormey, S. *Anti-capitalism: A Beginner's Guide* (Oxford: One World Press, 2004).
27. See Fisher, W.F. & Ponniah, T. (Eds) *Another World Is Possible,* op. cit. See also: Sen, J., Anand, A., Escobar, A. & Waterman, P. (Eds) *The World Social Forum: Challenging Empires* (New Delhi: Viveka Foundation, 2004); and Sen, J., Saini, M. & Kumar, M. *Other Worlds Are Possible*, op. cit.
28. Porto Alegre is a stronghold of the Brazilian Worker's Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores) which achieved renown through its implementation of participatory community budgeting.
29. See Chesters, G. 'Shapeshifting: Civil Society, Complexity and Social Movements', *Anarchist Studies*, 11(1)(2003), pp. 42–65. See also: Chesters, G. & Welsh, I. *Complexity and Social Movements*, op. cit.
30. Bateson, G. *Steps to an Ecology of Mind* (London: Paladin, 1973).
31. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 22.
32. The concept of a digital commons is closely associated with the 'free software' movement, however it is used here in a broader sense to include the patterns of information/knowledge exchange within activist milieu that are mediated by digital technologies.
33. See Chesters, G. & Welsh I. 'Rebel Colors: "Framing" in Global Social Movement', *Sociological Review*, 52(3)(2004), pp. 314–335.
34. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., p. 22.
35. Hardt, M. & Negri, A. 'Foreword', in Fisher, W.F. & Ponniah, T. (Eds) *Another World Is Possible*, op. cit., p. xvi.
36. Granovetter, M. 'The Strength of Weak Ties', *American Journal of Sociology,* 78(6)(1973), pp. 1360–1380.
37. See Barabasi, A-L. *Linked: The New Science of Networks* (Cambridge: Perseus, 2002); and Buchanan, M. *Small World. Uncovering Nature's Hidden Networks* (London: Wedenfeld Nicholson, 2002).
38. This is a description proffered to the author by a Dutch activist from People's Global Action, an international networking tool/forum of the alter-globalization movement(s).
39. See www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/ accessed 25 March 2006.

40. Such as the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) in Brazil, Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR) in France, Rifondazione Communista in Italy and the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) in Britain.
41. Wittel, A. 'Towards a network sociality', *Theory, Culture and Society*, 18(2001), pp. 31–50.
42. This term is derived from the work of the Italian autonomist Paolo Virno, see for example Virno, P. 'Virtuosity and Revolution', *Make Worlds* (2004) Accessed 25 March 2006 from: http://www.makeworlds.org/node/view/34 and Virno, P. *A Grammar of the Multitude* (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004).
43. See Notes From Nowhere (Eds) *We Are Everywhere*, op. cit., pp. 352–373.
44. The public relations use of this strategy is evidenced by the US suggestion that the anti-debt campaigner and rock star Bono be made Head of the World Bank (see Borger, J. 'Bono's Next No 1 Might be at World Bank', *The Guardian*, 7 March 2005) which appears to have been part of a PR 'spin' to pre-empt/distract from the appointment of a key US neo-conservative – Paul Wolfowitz – to this post.
45. Originally used by Marx, this term has gained currency through its use by other social philosophers/commentators, for example, see Eco, U. *Faith in Fakes* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1986), English edition, p. 249.
46. 'Virtual singularities' are implicit forms or potentialities. For a full explanation see Protevi, J. *Political Physics*, op. cit., pp. 6–10.
47. See Castells, M. *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996); Hardt, M. & Negri, A. *Empire* (London: Harvard University Press, 2000); Melucci, A. *Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Urry, J. *Sociology Beyond Societies* (London: Routledge, 2000).
48. Lash, S. & Urry, J. *Economies of Signs and Space* (London: Sage Publications, 1994).
49. Hardt, M. & Negri, A. *Empire*, op. cit., p. 290.
50. Ibid.
51. Klein, N. *No Logo* (London: Flamingo, 2000).
52. Hardt, M. & Negri, A. *Empire*, op. cit., p. 313.
53. See Bogue, R. *Deleuze's Wake*, op. cit., pp. 9–26; and Deleuze, G. & Parnet, C. *Dialogues* (French: 1977) Trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam (London: Athlone, 1987), pp. 127–128.
54. Diani, M. & McAdam, D. (Eds) *Social Movement Analysis: The Network Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
55. See Appadurai, A. 'Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy', *Public Culture*, 2(2)(1990) pp. 1–23; Castells, M. *The Information Age*, op. cit.; and Urry, J. *Sociology Beyond Societies*, op. cit.
56. Hardt, M. 'Today's Bandung?', *New Left Review*, 14(2002) p. 118.
57. A machinic phylum is 'the set of self-ordering material processes inherent in material and enabling emergent effects'. See Bonta, M. & Protevi, J. *Deleuze & Geophilosophy* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), pp. 108–109; and Delanda, M. 'Nonorganic Life', in Crary, J. & Kwinter, S. (Eds) *Zone 6: Incorporations* (New York: Urzone, 1992), pp. 129–167.
58. Protevi, J. *Political Physics*, op. cit., p. 3.
59. Protevi, J. *Political Physics*, op. cit.; and Bonta, M. & Protevi, J. *Deleuze & Geophilosophy*, op. cit.

60. Bonta, M. & Protevi, J. *Deleuze & Geophilosophy*, op. cit., p. 35.
61. Eve, R., Horsfall, S. & Lee, M. *Chaos, Complexity, and Sociology: Myths, Models, and Theories* (London: Sage Publications, 1997), p. xv.
62. 'Becoming minor' is the process of following a course of thought, action or behavior that is subversive to the dominant norm. Minor is not to be confused with minority, it is a qualitative rather than quantitative concept.
63. Bogue, R. *Deleuze's Wake*, op. cit.
64. Ibid., p. 54.
65. See Foucault, M. *Birth of the Clinic* (London: Tavistock, 1975); Foucault, M. *Discipline and Punish* (London: Penguin, 1977); and Foucault, M. *The History of Sexuality* (London: Penguin, 1979).
66. Deleuze, G. *Negotiations*, op. cit.
67. Guattari, F. *The Three Ecologies* (London: Athlone Press, 2000), p. 47.
68. Hardt, M. & Negri, A. *Empire*, op. cit.
69. Bogue, R. *Deleuze's Wake*, op. cit., p. 53.
70. Massumi, B. *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), p. 255.
71. Ibid.
72. Jordan, J. 'The Art of Necessity: The Subversive Imagination of Anti-Road Protest and Reclaim the Streets', in McKay, G. (Ed.) *DIY Culture: Parties and Protest in Nineties Britain* (London: Verso, 1998).
73. See Notes From Nowhere (Eds) *We Are Everywhere*, op. cit., pp. 173–183.
74. See Bruce, I. (Ed.) *The Porto Alegre Alternative: Direct Democracy in Action* (London: Pluto, 2004).
75. Deleuze, G. & Parnet, C. *Dialogues*, op. cit., p. 136.

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